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 Introduction 
 
This research is about the impact of states’ financial size on their choices in the field of 
monetary and exchange rate policy. The main argument of the thesis is that small 
countries, under certain conditions, can be counterintuitively more autonomous in 
these policy dimensions than middle-sized states. This conclusion, and its corollaries, 
proceed from the unsatisfactory explanation given by the present literature, in both 
economics and political science, to the policy outcomes observed in small states, and 
results from an original application of the Collective Choice Theory to strategic 
interactions within asymmetrical monetary systems. A model is designed to depict an 
international payment system led by a leader country with significant balance-of-
payment problems, surrounded by minor states characterised by a persistent record of 
current account surplus. The model investigates the impact of financial size on the 
bargaining among small and medium-sized states for the preservation of policy 
autonomy vis à vis an interdependent economic environment. States are supposed to 
select one of two alternatives between following the leader’s policies, so as to support 
the stability of the system, or remaining neutral, so as to pursue domestic-oriented 
goals. The results, both on the theoretical and the empirical side, show that small surplus 
countries, under the assumptions of the model, are averagely more autonomous than 
middle powers, that is, less prone to take on responsibility for the smooth functioning 
of an international payment system. In turn, this makes traditional theories incomplete 
in the explanation of monetary followership in small countries, while the present model 
explains this phenomenon through the action of neighbouring middle powers in 
providing selective incentives.  
 Besides the specific contribution of International Political Economy (IPE), the issue 
of states’ size and its impact on international politics has been widely addressed by both 
economics and International Relations. On the one hand, early studies on alliance 
formation have since the beginning investigated the peculiar incentives and constraints 
of small states in the choice over different alliance strategies such as balancing, 
bandwagoning and neutrality vis à vis major powers. Similarly, another strand of 
literature looks at the effect of dimension over policy outcomes considering size as a 
proxy for a state’s relative capacity for influence. This rational-choice approach, derived 
 from Collective Choice Theory, has contributed since the 1960’s to improve our 
interpretation of state-to-state negotiations within military alliances showing an 
unsuspected bargaining advantage in favour of small states, summarised in the well-
known «small-exploit-the-large» statement common to its major works. Within 
asymmetric alliance arrangements, small states can actually escape their contribution in 
terms of military spending thanks to the insignificance of their contribution for the 
overall balance of power.  
On the other hand, economic theory offers a completely different perspective, 
as the role of dimensional constraints is at the base of open macroeconomics through 
the divide between price-makers and price-takers. The former indicates a large market 
whose trade or financial flows are able to modify international prices and other 
significant variables simply by changing their volume and direction. The latter defines a 
small market acting under the exogenous constraint of princes taken as immutable and 
decided by international markets. In studying the effect of domestic-market size on 
trade policy, currency movements and vulnerability to external shocks, international 
economists have always remarked that what may be profitable for larger price-makers, 
such as applying an optimal trade tariff or manoeuvring on exchange rates to gain 
competitiveness, can be bad or at best useless for small price-takers, where restrictions 
to trade and financial interdependence are more likely to backfire through raising 
princes and increasing unemployment. Contrary to IR studies, economic theories have 
assumed a rather pessimistic stance, where being a price-taker has practically no 
advantages in international economic relations, and turns small states into passive 
receivers of policies and decisions made by major foreign actors, whether good or bad 
for the local economy. 
In this context of ambiguous and contradictory predictions, the IPE literature, 
particularly in the subfield of international monetary relations, has frequently 
reproduced the different conclusions of either economics or International Relations. On 
the one hand, early theories on the functioning of the international monetary system, 
focusing on the impact of systemic-structural variables and the interactions between 
great powers and followers, have taken the size-optimist stance of security studies. The 
most famous example is Charles Kindleberger’s Hegemonic Stability Theory, suggesting 
that dominant states provide unilaterally the instruments for the stability of an 
 international financial system, while in periods of economic distress smaller states 
would indiscriminately free-ride through beggar-thy-neighbour policies. On the other 
hand, econometric studies on large panels, focusing on domestic variables and cross-
country variance, found on the contrary that small economies renounce to exchange-
rate flexibility and policy autonomy more often than large developed states, promoting 
instead a size-pessimist interpretation borrowed from international macroeconomics. 
Similarly, ‘coercive’ hegemonic theories, from the contribution of Robert Gilpin to the 
recent ‘passive leadership’ approach to asymmetric monetary systems, have stressed 
the bargaining weakness of minor states against major powers and its negative 
consequences on their policy-making autonomy. 
Overall, both approaches suffer from two evident and significant shortages. The 
first is to make no efforts to reconcile the contrasting views of size-pessimism and size-
optimism. Even though scholars have collected evidence in one sense and the other, it 
is still unclear under which conditions ‘smallness’ can be an advantage or a 
disadvantage. The second is to ignore the different position of middle-sized states within 
the group of minor countries, and especially, the interactions between middle and small 
powers as potential co-determinant of policy choices besides the univocal relation with 
the dominant great power. The purpose of this research is to fill these gaps shading new 
light on the effect of states’ size (that is, being small or middle states) in the struggle to 
preserve autonomy against the cage of financial interdependence and the pressure of 
great powers. My argument is that neither size-optimism nor size-pessimism should be 
given for granted when approaching the issue of monetary relations. Rather, a country’s 
external financial position vis à vis the world economy  ̶  namely, whether it is a net 
debtor or a net creditor  ̶  leans the condition of minor states towards one of the two 
archetypical models. While deficit or debtor economies tend to reproduce the 
expectations of the macroeconomics literature, with small states disadvantaged by the 
insignificant size of their financial markets, the situation is reversed for countries with a 
structural current account surplus, whose situation strikes as better depicted by the 
small-size advantage suggested by Collective Choice Theory. Given the lesser attention 
received so far by these countries, the thesis deals precisely with strategic relations in 
the group of surplus states.  
 Obviously, such a clear-cut definition of the relevant actors can create problems 
and inconsistencies concerning the thresholds and indicators used for their 
identification. On the one hand, the divide between surplus and deficit countries refers 
to the solvency position of a country vis à vis international financial markets. However, 
the one-year trend of the current account is hardly a sufficient indicator of this 
condition, and solely a persistent or prolonged accumulation of imbalances will be 
considered to make a country solvable or potentially insolvable on international 
markets. In turn, this opens another discussion on how long the trend on the current 
account should be for causing significant effects on a country’s external position. For 
simplicity, I assume that after some years of structural current account surpluses or 
deficits all economies start experiencing significant market pressures to adjust, as 
testified by numerous studies on cross-border financial crisis and macroeconomic 
imbalances. Nonetheless, I disregard any attempt to provide a precise quantification of 
this period. Accordingly, I suppose that other things being equal surplus states show a 
long-term upward pressure on the local currency, and vice versa for deficit states.  
On the other hand, also the dichotomy between small and medium-sized powers 
can be traced along several dividing lines. Prima face, the international politics of money 
and exchange rates may seem a field where looking at the effect of states’ size on policy 
outcomes is somewhat puzzling. In the contemporary world economy, small states like 
Singapore, Sweden or Norway can look at themselves as relevant powers in the financial 
field despite lagging far behind major states in terms of population and ruling over a 
comparably small territory. However, the fact that size in terms of population or 
landmass may not coincide, sometimes, with a country’s dimension in the financial 
system means simply that the concept must be rearranged to fit the environment of 
monetary politics. In this domain, the relevant dimension to assess countries’ influence 
on the system is indeed their capacity to be price-makers, that is, to effect with their 
decisions the prices of financial assets or liabilities held by foreign economic actors, 
included currencies and exchange rates. As before, I observe that most of the countries 
actually calibrate their moves taking into account the fact of being influential on 
uninfluential on systemic variables, and I conclude that assuming such a clear-cut 
distinction is perfectly consistent with the exigencies of a theoretical modelization. 
 The model of strategic interactions among minor states develops around a series 
of assumptions that are carefully justified in following chapters. The base assumption is 
the maximisation of policy-making autonomy, especially as regards macroeconomic 
decisions, as a primary objective of all states in the politics of the monetary system, 
included small and middle powers. The conflict on this basic good arises from the 
fundamental contradiction between economic interdependence and autonomy 
highlighted by the well-known Mundell-Framing trilemma of open economies. I suppose 
that states prefer to create wealth through economic openness and then conflicting 
over the management of the inevitable systemic imbalances, assuming in the model a 
moderate or high degree of capital and trade mobility across countries. The third 
assumption is the focus on the functioning of an asymmetrical monetary system, that is, 
a system characterised by the presence of a great power in the role of monetary leader 
and two or more minor states playing as either neutral or followers.  
Notably, monetary followership in minor states entails the surrender of a 
country’s national policy-making autonomy, included the freedom of manoeuvring the 
exchange rate, in order to manage the system’s macroeconomic imbalances. In such 
context, I assume the main imbalance to be the leader’s chronical currency overhang on 
international markets  ̶  caused by either a persistent current account deficit or the 
mechanism known as Triffin Dilemma  ̶  which threatens an excessive depreciation of 
the core-currency and the consequent collapse of the whole arrangement, although the 
leader is not necessarily the issuer of a global key currency. In this context, contrary to 
previous theoretical models, I consider the conflict on policy autonomy to take place at 
two levels. In the first, a great power deploys its bargaining weapons, included 
ideological and impalpable inducements, to drive as many minor states as possible into 
its sphere of monetary influence. In the second, small and middle powers, against the 
implicit or explicit pressure of the would-be leader, face a collective choice dilemma 
among themselves given by the crossing preferences between remaining autonomous 
or supporting through monetary followership a monetary arrangement revolving 
around a regional or external great power, in which they have presumably an interest. 
The public good in this specific bargaining is the stability of the core-currency 
(i.e. the leader’s money), on which both small and middle-sized states can be assumed 
to be interested although willing to pay the lowest possible price for it. The nature of 
 this interaction makes possible to develop an analogy with the debate on the ‘burden 
sharing’ in military alliances. Indeed, in that framework scholars have already faced both 
problems analysed here: the free-riding of small states and the puzzling compliance of 
these actors despite strong incentives to defect. Consistently, monetary followership 
represents the effort to produce currency stability as well as a military build-up 
contributes to conventional deterrence in alliance theory. Conversely, monetary neutral 
states ‘consume’ the smooth functioning of the international payment system while not 
paying the prince of followership, as well as allied, but defective countries, ‘consume’ 
deterrence without paying the price of a higher military spending. The result of the 
modelization is two-fold. On the one hand, small surplus states (here called ‘small 
holders’) show a greater tendency to free-ride than middle-sized surplus states (here 
called ‘major holders’), which are considered as Olson’s privileged group or, collectively, 
as Schelling’s k-group. On the other hand, small states are more likely to follow, 
notwithstanding baseline disincentives, when major holders are present and willing to 
intervene in their regional area.  
The findings of this research shed new light on the motives driving states’ choices 
in the conflict for macroeconomic adjustments in asymmetric systems. The implications 
of this model encompass a great variety of present and historical situations of primary 
importance for both economic and security relations. Just to mention a few, the politics 
of the so-called Dollar Standard after the demise of Bretton Woods is based on the 
relation between the US and a handful of major holders, each playing their own parallel 
game on a regional scale populated by small surplus states. The politics of the Sterling 
Area following the weakening of the British coinage after World War II is a combination 
of precarious followership by a few major actors and the continuous defections of small 
states. Likewise, relations in the German-centred clearing union, which dominated 
international economic relations in the 1930’s in eastern and central Europe, is readable 
through the lens of this model. In all these cases, the focus on the major/small holder 
divide and its proposed explanation for monetary followership in surplus countries is 
able to account for a significant unexplained variance in the past and present functioning 
of interstate monetary systems.  
 
 
 The thesis is divided into six chapters. In the first, I give a general overview of how the 
condition of small and middle powers have been discussed in economics, political 
economy and security studies. I then evaluate how the hierarchical distinction employed 
in other fields to classify states’ size can be rearranged to depict the hierarchy of a 
monetary system and I outline the tenets of my research proposal. In the second 
chapter, I justify the core assumptions of the model through a cogent review of the 
scholarly reflection on the relation between power, wealth and money in international 
politics. The discussion is mainly conducted within the realist paradigm, emphasising 
inter alia the different perspectives adopted by realism in International Relations and 
International Political Economy on this topic. In the last sections, I provide a technical 
account of how states interact in the monetary arena, justifying the choice to focus on 
monetary policy coordination rather than fiscal policy.  
The third chapter identifies the binary dependent variable of the model 
(follower/neutral) discussing the anatomy of monetary leadership, neutrality and 
followership in past and present instances of asymmetrical monetary systems. In the 
case of surplus countries, followership implies the management of official reserves or 
interest rates in a way to ‘prop up’ the core-currency, and some extent of stabilisation 
of the exchange rate. A neutral position, on the contrary, is characterised by an inward-
oriented monetary policy, a risk-averse diversification of foreign assets and a 
management of exchange rates coherent with domestic policy objectives. 
In the fourth chapter, I provide a wide and cogent review of the factors 
emphasised by the existing literature to explain how minor countries choose between 
monetary followership and neutrality. In particular, after a general overview of current 
theories, I focus on the few hypotheses dealing with the case of surplus economies. 
Trade dependency, military dependency and financial dependency are the three 
elements analysed with significant examples and case-studies to stress their strengths 
and weaknesses in explaining monetary followership.  
Subsequently, in the fifth chapter I develop the model to investigate the 
behaviour of small countries and the possible interactions with intermediate powers. 
Through a discursive theoretical elaboration and a simple game-theoretical 
representation of strategic interactions, I demonstrate, first, that small holders do enjoy 
a greater room for neutral strategies than major holders and second, that the deviation 
 of small holders from this general pattern is more likely to be result of a major holders’ 
action than of a leader’s attempt to influence.  
Finally, chapter six tests the two hypothesis on an innovative case study 
presenting ideal characteristics to detect the role played by the two key variables of the 
model.  The analysis performs a qualitative comparison of the monetary and currency 
policy of the six countries members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (Bahrain, Kuwait, 
Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates), especially during the troubled 
years of the 2008 subprime mortgage crisis. Their similar characteristics in terms of 
political and economic structures, the strong military relations with the Unites States 
and the common external position as net international creditors make this regional 
context the ideal place to detect the major/small holder interactions at work without 
further causal interferences. Eventually, both hypotheses derived from the model turn 
out consistent with data, facts and documental evidence provided in the case study.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 CHAPTER I 
Small and Middle Powers in the International Monetary System. A Critical 
Assessment of the Literature 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 
 
1.1  Challenges and opportunities of ‘smallness’ in International Relations 
The study of small countries, and of their troubled relationship with the international 
system, has developed within International Relations as early as the 1960’s. In those 
times, the interest of scholars was triggered by the emersion of numerous weak states 
as a consequence of the de-colonization process, as well as by the curiosity for the way 
some historical subjects of the European international system, such as Sweden, 
Switzerland or Austria, were dealing with the unprecedented bipolar structure of 
international politics.  It is not a coincidence that for at least two decades the issue of 
small states in IR was largely related to that of alliance politics, and particularly to 
question of the viability and effectiveness of neutrality as a long-term strategy for small 
actors (Baker Fox 1959; Keohane 1969, 1971; Rothstein 1968; Vital 1967). Successively, 
other issue-areas such as economy, inter-governmental organizations and the 
international rule-making have been analysed with a special attention for the 
featherweights of the interstate system. From the perspective of economics and 
political economy, the study of small countries has often focused on the paradox 
between the extraordinary living standard reached by some of the smallest states in the 
world (suffice mentioning cases like Singapore, Qatar or the Cayman Islands) and the 
rhetoric on the weakness and vulnerability of these actors that often characterises past 
works on his topic (Bishop 2012; A. F. Cooper and Shaw 2009; Handel 1981; Keating and 
Harvey 2013; Prasad 2009). 
 The issue of the inherent vulnerabilities of small states is so pervasive in the 
literature to put in the background even the definition of these actors, which usually 
occupies a large space in social science debates. Among the few attempts in this respect, 
at least three main approaches can be identified: the elaboration of quantitative 
thresholds, the so-called behavioural criterion, and the impact of state actors on the 
whole system. In the first strand, authors opted for a combination of multiple 
quantitative indicators, classifying as ‘small state’ all countries behind a specified 
population threshold  ̶  which may arrive at 20-30 million inhabitants  ̶  and below a 
certain per-capita income threshold (Handel 1981; Neumann and Gstöhl 2006; Vital 
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1967). The second group of definitions, instead, identifies small powers1 with their 
recurrent behaviours in the conduction of foreign policy. According to Neumann and 
Gstöhl (2006), small powers would be more prone to promote the development of 
supranational institutions as a fundamental counterweight to crude power imbalances 
against the system’s larger actors. Vidal (1967) and Rothstein (1968) suggest that the 
self-perception of political elites must be a prime indicator of ‘smallness’ or ‘greatness’ 
in the international power hierarchy. Lastly, a third way to define not just small 
countries, but the entire power hierarchy of an international system, is the influence-
based definition proposed by Keohane (1971).  In his four-level hierarchy, this author 
classifies states as: a) system determining, when they are able to modify directly the 
polarity, the institutions and other foundational characteristics of an interstate system; 
b) system influencing, when they cannot have a constitutive role in the system, but are 
able to change some of its key features even acting in isolation; c) system affecting, 
when possessing sufficient resources to be somehow useful or indispensable to the 
system’s major actors (for example, raw materials producers), but without the same 
strength as system influencing countries to modify important systemic variables; d) 
system inaffecting, these are the small and micro-states limiting themselves to ratify 
changes and choices imposed from outside. 
 The theoretical discussion has been wider and deeper about the role and 
regularities of the foreign policy of small states in the international system. In an article 
for a recent collective volume, Baldacchino (2009) summarised the terms of the debate 
in a single question: «Thucydides or Kissinger?». To these two authors he links two 
opposing views of what portrays the action of small states in the international arena. 
For the first, who is particularly inspired by the famed episode of the Massacre of Melos, 
smalls states would have no destiny but to be, sooner or later, absorbed or subordinated 
to major states. Vulnerability is the most frequent word in the ‘Thucydidian’ writings on 
small states, in which the patent technological, productive and dimensional inferiority 
of these actors results too attractive for great powers, ready to exploit this intrinsic 
weakness to eliminate, explicitly or implicitly, the sovereignty of their weaker 
                                                          
1 Same authors (Handel 1981) have contested that the term ‘small power’ is an oxymoron, and thus should 
not be used in this debate. In this research, this doubt is not considered, and terms power, state and actor 
will be used interchangeably. 
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neighbours. The general expectation of this scenario is that the life of small powers, if 
not short and prematurely interrupted, be characterised by frequent interferences in 
their domestic politics, and continuous attempts of coercion or annexation by great 
powers (A. F. Cooper and Shaw 2009). This attitude, that someone has insightfully 
defined ‘size-pessimism’ (Handel 1981), is found in the opening sections of almost every 
work on the issue, as authors enlist the most-known factors of vulnerability affecting 
these actors in the military field or the global economic competition: absence of 
strategic depth, land-lockedness or isolation, scarce return on capital investments, 
absence of strategic resources, diseconomies of scale and so on (A. F. Cooper and Shaw 
2009; Handel 1981; Keating and Harvey 2013; Prasad 2009).  
The size pessimism of classical realism is anyhow largely balanced, in the 
literature on small states, by the ‘Kissinger side’ of the debate. In his ‘Years of Upheal’ 
of 1982, indeed, the former US Secretary of State coined the expression ‘tyranny of the 
weak’ to stress how often, in the history of international relations, small states actually 
succeeded in surviving and prospering in spite of their apparent weakness. If anything, 
Kissinger suggests, they have well performed precisely because of their weakness, being 
able to affect the decision of greater powers or at least to extort them privileges and 
compensations. The «“exploitation” of the great by the small» (Olson 1965) has been a 
longstanding argument of collective choice theories, and the idea that the systemic 
irrelevance of small actors may also grant them more room for neutral and autonomous 
policies has been extensively discussed, inter alia, in seminal contributions from the 
theory of alliances (Baker Fox 1959; Olson and Zeckhauser 1966; Rothstein 1968). The 
leitmotiv of most part of the literature devoted to these actors is indeed related 
precisely to this puzzling paradox in the performances of the most vulnerable states of 
the international system. Beside the few actors that actually realised the gloomy 
expectations of size-pessimist theories  ̶  like pre-colonial states in Asia and Africa, pre-
unification German states, central-American states under the constant interference of 
the United States and so on   ̶   a large group of countries has well performed in the 
economic and diplomatic field , getting to preserve important spaces of external and 
domestic autonomy despite the initially disadvantageous conditions.   
The fil rouge of most of the ‘size-optimist’ literature has been precisely the 
capacity of weak states «to exploit their smaller size in a variety of ways to achieve their 
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intended, and […] unintended outcomes» (Baldacchino 2009). The ‘equalising’ elements 
that allow the most likely losers of international politics to get much more than their 
condition would realistically predict have been detected in at least two general factors. 
The first is the control of some exclusive resources that can be used to ‘blackmail’ an 
allied great power and obtain from it a less asymmetrical relationship than the crude 
power relations would have guaranteed. It is omnipresent, for example, the exploitation 
of a geographically favourable position as a bargaining chip, subordinating its use by 
major allies to a set of politico-economic concessions that could not have been obtained 
otherwise. This is the case, amongst many others, of the so-called ‘maverick diplomacy’, 
through which the Maltese prime minister Mintoff succeeded in his negotiations with 
London in 1971-72. In that instance, he obtained from the Britons a three-hundred 
percent increase in official aids just by credibly threatening to expel the British personnel 
from their strategic outpost on the island.  
  The second balancing element of the situation of small states is their geographical 
distance or strategic insignificance from the epicentre of a conflict or crisis involving 
great powers. Baker Fox (1959) analyses the cases of Sweden and Switzerland during 
the Second world War, identifying precisely in this element the main cause of success of 
their neutral stance during the conflict, despite a general political background decisively 
unfavourable. Likewise, Prasad (2009) and Hey (2003) account for similar episodes 
exalting the ability of weaker states to exploit «the importance of being unimportant». 
In conclusion, what this longstanding reflection suggest is that small states may 
undertake at least two general strategies to cope with their outsized neighbours in world 
politics. On the one hand, small states should make themselves indispensable to major 
powers, carving out an economic, political and military niche from which to extract a 
positional rent. On the other hand, they could become irrelevant and invisible, so that 
the gap between the expected gain from a small country’s followership and the 
expected costs to coerce, induce or convince minor actors to have a stake in the great 
game of international politics results too large for the great power2.  
                                                          
2 Truly, there exists a third possibility highlighted by the literature, which is the old-fashioned practice of 
exploiting the rivalry of two great powers to offer one’s collaboration to the best offering. However, this 
should be considered as a tactics, more than a strategy, because this possibility allows minor states to 
take advantage of great power rivalry both when their objective is to maintain neutrality vis à vis the two 
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1.2  Small states in the international economic system   
The study of economic policy in small powers, and specifically of the survival strategies 
of smaller countries in a strongly competitive context, is probably the issue areas that 
posed the greatest challenge to the dominance of security studies in past decades. Like 
in other works, the theoretical reflection on the economic sphere focuses first on 
identifying the persistent disadvantages of small states in the international economic 
arena. Successively, also in this filed scholars have noted the evident gap between 
economic expectations on the performances of small states and the greatly 
differentiated performances of these actors. For example, endogenous growth theories 
stress the role of the size of the population, labour and capital productivity, and the 
numbers of employees in research and development sectors on which small actors are 
by definition disadvantaged. Yet, within this category one can find some of the richest 
countries in the world as well as many among the most underdeveloped economies.  
 The list of the weakness factors of small powers in international markets, and of 
the special exigencies of their economic development is long and complex. Nonetheless, 
the greater vulnerability of small actors to balance-of-payment problems is an 
undoubtable trait d’union among different economic sectors and structural 
shortcomings. Among the characteristics impeding the catching-up of small states in 
terms of per-capita income, a large part is related to the obstacles posed by the balance-
of-payment constraint concerning the equilibrium between inflows and outflows of 
goods, services and capitals. On the one hand, small states experience, at the same time, 
a greater demand for imports for the scarce domestic productive diversification, and 
greater difficulties in exporting their products due to the high costs of sea trade, the 
possible absence of access to the sea and the trade barriers erected by their larger 
neighbours. On the other hand, small states suffer from greater diseconomies on private 
and public capital investment, or in other words, they cannot exploit a large domestic 
                                                          
parties and when they aim at mitigating the asymmetry of privileges and prerogatives within an existing 
symbiotic relation. 
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market to generate enough aggregate demand to remunerate capital investments, 
while the access to foreign demand may be precluded by previously mentioned factors. 
In turn, the low average yield of investments, the sarce depth of local financial markets 
and the greater vulnerability to natural disasters discourage the integration of these 
countries with international financial markets, preventing, inter alia, the possibility to 
compensate on the financial account the tendency to chronic deficits experienced on 
the current account (A. F. Cooper and Shaw 2009; IMF 2013). 
 The consequences of this condition on economic policy, and particularly on the 
management of interest rates and exchange rates show a prevalence of fixed exchange 
rates, mainly hard pegs or strongly-stabilised managed floating regimes. The material 
exigencies of local populations, in economic systems limited by dimensional and 
productive constraints, bring on average to a high ratio  between national income and 
imports, while diseconomies of the public sector and the necessity to borrow in foreign 
currency contribute to an averagely higher public debt if compared with developed large 
countries (IMF 2013). The dependency on imports, the scarce currency flexibility, the 
high sovereign debt and the problematic access to international markets for goods and 
capitals are the causes of the chronic problems with external accounts in small states   ̶ 
statistically connoted by frequent current account deficits, low level of foreign-exchange 
reserves, high indebtedness rate and higher interest rates (Handel 1981; Neumann and 
Gstöhl 2006).  
 
 
1.3 ‘Size-optimism’ in international economy. Explaining the economic successes 
of small states  
Despite the apparent disadvantage of small economies when taking part to international 
economic flows, also in this filed, like in security studies, decision makers in small states 
have historically pursued several strategies to turn their weaknesses into strength. 
Among the fifteen countries with the world’s highest per-capita income, just three have 
more than ten million inhabitants, and no one is above two millions among the top five. 
With regard to the net foreign asset position, among the twenty countries that are net 
creditors vis à vis the rest of the world, at least half are small states with scarce 
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demographic, land and military resources. These stylised facts suggest that the usual list 
of disadvantages, common to all actors, do not exhaust the overview of capabilities 
affecting the hierarchical position of a state and its likelihood of success in the 
international economy.  
 Generally, any ‘survival strategy’ of small actors within the context of open and 
competitive international markets is based on the alternative between specialisation 
and diversification. In the actual economic policies of small states have been identified 
so far five ways of specialisation. Firstly, Bishop (2012) posits that the states’ capacity to 
resilience to externally-generated economic shocks increases with the level of 
technological advancement, favouring those countries that have been able to carve out 
a niche in highly-specific and high-value-added domains of the international economy. 
The second practice of productive specialisation, which has become extremely common 
in the world of microstates, is the so-called creative agency or commercialisation of 
sovereignty. This encompasses the sale to private or public foreign agents of the 
country’s air routes, internet domains, satellite orbits and of the flag on international 
cargo ships. Thirdly, another well-known specialisation strategy is the transformation of 
a small isolated economy in an offshore financial centre or a tourist destination focused 
on a particular kind of clients. Fourth, a peculiar form of specialisation of small states is 
the search for official state-to-state and multilateral aids, which is often associated to 
the fifth form: the encouragement of remittances from national migrants living abroad 
(Prasad 2009). 
 As to diversification, it is the preferred strategies for those countries aiming to 
minimise the impact of economic external phenomena on their structural shortcomings 
(Handel 1981). It can be realised in several areas of economic exchange, including trade, 
finance and money. As far as commercial relations are concerned, states can avoid the 
dependency on a single producer or consumer in order to reduce their vulnerability to 
idiosyncratic supply shocks and reduce the risk of a possible political subordination to a 
single economic partner. Historically, there is no better example than the many 
instances of failed trade wars, embargoes and custom blockades to illustrate the efficacy 
of this strategy. One of the most known episodes in this sense is the so-called ‘Pigs War’ 
of 1906, through which the Austrian-Hungarian Empire intended to roll-back the Serbian 
expansionism in the Balkans and the Slavic territories of the empire.  The small kingdom 
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was imposed a full custom blockade both on outflows and inflows of goods, which 
represented respectively the 83% of Serbian exports and the 53% of Serbian imports, 
included important military procurements. However, the Austrian trade-based coercion 
went far from damaging the Serbian economy and inducing Belgrade’s strategists to 
reshape their ambitions. Rather, thanks to a rapid commercial diversification towards 
France, the United Kingdom and even Germany, Vienna’s attempt turned out 
astonishingly unsuccessful. Paradoxically, at the end of the ‘war’ in 1907 Serbia had 
increased and diversified further its overall trade volumes with the rest of Europe. 
Likewise, IMF studies on the financial and monetary diversification of small countries 
show that the adoption of flexible exchange rates is able to increase their resilience to 
external economic shocks, if not granting a complete isolation, at least reducing 
negative effects on the national income (IMF 2013).  
 In conclusion, both strategies aim at attracting the greatest possible inflow of 
foreign currency (whether it derives from the exchange of goods o an influx of capitals) 
in order to cover the country’s imports. In the case of specialisation, the purpose is to 
generate structural currency inflows from markets that are insensitive to price 
fluctuations and external shocks. The downside of this positioning, however, is the risk 
of become inflexible with respect to big demand and supply-side shifts in the main 
reference market. In the case of diversification, conversely, states accept a greater 
sensitivity to external macroeconomic shifts in exchange for a reduced vulnerability on 
idiosyncratic economic and political shocks. Overall, the dichotomy between 
specialisation and diversification overlaps with the already mentioned difference 
between followership (or symbiosis) and neutrality. On the one hand, small states can 
specialise in the production of a small set of goods or services or diversify in a multiplicity 
of products and sources of income. On the other hand, both strategies can be pursued 
within a general framework characterised by the focus on a single external market   ̶ 
which can be a source of imports, a destination for exports or a source of investment   ̶ 
or within an alternative situation where actors rely on multiple foreign markets for the 
same purposes. Obviously, all choices can be equally effective on a country’s economic 
development depending on its own structural characteristics and the opportunities 
offered by the international system. However, the four strategic combinations may have 
a very different impact on political and economic autonomy for small countries. 
9 
 
Intuitively, while a combination of productive specialisation and symbiosis with a single 
market makes a small economy extremely vulnerable to intended or unintended 
troubles in the reference market, the combination of productive diversification and 
multiple economic partners shields the small economy, at least in principle, from both 
economic shocks and the risk of political influence.  
 
 
1.4 Middle powers in International Relations: the system’s responsible 
stakeholders  
The middle power, or middle-sized state, is unquestionably the actor whose contours 
are most blurred in the hierarchy of an interstate system. As reminded by on the most 
prolific author on this topic, Carsten Holbraad (1984), when studying these actors 
researchers risk to be entrapped in a high-heterogeneity middle ground,  where 
gathering all actors that are neither too weak to be considered small states nor too 
strong to be seen as great powers. Among the few robust conclusions achieved by the 
theoretical reflection of middle-sized states, one of the most important is the fact that 
this category comprises at least three kinds of actors different for power, identity and 
role: a) once primary powers in a phase of irreversible decline; b) rising powers with a 
future in the highest layers of the international hierarchy; c) traditionally intermediate 
actors between major powers and the irrelevance of small states (Gilley 2011; Holbraad 
1984; Jordaan 2003).  
 Like the similar but wider literature on small countries, the label of middle power 
can be linked to three alternative criteria. The first is that of relative capabilities, 
measured in quantitative terms through a combination of economic development and 
demographic weight. Handel (Handel 1981) distinguishes middle powers through a 
combination of demographic size and per capita income. In general terms, he considers 
as such those countries having either a low income combined with a high demographic 
potential or a high per-capita income with below-the-mean geographical and population 
size. Neack (1993) realises a similar classification refined through the cluster analysis: 
population, per-capita military spending, per-capita GDP, literacy rate and infant 
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mortality are combined to produce different clusters of states among which she counts 
until forty middle powers (Valigi 2014).  
 The second criterion is the so-called ‘behavioural model’ (Chapnick 1999), where 
middle powers are identified through their recurrent behaviours and attitudes in the 
international arena. In particular, a middle power is defined as an actor 
«[demonstrating] a propensity to promote cohesion and stability in the world system» 
(Jordaan 2003). The same author remarks that middle-sized states would be more prone 
to conduct an interventionist policy beyond their regional narrow interests, most of 
times aimed at reducing conflict between great powers and strengthen the role of 
international organizations (Jordaan 2003; Lopes, Casarões, and Gama 2013). This 
behavioural evidence, actually recurrent in the foreign policy of intermediate actors, 
would be the main responsible for the common image of ‘responsible stakeholder’ of 
great powers, or the ‘good citizen’ of the international system, through which IR theory 
has looked at middle powers since its first reflections. Namely, a state which never 
threatens, and if anything promotes, the status quo in the economic, normative and 
politico-military field with the purpose of legitimising the existing international order 
(Gilley 2011; Jordaan 2003; Valigi 2014). Nevertheless, the choice of identifying the 
middle power with its actual behaviour on international politics presents a number of 
primary epistemological loopholes, tied in particular to the circular and tautological 
nature of this definition. In other words, the characteristic behaviours of intermediate 
actors  ̶  such as a legitimising, conservative and conflict-reducing attitude toward a 
given political or economic system   ̶  cannot be at the same time the main characteristics 
of the actor and the object of a theoretical investigation aimed at explaining their 
recurrence.  
 The third and last criterion identifying middle-sized actors in an international 
system is the one proposed by Keohane, based on the influence of state actors on major 
systemic variables. In the hierarchy elaborated by this author, the middle power is 
equated with the so called system-affecting state, which «is a state whose leaders 
consider that it cannot act effectively by itself, but may have a systemic impact in a small 
group or through an international institution» (Keohane 1969). However, this 
excessively narrow definition is reshaped and, to some extent, radicalised, by Holbraad 
(1984), for whom middle powers can be considered as ‘occasional great powers’, since 
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they are able to modify directly, even unilaterally, the system’s power equilibria and 
fundamental variables. However, they are still prevented from redesigning the polarity 
or the pivotal institutions of an international system, enjoying instead a sort of 
(potential) destructive power on the status quo thanks to their natural, economic or 
military resources. In this research, middle powers or middle-sized states will be 
discussed assuming as correct this last definition, which identifies these actors for their 
power on the ‘pars destruens’ of a political or economic system. Indeed, this approach 
satisfies the requisite of mutual exclusivity in the definition of social phenomena since 
the possibility to destroy and support a political or economic system is in the power of 
great power as well as of middle powers, but the second lacks the capabilities to 
construct the alignments, hierarchies and institutions of an international system. On the 
contrary, small powers would enjoy neither of the two prerogatives.  
 The second relevant question in the literature on middle powers is the explanation 
of the recurrent outcomes and behaviours characterising the foreign policy of these 
actors. According to Carlo Maria Santoro, in a famous study on Italian foreign policy, 
middle-sized powers are endowed with a peculiar combination of strength and 
weakness (Santoro 1991). This author considers intermediate actors as affected by a 
singular paradox: on paper, they are more powerful than small states, but do not get to 
translate that power into political influence or simply in autonomy for themselves 
against external pressures. If anything, middle-sized states have to pay this potential for 
influence with a much greater pressure on the part of great powers and relevant actors 
to sacrifice their own goals for the governance of the international system. Without the 
screen of a microscopic insignificant power, the intermediate actor can no longer rely 
on the disregard of major states for its alliance politics, for the development of its 
military force, for the direction of its financial and trade flows, and is more vulnerable 
to their pressure. Admittedly, there are particular systemic conditions where middle 
powers can gain some room for autonomy, but for the abovementioned reasons, these 
breathing space is averagely inferior to that at the disposal of small states.  
To conclude, instead of the strategic dilemma facing small states   ̶  between 
symbiosis/followership and irrelevance/neutrality   ̶ there seems to be no alternative for 
middle-sized powers than a reluctant yet reliable followership.  
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1.5  The hierarchy of power in the international monetary systems. Rethinking 
Cohen’s ‘Monetary Power’ 
The choices of small and middle-sized powers in monetary and currency affairs propose 
again the same dilemma addressed by these countries about productive and commercial 
issues: that between symbiosis and neutrality. Nonetheless, to understand political 
choices in these field is first necessary to grasp what defines the hierarchy of a monetary 
system, or in other words, which indicators classify countries as great, middle or small 
powers in this domain of international politics. In traditional IR analyses, especially 
within the realist paradigm, states are assumed either to maximise pure military power 
(Mearsheimer 2001), or to maximise security in a broader sense (Waltz 1979). 
Coherently, in both approaches power is measured in relation to these objectives, 
through a set of factors enhancing a state’s capacity to exploit its military capabilities 
for defensive or offensive purposes: demography, technology, manufacturing 
production, firepower, territorial size and many others. Likewise, to understand which 
dimensions affect the measurement of power, and thus determine the hierarchy, in 
monetary systems, it is sufficient applying the same criterion and assuming a realistic 
objective of state actors when interacting in this field of international politics. This 
overriding goal is assumed to be macroeconomic policy autonomy vis à vis the spillovers 
of financial and trade interdependence. Consequently, the traditional demographic, 
geographical and military variables would become less determinant, whereas the 
position of states in the monetary hierarchy would come to depend on two additional 
dimensions marking a state’s capacity to withstand against financial markets and to 
influence major economic variables within the relevant system. The first dimension is 
related to a country’s creditor or debtor position with the rest of the world economy, 
while the second dimension is measured through the ‘market power’ of an actor on 
fundamental systemic variables such as exchange rates, prices, interest rates and 
aggregate demand.  
 Benjamin Cohen is the author who most insisted on the link between power in the 
monetary system (or ‘monetary power’) and macroeconomic policy autonomy, which 
he conceive as both precondition for the exertion of influence and a primary good in 
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itself, being the key goal of economic statecraft in the international relations of the 
monetary system (Cohen 2006, 2008, 2013). Generally, autonomy is defined as an 
actor’s room for manoeuvring in its own monetary and fiscal policies against the 
constraint posed by the balance of payment. In Cohen’s worlds, «[for] state actors in the 
monetary system, the key to autonomy lies in the uncertain distribution of the burden 
of adjustment to external imbalances. […]Excessive imbalances generate mutual 
pressures to adjust, which can be costly in both economic and political terms, [and] no 
government likes being compelled to compromise key policy goals» (Cohen 2008, 457).  
Accordingly, Cohen creates the concept of ‘monetary power’ to analyse (and 
potentially predict) the distributive outcome of monetary relations relative to this 
pivotal issue. Actors with a greater monetary power can afford to accumulate 
macroeconomic imbalances for a longer time span, and obtain their partners’ 
cooperation in order to adjust the system’s currency misalignment or contain their most 
malevolent effects. This two-fold capacity for autonomy and influence represent two 
moments of the conflict on macroeconomic adjustments, which the author defines as 
«the two hands of monetary power». The first, called ‘power to delay’, measures an 
actor’s autonomy in the sense of being able to ignore the pressure for adjustment 
coming from international financial markets. The second, called ‘power to deflect’, 
concerns an actor’s capacity to shift these adjustments onto other states by mobilising 
a wide range of bargaining weapons including the distortion of economic variables 
(prices, trade and capital flows etc.) and non-economic ones (military cooperation, 
ideological convergence). Between these two, however, there would be a clear 
hierarchical relation, as autonomy from financial markets (the power to delay) is 
necessary and sufficient to measure a country’s monetary power and exists 
independently from influence, while influence (the power to deflect) would be 
unconceivable without a prior establishment of autonomy.  
 However, this conception of power in monetary relations presents at least two 
loopholes, which are more difficult to note in major powers, but emerge with particular 
evidence when the concept is applied to small and middle-sized countries. The first is 
precisely that, contrary to Cohen’s main argument, actors may happen to be influential 
before becoming more autonomous. According to the author indeed, «the power to 
delay is largely a function of a country’s international liquidity position relative to others, 
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comprising both owned reserves and borrowing capacity» (Cohen 2008, 457). 
Nonetheless, the capacity of an economic system to borrow abroad to cover balance-
of-payment deficits cannot be conceived as independent from the will of other actors, 
and especially of sovereign actors and central banks, of investing their money for this 
purpose instead of diversifying their assets in an economically-convenient fashion. 
Secondly, the case is even more evident for the power to deflect, where to be 
autonomous states have to convince or coerce others to bear the transitional cost of 
adjustments in their place, that is, influence comes first and produces autonomy 
through the others’ subordination to the policy preferences of a powerful state.  
In this research, I argue that Benjamin Cohen’s conceptual construction needs to 
be revised to be translatable into the world of small and medium powers. Rather than 
assuming autonomy as a premise of monetary statecraft, I suggest that autonomy from 
the external constraint is the key goal states can reach through the two hands of 
monetary power. Accordingly, I avoid the automatic equation between a country’s 
position in terms of reserves, net foreign assets (NFA) and current account balance with 
its ability to govern autonomously the levers of macroeconomic policy. Instead, I define 
these three components of monetary power as a country’s solvency or balance-of-
payment position, which measures the capacity of a country to resist against market 
pressures for adjustment without the coordination of other states. Secondly, I consider 
the capacity of influencing fundamental systemic variables (i.e. the country’s market 
power and its role in non-financial issues) as a second essential element of power in 
monetary affairs, increasing further a country’s capacity to delay and deflect 
macroeconomic adjustments tanks to the benevolent coordination of other actors. 
Accordingly, I consider policy autonomy as the outcome of a zero-sum strategic 
interaction with the monetary power of other states in the system.  
In conclusion, if non-material capabilities play a remarkable role in defining an 
actor’s policy autonomy, the hierarchy of the international monetary system can assume 
a fairly different shape compared to traditional assessments based on military power, 
especially in its lower layers. In the top positions, indeed, great powers with outstanding 
economic and military capabilities remain the sole actors able to play the role of 
monetary leaders. These actors hold a constitutive power on a regional or global 
monetary system, above all, because they are able to induce other states (followers) to 
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cooperate for the adjustment of macroeconomic imbalances. Below monetary leaders, 
however, small and medium states cohabitate under the shadow of powerful 
hegemonic actors. Taking into account the two-fold nature of monetary power  ̶  
comprising solvency and influence   ̶  in the next section I explore how these two 
dimensions combine to generate four typologies of minor state3 with a different ability 
to gain autonomy in the conflict over macroeconomic adjustments.  
   
 
1.6  Small and middle Powers in international monetary relations 
Small and medium-sized powers, engaged in a system-wide struggle for autonomy, act 
in a web of incentives and constraints which looks very different from the that of great 
powers with the potential to play as monetary leaders. On the one hand, in the case of 
great powers a favourable balance-of-payment position can be the consequence of 
sound macroeconomic results  ̶  such as a strong current account surplus, large official 
reserves, low inflation or efficient financial markets  ̶  but also of the privilege of issuing 
the international key currency of an international system. Contrarily, minor state can 
rely solely on the first option, and with greater difficulties, in order to reduce their 
vulnerability to the pressure of financial markets. On the other hand, the influence 
capacity of monetary leaders impinge on purely monetary-financial mechanisms  ̶  like 
capital flights and devaluation of weak-currencies  ̶  as well as on alternative instruments 
not related to the monetary game such as military and security issue, trade flows (e.g. 
the threat of closing one’s market to other countries’ exports), or ideological like-
mindedness. On the contrary, non-financial mechanisms are much less viable for minor 
states, whose reliance on financial weapons remains preponderant.   
As concerns a country’s solvency position vis à vis international investors, the 
main elements to consider are the trend of its current account balance4 and the stock 
                                                          
3 For the rest of this writing, with the term minor states I mean small and middle states considered 
collectively. 
4 Notably, the current account balance records the flows of foreign currency entering or leaving a country 
for transactions on goods, services, remittances, tourism and interests on foreign investments. 
Conversely, the net foreign asset position (NFA) or net international investment position (NIIP) shows the 
difference between the stock of foreign-owned domestic liabilities and the stock of domestic-owned 
foreign assets. If positive, it indicates that the country’s overall economy holds more credits abroad than 
debts owed to foreigners, and thus is fully solvent without mobilising domestic assets. However, even 
though the second is in principle more suitable to identify the solvency position of a country, the two 
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of official reserves. The first, however, is by far the most relevant, since the 
accumulation of persistent current account surpluses is both the cause and the 
reinforcement of a country’s credibility on financial markets. Benjamin Cohen 
represented clearly this condition as follows: 
«[a state] presumably has to show a positive balance of international indebtedness, an 
excess of foreign assets over foreign liabilities. More importantly, it probably would also 
have to be a capital exporter on a fairly large scale, with a corresponding tendency toward 
surplus on current account of the balance of payments in order to assure potential users 
of its currency that solvency would be maintained into the future» (Cohen 1971) 
Ceteris Paribus, these countries are more autonomous than their deficit 
counterparts for at least three reasons. First, the persistent accumulation of foreign 
assets characterising surplus economies reduces sensibly the risk of capital flight and 
severe depreciation that generally supports the leader’s influence against weak-
currency followers. If anything, surplus countries are more likely to be the recipients of 
flying capitals, and experiencing an appreciation of their currency in case of currency 
crisis. Second, if the breakup of the system’s currency stability because of unbearable 
imbalances produces recessionary effects, for example due to the fall of the country’s 
export revenues, these problems can be offset via domestic reflation as surplus 
countries do not risk falling into trade deficit with a shortage of capital inflows or foreign 
reserves. Third, central banks in surplus states are better placed to intervene in the 
foreign exchange market to stop, although in the short term, the unwanted appreciation 
of their national currency even in presence of policy divergence and capital mobility. 
Empirical tests confirm the widespread effectiveness of this practice especially as far as 
emerging economies are concerned (Al-Jasser and Banafe 2005; Disyatat and Galati 
2005; Fatum and Hutchison 2003; Fratzscher 2005; Hassan, Nakibullah, and Hassan 
2013; Levy-Yeyati, Sturzenegger, and Gluzmann 2013; Schnabl and Chmelarova 2006; 
Siklos and Weymark 2007; Turner and Mohanty 2006).  
Deficit actors, on the contrary, stockpile liabilities owned to foreign investors 
contributing to deteriorate their external position as potentially insolvent debtors. The 
                                                          
couples of terms (creditors and surplus, debtor and deficit) will be used interchangeably in this research 
given that the NFA is simply the medium- and long-term effect of the trend on the current account (net 
of valuation changes). 
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dynamic of current transactions generate an over-supply of the local currency, which, in 
turn, creates expectations of depreciation that markets will sooner or later bandwagon. 
If deficit nations want to avoid the exchange rate consequences of their balance-of-
payment condition, they can temporarily sell foreign reserves to buy the local currency 
on international markets. However, they have a constraint in the available reserves of 
hard currency, which once depleted leave the local coinage undefended against 
speculative attacks (Kaelberer 2001).  
 The ‘influence’ side of monetary power in minor states, assuming a limited role 
for non-financial tools, concerns entirely the price-maker/price-taker cleavage, that is, 
their capacity (or incapacity) to affect the price of international goods, assets and 
currencies. In the definition of international hierarchy adopted by Keohane (Keohane 
1969, 1971), it was already implied that a country’s demographic-territorial size may be 
not necessarily correlated with its importance for the international system, while the 
most relevant factor, according to this scholar, is the extent to which power resources 
are translated into concrete systemic changes. This cleavage between price-makers and 
price-takers is precisely the keystone of the divide between small and middle powers in 
the monetary system, considering the second as those actors whose financial wealth or 
liability is able to trigger variations in the price of assets and major currencies of the 
international monetary system. 
Contrary to the common wisdom, though, big creditors, like China towards the 
US Treasury are not the sole actors capable of shocking the monetary system through a 
massive manoeuvre on their financial exposure. Countries with a large debtor position 
vis à vis foreign economies are also able to cause severe changes in the other actor’s 
wealth and income by refusing to undertake the fiscal and monetary adjustments 
needed to restore their solvency or not intervening in the currency market to prop up 
their money though massive sales of foreign exchange. This may cause the debtor’s 
currency to devaluate, de-facto depreciating also the value of creditors’ assets and 
potentially hurting their export revenues via import substitution. The scheme below 
provides a summary of the four hierarchical layers of the monetary system for minor 
countries along the two dimensions of monetary power  ̶  solvency (BoP position) and 
influence (market power). The next section provides a detailed description of their 
expected behaviour. 
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1.7  The two typologies of deficit countries  
Small and middle powers are engaged in the struggle for autonomy in an international 
system prone to the chronic accumulation of currency misalignemnts. In this context, 
the conflict for the distribution of the burdens of adjustment imposes itself recurrently 
as a zero-sum game between great powers and minor states, where the renounce to 
autonomy by one of two sides implies a gain of autonomy for the other according to the 
well-known nth-country mechanism (Mundell 1968). As already explained, within this 
highly competitive structure, small and middle-sized states act prevalently by 
influencing the price of either debts or credits held by the leader country. In case of 
deficit actors, big debtors enjoy some room for extorting better conditions to the 
supposedly creditor leader. In the case of surplus economies, instead, market power 
holds exactly the opposite effect, favouring small holders and disadvantaging big 
creditors. This state of things impacts on the leader’s monetary power as well, which 
notwithstanding the strength of non-financial coercion, is indeed more advantaged 
when playing as creditor rather than debtor. The equation below formalises what has 
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been said so far about the impact of influence and solvency position on a country’s 
monetary power.  
  
Proceeding from these considerations, the four typologies identified above enjoy the 
following set of constraints and advantages vis à vis potential leaders in an interstate 
monetary system.  
 The ‘big debtor’ is a country with a negative net foreign asset position or a 
structural and protracted deficit in the current account accompanied with constant 
capital inflows allowing national investment and consumption to overcome the limit of 
export proceedings. This situation, which determines a chronic dependency on foreign 
capitals and thus a country’s vulnerability to changes in the monetary policy of creditor 
countries, turns into a bargaining advantage of the big debtor when it comes to 
distribute the burdens of macroeconomic adjustments to address an incipient currency 
crisis. If the stock of liabilities owned to foreign actors is sufficiently wide and 
concentrated on a few markets, the leader’s gains as creditor in terms of autonomy and 
positive financial flows can be easily outweighed by the economic costs of a default or 
devaluation by the debtor follower. Deficit middle powers can indeed break a currency 
parity and let the exchange rate devaluate or repudiate payments and arrears on 
liabilities owed to foreign subjects. This would cause a net capital loss on foreign 
investments for the surplus leader and a likely contraction of exports and national 
income as well. Other conditions held constant, this situation might be sufficiently 
serious to guarantee the leader’s intervention with a countercyclical flow of capitals and 
a public or implicit guarantee on the solvency of the follower state. In other words, the 
leader can arrive to renounce to its first-best situation (the unilateral coordination of 
followers) to increase the debtor’s ‘power to delay’ on international markets. However, 
it remains unlikely that the leader adapts its own domestic policies to restore the 
MONETARY POWER = SP – (CA)*MP (+ NFM) 
AUTONOMYi = F(MONETARY POWERi – MONETARY POWER1-i) 
SP= solvency position  CA=current account MP= market power   
NFM=non-financial means= issue-linkages with trade, military affairs; ideological biases 
NFMGreat Powers >> NFMMinor powers 
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equilibrium of trade balances across countries5. A typical example of this situation is that 
of France after the 2010 Eurozone crisis. The strong interdependency of the French and 
German banking and financial sectors, where the first is actually the second’s major 
debtor, has allowed the République, so far, to enjoy interest rates almost as low as 
German ones, and avoiding imposed conditions on matters such as public spending, 
labour regulation and public budget. This has been possible in spite of the decennial 
accumulation of foreign indebtedness by France and the serious difficulties of its own 
banks and financial firms in recouping their investments in Southern Europe and other 
Eurozone’s peripheral countries.  
 The ‘small debtor’ faces the same situation of potential insolvency of big debtors, 
but with enormously greater liquidity problems. On the one hand, these countries 
combine a strong propensity to import   ̶ often irreducible because composed of a too 
large share of essential goods  ̶  with a greater distrust of international financial markets. 
These actors have indeed a structural incapacity to play these cards, being their financial 
markets scarcely influential or completely irrelevant in the total credit exposure of major 
markets. Actually, most of the existing literature on the causes and the consequences of 
monetary followership in minor countries is built on the archetype of the small debtor. 
This evidently emerge from different strands of research such as studies on currency 
anchorage with anti-inflationary function (Calvo and Reinhart 2002; Giavazzi and Pagano 
1988), the reflections on the ‘punitive’ function of financial markets in currency politics 
(Abdelal 1998; Andrews 1994a; Goodman and Pauly 1993; Pauly 1995), the role of 
import dependency in the choice of the nominal reference in fixed exchange rate 
regimes (Meissner and Oomes 2008; Plümper and Neumayer 2011). Historically, this 
typology describes some of the best-known cases of sovereign default or balance-of-
payment crisis of the last thirty years. For instance, the ‘Tequila Crisis’ in 1980’s and 
1990’s Mexico, the Finnish and Swedish baking crisis of the early 1990’s, the ERM crisis 
of 1992, the East Asian Crisis of 1997, Brazilian Crisis of 1998 (c.d. ‘Samba Effect’) and 
the Argentinian Depression of 1999-2002. 
                                                          
5 This strategy would be in patent contradiction with the key objective of monetary leadership, that is, the 
autonomy of macroeconomic  policies by means of a parallel renounce of autonomy by follower actors. It 
is not a coincidence, in this respect, that available case studies about the European Monetary System 
show that the pressures of debtor countries over Germany for reflating its economy have never turned 
out successful. Rather, up against the dilemma between revaluing the deutschmark and allowing for more 
expansive policies, Bonn has always chosen to preserve its policy freedom through currency realignments. 
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1.8  The characteristics of major and minor holders and the literature gap on 
surplus countries  
The positive effect of a large market power on the bargaining advantage of middle states 
is reversed when the case of surplus countries is assessed. In terms of solvency position, 
these actors are characterised by a structural and persistent inflow of foreign currency 
from current account transactions, which allows paying for imports and accumulating 
net foreign credits. Should an unexpected shock hit the country’s exports, it could 
preserve its level of consumption and investments by selling foreign assets and reflate 
the domestic market without necessarily undertaking fiscal and monetary tightening to 
restore a positive balance in the short term. Moreover, if well integrated in financial 
markets, it is not excluded that a country’s currency becomes an international safe 
haven, proving the economic system with liquidity in a moment of shrinking domestic 
demand.  
 However, once the influence side of monetary power is taken into account, small 
surplus countries, or small holders, show a great positive divide with middle powers in 
the same balance-of-payment position, the so-called major holders. With respect to 
these actors, small holders are advantaged in at least two ways. Firstly, they are better 
placed to pursue a general strategy of currency diversification in the allocation of foreign 
investment portfolios. Indeed, because of the irrelevance of their economic moves on 
the stability of the core currency and other international coinages, small holders are not 
subject to the same pressure from great powers in order to support a leader’s currency 
with sound monetary, fiscal and exchange-rate policies. Secondly, even when 
diversification is unviable, small holders can neglect pressures and invitations to adjust 
their policies to address global macroeconomic imbalances given the irrelevance of their 
contribution to the systemic governance. In brief, small holders are on average more 
autonomous in the choice of economic policies than major holders. Among the most 
common empirical cases, it is worth mentioning the currency and investment policy of 
the small Arab monarchies of the Persian Gulf, the adoption of a flexible exchange rate 
and a partial diversification of assets in the last decade in Singapore or the currency 
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allocation of foreign investments managed by the gigantic Norwegian sovereign wealth 
fund, coupled with the free floating of the Norwegian krone.   
 An opposite mechanism, instead, constrains the actions or ‘major holders’. These 
actors are characterised by a positive external positon on the current account, and enjoy 
a powerful ‘negative’ influence in the system that constrains their actions and locks the 
range of autonomous policies they can bring forward in the monetary and exchange rate 
field. Charles Kindleberger, in an article on French currency policy in two historical 
moments (the period 1926-1936 and the period 1960-70) distinguishes state actors into 
three categories based on their role in the international economic system: great powers, 
near-great powers and small powers. Within this schema, near-great power represent 
the actors that «have the power to hurt the system, [but] generally insufficient […] to 
steady it in the face of disruption on wide scale» (Kindleberger 1985). This definition is 
coherent with the previously established criterion of influence to identify the cleavage 
between small and middle powers in the different domains of international politics. 
Major holders are indeed those actors whose official reserves or private portfolio of 
foreign investments allow the country to modify, negatively as well as positively, the 
price on international markets of the coinage in which its assets are denominated.  
 This status, however, even though apparently advantageous, is in fact deleterious 
for the major holder’s policy autonomy once its drawbacks are taken into consideration. 
On the one hand, the baseline advantage of these actors, in that solvent economies, is 
counterbalanced by the set of conditionings put in place by the leader with the purpose 
of promoting the loyalty of systemically relevant subjects such as major holders. On the 
other hand, even in the hypothetical absence of non-financial bargaining tools, major 
holders are much more vulnerable than small actors to the so-called entrapment 
mechanism (Kirshner 1995). In his hypothesis, Kirshner links minor countries’ 
followership in interest rates and currency policy to the tendency of many surplus 
economies to accumulate foreign assets and reserves denominated for a large part in a 
single core-currency. By doing so, local authorities end up making the whole country’s 
financial wealth vulnerable to a collapse of the leader’s coinage, and since the cost of 
exchange rate adjustments outweighs the benefits of autonomy, the follower’s central 
bank becomes a reluctant stakeholder of the system’s currency stability. With this 
transformation in a stakeholder of a hegemonial power’s outstanding foreign debt, 
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major holders are in fact unable to allow for excessive exchange rates fluctuations for 
not risking to evaporate the value of their financial wealth both domestically and against 
other major currencies. Finally, also the opportunities for currency diversification, which 
was a consistent way out of this conundrum for small holders, are remarkably reduced 
given the greater systemic relevance of these middle powers in the international 
monetary system. Major holders, indeed, may have an interest beyond the entrapment 
mechanism in guaranteeing the stability of the core-currency and the smooth 
functioning of the payment system   ̶  for example the connection between a leader’s 
role as security provider and its economic conditions, or the necessity to preserve their 
market share in a great power’s market for goods and services. The clearest examples 
of major holders in today’s monetary system are Saudi Arabia, Japan, Taiwan, South 
Korea and China towards the United States. In the past, South Africa and Canada have 
played this role within the post-war British sterling area (1945-1960), while Japan, Russia 
and the British colonies in the Indian subcontinent had a similar position in the heydays 
of the UK-centred Classical Gold Standard.  
 
 
1.9  Literature gaps and research design  
In previous sections, the fundamental criteria for mapping the power hierarchy of 
international monetary relations have been cogently illustrated. Consequently, it makes 
sense at this point to summarise the main strategic dilemma of small and medium-sized 
states in this domain of international relations. Drawing a parallel with the scheme 
already observed for military alliances, trade relations and development policies, on one 
extreme we find the symbiotic specialisation with a great power, which corresponds in 
this domain to monetary followership, especially in its more tight variant involving both 
fixed exchange rates and a unilateral adaptation of domestic policies to govern the 
spillovers of imbalanced payment systems. This alternative is practically a one-way 
choice for small countries with a chronic payment deficit, a situation that is over-
explained by an abundant literature. On the other extreme, we find autonomy-
maximising strategies of neutrality, characterised in the monetary arena by financial and 
trade diversification, by the freedom to set inward-oriented monetary policy moves, 
and, if necessary, by exchange-rate flexibility. Among small countries, surplus 
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economies are the best-placed actors to practice the various forms of monetary 
neutrality given their scares influence on currency values and the substantial protection 
against the negative feedbacks of financial interconnection.   
 Nevertheless, despite the good theoretical groundings embodied in this 
typization, current models conceived to explain the foreign economic policy of surplus 
countries in monetary affairs tend frequently to underestimate or neglect the positional 
divide between major and small holders in their relation with great powers. Generally, 
at least two branches of studies have addressed the choices of minor countries, and 
both have consistently ignored this distinction. The first includes explanatory models of 
monetary followership analysing the leader-follower bargaining, while the second, less 
common, implies a game-theoretical assessment of intra-followers relations in 
asymmetric monetary systems. Among the firsts, the dominant bias is to consider 
surplus followers, by definition, as systemically relevant actors with little prospects for 
diversification (i.e. major holders). This is the case in the so-called ‘mercantilist theories’ 
linking monetary followership to a country’s dependency on a larger end-market for 
exports, but also in the abovementioned hypothesis of financial entrapment, where the 
author assumes that follower’s policies have a wide effect on the value of the core 
currency. Equally, in hypotheses identifying a link between security affairs and choices 
of macroeconomic policy coordination, scholars presuppose that followers’ moves hold 
some effect on the leader’s military effectiveness. As regards the second strand on intra-
followers bargaining, there is a blatant prevalence of heuristic models based on a two-
player static Prisoner’s Dilemma. In such models, surplus followers are assumed to have 
symmetric incentives to defect through currency diversification on foreign exchange 
reserves, predicting an outcome similar to the mutual-defection Nash equilibrium of the 
famous game-theoretic dilemma. However, this approach assumes once again that each 
actor’s diversification would trigger a run on the core currency and cause the collapse 
of the existing system.  
 The purpose of this research is to bridge the gap about the comprehension of the 
effects of the small/major holder divide from two fundamental perspectives. Firstly, by 
providing a theoretical demonstration and a set of empirical corroborations to the 
hypothesis that the weaker market power of small holders determine also a greater 
policy-making autonomy as regards monetary and exchange-rate issues. Secondly, I 
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hypothesise that major holders do not simply wait to be free-ridden by small holders 
while providing the public goods for the smooth functioning of an imbalanced payment 
system. Rather, I suppose they are the only actors with motives and instruments to 
induce reluctant small surplus states to contribute with their negligible financial wealth 
to the governance of a system characterised by deep macroeconomic imbalances.  
 In next chapters, the issue of the conflict for autonomy and the causes of 
monetary followership in small states will be framed within the wider theoretical debate 
inside the International Relations (IR) and the International Political Economy (IPE). In 
detail, the next chapter illustrates the reasons why, especially from a realist standpoint, 
policy autonomy emerges as a primary good in anarchical interstate systems, as well for 
great power as for minor states. This passage is necessary to support the assumption 
that there is an inherent conflict for autonomy among the actors of international 
relations, and that the international monetary system is the privileged arena of this 
competition. In the same chapter, I describe the main technical mechanisms of 
monetary, fiscal and exchange-rate coordination across countries, and I focus in 
particular on the policy moves of minor states to isolate a great power’s policy-making 
from the balance-of-payment constraint.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 CHAPTER II 
The Power of Currency. Macroeconomic Policy Autonomy and Power 
Relations in the International System 
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2.1  The role of economic relations in the ‘struggle for autonomy’. A review of 
state’s priorities in the realist framework 
One of the core assumptions of realism, distinguishing this way of thinking from other 
paradigms of International Relations (IR)   ̶ Marxism, constructivism, liberalism   ̶ is the 
saliency of economic issues as an indispensable premise to military power. For example, 
Kenneth Waltz devoted a large part of his discussion on the concept of polarity to reject, 
on these bases, the thesis of those historians and IR analysts who conceive international 
politics as composed of parallel hierarchies: one for economic powers and one for 
military powers (Waltz 1979). The two, he argues, are nothing but two faces of the same 
coin, since economic development, far from being important per se, is essential above 
all for nurturing a country’s military apparatus. Likewise, John Mearsheimer 
distinguishes the measures of great powers’ capabilities between ‘latent power’ and 
‘military power’. The first  ̶  given by the product of economic wealth and the size of the 
population  ̶  would be the «sinew» of military capabilities, not relevant in its own, but 
as an indispensable asset to develop a top-ranked army and compete for hegemony in 
the international system (Mearsheimer 2001). Within the sub-field of International 
Political Economy (IPE), the realist strand has certainly observed scrupulously the 
assumption of indivisibility between the two realms of power, going so far as to theorise, 
in a famous seminal article by Jacob Viner, their mutual complementarity. As the author 
puts it,  
« (1) wealth is an absolutely essential means to power, whether for security or for 
aggression; (2) power is essential or valuable as a means to the acquisition or retention of 
wealth; (3) wealth and power are each proper ultimate ends of national policy; (4) there 
is long-run harmony between these ends, although in particular circumstances it may be 
necessary for a time to make economic sacrifices in the interest of military security and 
therefore also of long-run prosperity» (Viner 1948) 
If considered in combination with the other base assumptions of the realist paradigm, 
the mutual complementarity between military capabilities and economic wealth plays 
the lion’s share in the development of the realist view on the impact of economic 
relations and interdependence on the competition for power and security among 
sovereign states.  
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Realism is indeed a wide-ranging umbrella concept, formed by different sub-
schools and branches that share nonetheless a handful of core assumptions. First, states 
are considered unitary and rational actors, which hold persistent objective interests, and 
employ their resources strategically to achieve them. Second, when major issues like 
survival, independence and physical security are at stake, self-interest ultimately drives 
states’ policy choices, with little room left for ethical or ideological considerations, and 
setting aside those sub-state societal interests that classical liberalism, constructivism 
and Marxism have put under the spotlight in their theories. Thirdly, the distribution of 
power among states, and not among social classes, multinational corporation or 
multilateral agencies, shapes regimes, patterns of relation and distributive outcomes 
throughout the international system and all its issue-areas. Finally, any state holds 
survival, independence and security as its primary and compelling goals, but has to 
achieve them in a self-help (or self-defence) anarchical system, where no superior 
coercive authorities can be appealed in case of danger or threat from another actor. 
However, given the importance of an independent military force in such an uncertain 
environment, and the complementarity between wealth and the capacity for self-
defence, it is not sufficient that governments have these economic resources available, 
they must also be autonomous in the allocation of their wealth to the enhancement of 
military power (Harknett and Yalcin 2012). As highlighted by Mearsheimer indeed, latent 
power may be converted into military might with different proportions, ways and 
timings. Thus, states need flexibility in the use of economic resources, and the possibility 
to preserve and increase their value throughout time in order to be able to turn wealth 
into hard power whenever necessary.  
If this is the reason why autonomy rises to the top of state’s priorities in a realist 
framework, what makes the issue a puzzling political question is the intrinsic 
contradiction that may arise between wealth and autonomy. On the one hand, both play 
as essential premises of a country’s self-defence in the anarchical system; on the other 
hand, the pursuance of wealth implies the parallel need to expand a country’s trade in 
goods, services and capitals to achieve higher standards of income and finance military 
power. Economic growth, indeed, is based on exchange, and the greater the exchange, 
even between nations, the greater is the level of wealth reachable through the 
specialisation and integration of states’ productive and financial systems. However, 
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economic integration undeniably hurts policy autonomy in at least two ways. First, by 
making states excessively dependent on goods, services and capitals produced abroad, 
and second   ̶ since everyone’s economic policy decisions impact on prices, demand and 
growth in other countries  ̶  by making states subject to pressures for orienting their 
domestic choices to the ‘general’ welfare rather than to their narrow domestic 
exigencies. Regrettably, the only alternative solution, which is the planning of autarchic 
national markets, remains a cure worse than the disease, since it would guarantee the 
maximum of autonomy, but at the detriment of economic development. Often, until the 
point of jeopardising a country’s military effectiveness like in 1930’s Italy or North Korea 
in the current international system. Since this undoubtedly dilemmatic condition cannot 
be solved with a clear-cut choice on one side of the spectrum   ̶ maximising autonomy 
might damage relative wealth, maximising wealth requires interdependence and thus 
reduces autonomy  ̶   two intermediate solutions can be identified. On the one hand, 
great powers, which compete for security and control at the top of the international 
system, must necessarily force to long-term harmony the two contrasting goals: 
becoming autonomous while maintaining open markets as concerns both trade and 
financial transactions. To achieve this privileged condition, they have historically 
exploited the inequality of power with other actors to turn interdependence, intended 
as a reciprocal phenomenon, into dependence, intended as the control exerted by great 
powers on the economic policy of minor states. Essentially, great powers that hold the 
leadership of an economic or monetary arrangement obtain to increase their policy 
autonomy by reducing symmetrically the autonomy of the system’s minor actors. 
On the other hand, minor powers re-experience the dilemma already mentioned 
by the generalist literature on small states. They can either surrender autonomy to 
become dependent on a leader’s policy choices, or seeking to enjoy the gains of open 
markets while retaining a good extent of autonomy, not the maximum, on their own 
policy-making. Generally, minor states’ utility function, given economic 
interdependence for granted, maximises autonomy as well as great powers. However, 
the real question is about the level of risk and practicability of neutral strategies. For 
example, the small or middle-sized state may not be able to stand on its feet in rapidly 
changing global markets, and prefer to develop a symbiosis with a major monetary 
partner than risking a hard life as an autonomous actor. In this specific case, autonomy 
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would be a ‘useless luxury’, which smaller countries cannot give to themselves in an 
environment where economic development depends almost exclusively on exogenous 
flows of products and capitals. Alternatively, the small country can weight autonomy 
less than great powers because of other compelling reasons like military weakness and 
the consequent need for external patronage. In this case, it is sacrificing autonomy for 
security as the two things are actually less connected in small power than they are in 
great powers.  
Nonetheless, in the next section the focus remains on great powers, because if 
monetary  followership is about minor countries abandoning their autonomy to enhance 
that of stronger states, the first key passage is understanding why policy autonomy 
holds such an overriding importance for the most important actors of the international 
system. Subsequently, however, I discuss why the loss of policy autonomy inherent to 
monetary followership may be, contrary to a widespread common wisdom, a political 
and economic conundrum also for minor powers, hence creating a conflict between who 
is going to cede more of its autonomy for the smooth functioning of a system of cross-
border economic interactions.  
 
 
2.2  Autonomous from what? ‘Iron and steel’ versus purchasing power in the 
approach of realist IPE 
As widely discussed in previous section, the thesis of realist IPE is that the entire life of 
state actors in the international monetary system revolves around the search and the 
exploitation of policy autonomy to pursue a greater military spending or other 
domestically-convenient policies. As regards the issue of transforming economic wealth 
into military and coercive power, it has to be noted that a lively debate surrounds the 
nature of power in international relations6, while the nature of wealth  ̶  that is, which 
kind of wealth is really valuable in that convertible into military effectiveness or in other 
forms of political influence   ̶ has been decisively the less considered side of the debate.  
                                                          
6 In particular, scholars have wandered whether this term should refer merely to concrete military 
capabilities or to the larger toolbox of ‘soft power’, including popular culture, ideational seduction, 
economic incentives and similar indirect strategies (Ikenberry and Kupchan 1990; Nye 2005). Or else, as 
Susan Strange suggested, states may act both in the direct way generally considered by realist analysts, 
or through a subtle, yet perhaps more effective form of structural power (Strange 1987, 1994). 
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Usually, IR neorealism focuses on the development of those sectors of economic 
activity providing the material bases to build up a strong military for the contemporary 
mechanised warfare. Accordingly, Mearsheimer and Waltz classify great powers on the 
base of a composite index of iron and steel production complemented by the 
consumption of energy. Paul Kennedy, in his ‘Rise and Fall of Great Powers’, uses the 
share of the world’s manufacturing and, again, iron and steel production, to assess the 
economic fundamentals of military strength (Kennedy 1987). Although none of them 
would argue that latent power is the only determinant of state influence, both structural 
and classical realists link states’ military might to what an economic system is able to 
produce domestically, especially in the manufacturing and the heavy industry. In this 
respect, it worth noting how the IPE approach, specifically in monetary studies, has 
often looked at the issue from a remarkably different perspective. Instead of considering 
the impact of what a countries’ can produce by themselves through industrial 
development, IPE scholars have rather discussed how military power can be affected by 
what countries can buy abroad. Drawing on a vast historical literature on the import 
patterns of states engaged in military efforts, many authors have concluded that states’ 
domestic industrial capacity is perhaps a necessary but certainly not a sufficient 
condition to fill the exigencies of great powers playing a major role in international 
security politics (Cappella 2013b; Cohen 2013; Kelly 1977; Knorr 1975). In IPE realism, 
the roots of ‘latent power’ should be rather sought in a country’s autonomy in foreign-
products purchases than (solely) in its capacity for domestic production in military-
related manufacturing. 
 To understand this point, it is a good idea looking at what early mercantilist 
thinkers wrote in the XVII and XVIII century about the relation between military power 
and economic resources. As reported by Viner, in their view states should have «sought 
a favorable balance of trade […] and the indefinite accumulation of the precious metals 
solely as means to power» (Viner 1948). What this concise proposition suggests to 
today’s readers is that the economic bases of power, in this perspective, is not 
manufacturing or industrial production, but the possession of precious metals. Second, 
the way to hoard precious metals is running a positive trade balance vis à vis the rest of 
the world economy. In fact, when the total amount of gold outflowing a home country 
for paying goods and services in foreign markets (i.e. imports) is below the quantity of 
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gold that the rest of the world ships to the same country with the identical purpose (i.e. 
exports), the home economy realises a net accumulation of precious metals. In the age 
when mercantilist authors wrote, and until the first half of the XX century, sovereign-
coined specie were nothing but actual fragments of silver, gold or copper, on which the 
emblem of kings guaranteed the users about the real content of metal with which those 
coins were supposedly made of7. Through these metals, which were market-based 
moneys universally accepted inside and outside any country, sovereigns could pay, in 
home or foreign markets, manpower, raw materials, equipment and supplies for their 
armed forces and police corps, as well as financing art, culture, or technology within 
their commonwealths.  
In the studies of monetary history, the counterpart of such commodity-based 
system is the so-called fiat money system. Under this regime, governments issue papers 
and coins that have no intrinsic market value or connection with a precious metal, and 
impose the legal tender of these currencies by accepting the same papers and coins for 
the payment of taxes and tariffs. Historically, this systems have been less rare than it is 
commonly thought, since also in the heydays of the Classical Gold Standard many of the 
non-primary powers (like Italy, Spain or Austria) resort to fiat money to settle domestic 
transactions and part of their international trade (Gallarotti 1995; Knafo 2006; Martín-
aceña, Martínez-ruiz, and Nogues-marco 2011; Meissner 2002; Di Nino, Eichengreen, 
and Sbracia 2011). Successively, with the great recession of the 1930’s, several major 
powers, not last Britain in 1931, were forced out of the Gold-Exchange Standard into a 
fiat money system, and never restored the old regime after World War II. In its place, a 
semblance of gold-backed monetary system was designed with the Bretton Woods post-
war order  ̶  where almost all the world’s currencies were pegged at a fixed adjustable 
rate to the dollar, which was in turn exchanged at 35$ per ounce of gold. Since the 
definitive fall of Bretton Woods in 1973 though, practically all states have been 
operating under a fiat money system.   
Nevertheless, this poses a problem on how to identify a country’s international 
purchasing power given that wealth is no longer embedded in precious metals, but is 
measured through a worthless fiduciary currency. If central banks, in the new system, 
                                                          
7 Likewise, when both the government and banks issued non-metallic currency, it took the form of notes 
front-printed with the exact quantity of metal that was redeemable in exchange for it. 
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are prepared to print as much money as necessary to the Treasury, what is the economic 
limit that national governments face when trying to finance investments, fund military 
expansions, or simply to cut taxes? One of their main limits lies in the crude fact that not 
all the commodities and services necessary to carry out a strong military, a 
technologically advanced economy or a solid financial system can always be self-
produced in a domestic market. Some resort to externally-purchased goods, especially 
for great powers projecting their presence well beyond national borders, is strictly 
unavoidable even for the largest and most diversified economies of the international 
system, and these purchases cannot be realised but using a foreign currency or a 
universal means of payment. This limit is universally known in the economic and 
political-economy literature as the balance-of-payment constraint. Namely, the limit for 
which foreign products cannot be bought unless a country’s economic actors gain 
foreign currency through exports or borrow it from international financial markets, 
international institutions or foreign governments. The concept of purchasing power, no 
longer tied to the money’s content in precious metals, is now identified with a country’s 
exchange rate vis à vis other major currencies, since this conversion factor represents 
the units of foreign products that can be purchased with one unit of local coinage.  
The issue of purchasing power stability, measured through the exchange rate, 
introduces into the picture the last side of the well-known Mundell-Flaming Trilemma 
(Fleming 1962; Mundell 1961, 1963), opposing the pursuance of wealth through 
economic interdependence to the value of policy-making autonomy. Indeed, exchange-
rate volatility is the price to pay for policy divergence in open economies, and can 
potentially jeopardise the achievements of autonomy when it is excessive and too rapid. 
Actually, states need to reconcile all the three elements of the Trilemma to be fully 
capable of pushing forward their own priorities without concerns from the balance-of-
payment constraint. For instance, historical evidence is generous in showing how this 
set of limits is able to restrain states’ military effectiveness and determine their success 
in international politics. Among several cases, that of Britain in the 1950’s stands out as 
emblematic. In assessing the British case, Cappella (2013b) develops an impressive 
comparison between the conditions at which London had been able to fight and win the 
1848 Crimean War and the extreme constraints experienced by Britain one hundred 
years later during the Korean War. At the heights of the pound sterling’s dominance 
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over the international monetary system, in 1848, with new mines discovered in 
California and Australia and a net inflow of gold due to the explosion of its 
manufacturing exports (economic openness), Britain had been able to fight an overseas 
war (policy autonomy) without losing even a ton of its gold reserves (purchasing power 
stability). Since the pound sterling was deemed as good as gold, people around the 
world, included mercenary armies, local suppliers, and sovereigns in the allied countries 
were prepared to accept sterlings IOUs printed out of nothing by the British government 
as a means of payment for all the supply of goods and services to the United Kingdom 
and its allies. In fact, London became also the principal financer of the war bills in all its 
smaller partners, lending its universally-accepted money to Prussia, the Ottoman Empire 
and the Kingdom of Sardinia from which Britain obtained not just substantial interest 
payments, but also a good measure of political leverage.  
By contrast, one hundred years later a prostrated British Empire had to play its 
part in the Korean War with a mountain of overseas debt owed to the United States, 
and a dangerous systemwide oversupply of sterlings. Although London would have 
desired to purchase war-related inputs and pay its troops’ presence in East Asia relying 
solely on the resources of sterling-area countries, «the BCOF8 drew heavily from 
American equipment and services. […] items as flamethrowers and 3.5 inches rocket 
launchers […], support from American engineer, signal, and medical services, and some 
rations were […] supplied from U.S. Army sources». Since all these purchases had to be 
paid in dollars, «if the British were to continue the war effort, they would need to […] 
engage in a dollar loan» (Cappella 2013b). The purchase of goods and services from the 
US army represents trade openness, at least to the extent necessary for the war effort. 
Pairwise, the necessity of financial assistance by the United States marks the exigency 
of open markets for capitals, at least concerning state-to-state transactions. The 
oversupply of British sterlings in the colonies and the consequent risk of an abrupt 
depreciation shows the exigency for currency stability. However, given the extreme 
bargaining weakness of Britain compared to the Crimean War, policy autonomy was 
partially saved (as London actually took an active part in Korea) with a costly side-
payment about the British politics in the Commonwealth. Indeed, the US extended a 
conspicuous dollar loan subordinating their financial assistance to a further series of 
                                                          
8 British Commonwealth Occupation Force 
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economic concessions aimed at dismantling the remnants of the formerly self-sufficient 
British colonial system.  
This brief case confirm that a country’s domestic industrial capacity is hardly able 
to sustain a considerable military engagement without inputs (energy, raw materials, 
metals, intermediate goods etc.) and finite goods (spare parts, equipment, foodstuff and 
consumption goods) form aboard that can hardly be covered solely by domestic 
productions. Past cases have effectively shown that when a painful war effort is 
forthcoming, the resilience on the home front becomes more dependent on basic 
products such as grain, fruit, meat, alcoholic drinks or cigarettes than it is on propaganda 
and violent repression. If this is true for major powers, small and medium states are 
even more dependent on external inputs to wage wars and maintain a strong military, 
and are more apt to be hungry also for finite weapons and military equipment that they 
have not the industrial potential to produce autonomously. International purchasing 
power, once related to gold stocks and now to the stability of the exchange rate, is what 
makes these goods affordable on foreign markets, but enters in a contradiction with 
policy autonomy and the openness of national markets which is necessary to their 
procurement. 
 
 
2.3  Beyond great powers and security: policy autonomy as a fundamental good 
of anarchical systems 
The convincing narrative exposed in previous section on why major powers seek 
autonomy as a prime goal of economic statecraft represents a narrow and limited set of 
cases, concerning above all interventionist dominant powers with global military 
commitments. On the contrary, this perspective falls short in at least three alternative 
instances. First, it does not explain why monetary leadership, seen as the main road to 
full policy autonomy, appears also to be the preferred strategy of non-militarised great 
powers such as post-1945 Germany. Second, it says little about the need for autonomy 
of minor states, whose security exigencies cannot be conceived as fully covered by the 
patronage of external great powers. Thirdly, it diverts attention from other political 
domains, besides military and security issues, which are strongly touched by the conflict 
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for autonomy in the international economic system, and affect a country’s capability to 
cooperate or conflict on economic affairs. 
On the first issue, the case of Germany after World War II demonstrates that the 
policy autonomy and the exchange rate stability granted by monetary coordination can 
be actively sought also by a large country with no intentions to develop and deploy a 
hegemonic military status. On the one hand, because in case military expansion is 
prevented by other reasons, monetary leadership can actually play as a substitute of 
military power in influencing neighbours. On the other hand, because any 
comprehensive grand strategy on a country’s position in the international system 
implies a set of underlying conditions to manage its consequences on the country’s 
balance of payment. Namely, if military expansionism requires mechanisms to deal with 
complications like the Triffin Dilemma, extensive trade deficits and shortages of foreign 
currency, military isolationism coupled with a successful export industry, the model 
chosen by Germany as of the 1950’s, requires the followers’ commitment to accumulate 
trade deficits and eventually bear the burden of deflation and unemployment when 
intra-systemic imbalances become unsustainable. Paraphrasing the famous adage of 
classical economists, there is no ‘free-lunch’ grand strategy in international politics, and 
major powers can only get allies and neighbours pay for it.   
 The second point that has been frequently neglected by traditional approaches to 
the relation between war and economic interdependence is that in some occasions 
small and medium countries do actually experience the same need for military-oriented 
policy autonomy as major states. On the one hand, the long-standing debate inside the 
US government and the academia on the ‘paradox of unrealised power’, which followed 
the American defeat in Vietnam, has demonstrated that minor states can prevail on 
immensely superior adversaries by gaining time through guerrilla warfare and bring the 
resilience on the great power’s home front to the break point. However, precisely an 
economic analysis of North Vietnam’s external constraints during the famed war with 
the United States reveals that a prolonged war of attrition can hardly guarantee the 
inflow of foreign currency that a small economy needs to supply electric power to cities, 
fuelling its vehicles and exploiting its industrial and manufacturing facilities. In facts, the 
‘victory’ of Communist Vietnam could not have been possible without the Soviet Union 
and China’s will to finance heavily Hanoi’s policy autonomy until the US threat was finally 
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defeated. Instead, if they had asked North Vietnam to adjust its huge external 
indebtedness, prioritising economic over security concerns, Hanoi’s ability to fight 
would have collapsed far before the US decided to withdraw their military support to 
South Vietnam.  
On the other hand, policy autonomy against balance-of-payment troubles is a 
key asset for minor countries, included small states, in that military rivalries and security 
threats are as likely to come from major powers as from other minor states. As a matter 
of fact, in the post-Cold War international system 5 out of 9 interstate wars have taken 
place among minor powers, and long-standing disputes among small states and regional 
powers are generally more diffuse and concerning than threats coming from major 
powers. The Greek-Turkish rivalry, the standoff between Saudi Arabia and Iran, the 
conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan on the Nagorno-Karabakh, the skirmishes 
between Peru and Ecuador over the Cenepa valley are few but remarkable examples of 
this possibility. In many of these cases, the mediation of the United States or another 
external power (e.g. Russia in the Caucasus) plays a significant role in containing the 
conflict, but does not imply that the minor power feels completely and perpetually 
secure against regional threats without the possibility to manoeuvre an autonomous 
military shield against high-priority regional threats.  
Lastly, the third reason of incompletes of great-power-centred approaches is the 
role of fiscal and monetary instruments in appeasing societal unrests and remunerating 
domestic constituencies in democratic as well as autocratic contexts. In this respect, the 
sacrifice of economic autonomy is both economically and politically costly for a 
government’s domestic popularity notwithstanding the position of the country in the 
hierarchy of the international system. Examples are plentiful. In 1970’s Italy, the 
government and the employers’ associations allowed nominal wages to grow above 
productivity while capital controls and a managed depreciation of the lira made the 
country afford its rising energy imports and avoided running out of foreign currency. The 
measure was part of a series of successful policies made necessary to placate the waves 
of social unrests, unions’ strikes and the proliferation of extreme-left parties that 
invested the country from the so-called ‘hot autumn’ of 1969 to the onset of the 1980’s. 
Similarly, the Arab oil monarchies provide an example from the perspective of a surplus 
country, as they paid the fixed exchange rate to the dollar during the subprime mortgage 
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crisis with a strong wave of inflationary pressures that triggered the complaints of many 
relevant constituencies between 2007 and fall 2008. In diplomatic cables sent to 
Washington, American diplomats relate of the Saudi monarchs’ concern for the 
accusations coming from prominent clerics for not being able to stop the rising inflation 
and powerful bank managers suggesting an abandonment of the peg and a revaluation 
of the riyal. Qatari leaders were anxious with the leak of indispensable foreign workers 
damaged by the nominal and real depreciation of their wages. Bahraini central bankers 
refer of an insistent press and popular campaign for de-pegging the dinar from the dollar 
and relieve pressure on the price of imported commodities led by local business tycoons 
with established contacts in the government.  
 
  
2.4  Monetary policy, payment imbalances and policy autonomy in asymmetrical 
monetary systems 
The stability of a country’s purchasing power under conditions of divergent 
macroeconomic policies is the keystone of autonomy in the politics of an open 
international system. If exchange rates oscillate excessively in presence of divergent 
(autonomous) policies, a state pays its greater decision-making autonomy at a price that 
can be higher than potential benefits. Vice versa, if the stability of exchange rates is 
maintained through policies aimed at correcting or offsetting the system’s 
macroeconomic imbalances, the absence of autonomy is in re ipsa. On the contrary, 
when the two elements are successfully pursued at once, and currencies remain stable 
despite self-oriented policies in an interdependent economic context, the main threat 
to this precarious equilibrium is the emergence of macroeconomic (or payment) 
imbalances, also known as currency misalignments. Payment imbalances entail the 
hoarding of symmetric stocks of international debts and credits in different countries as 
a consequence of the persistent deficits or surpluses on the current account generated 
by divergent policies and not corrected through exchange-rate fluctuations. For 
example, military expansionist states are more likely to accumulate international debts 
(like Britain in the Korean War) because they need to import goods and services beyond 
they capacity to export. Since they cannot bear an excessive currency devaluation to 
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maintain a balanced current account, deficit states are forced to borrow foreign 
currency from abroad to fill their import gap. However, sooner or later international 
debts must be paid back with a process that international economist define 
macroeconomic adjustments. This phenomenon entails a large threat to policy 
autonomy for weaker countries, and generates the perennial conflict on the burdens of 
policy adjustments among states which is the core object of this research.  
In this section, I outline the three policy strategies that according to Michael 
Webb’s classification (Webb 1995)  allow states to face currency misalignments. 
Successively, I provide examples of how these three instruments can be concretely used 
either for a fair distribution of the costs of adjustment (cooperation) or in an 
asymmetrical way to shift the costs onto one of the parties of the game (unilateral 
coordination). In his outstanding discussion of the political economy of macroeconomic 
adjustments, Webb systematised the wide range of policies aimed to manage or 
eliminate external imbalances in three main categories. First, ‘external policies’ denote 
the cases when «controls [are] imposed or adjusted on trade and capital flows, and 
exchange rates can be adjusted. Deficit countries might restrict imports and capital 
outflows or devalue their currencies; surplus countries might encourage imports and 
restrict capital inflows or revalue their currencies». The second way to manage external 
imbalances are the so-called symptom-management policies. Under such framework, 
«governments might intervene in foreign-exchange markets and balance-of-payment 
borrowing might be used to manage or offset the international market flows generated 
by different macroecomic policies». Lastly, internal policies encompass those situations 
when «governments […] adjust monetary and fiscal policies to eliminate imbalances 
between savings, investment, and consumptions that generate trade imbalances and to 
avoid crossnational interest-rate differentials that generate speculative international 
capital flows».  
However, none of the three strategies present an inherently asymmetrical 
character. External policies can be symmetrically applied on both sides, providing a 
moderate and sustainable diversion of trade and capital flows. Symptom management 
policies can be pursued in a mutually beneficial way by acting simultaneously on 
currency markets (strong-currency countries buy weak currencies while deficit countries 
selloff their exchange reserves to upkeep their coinage), and balance-of-payment 
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financing can be provided at reasonable conditions as regard interests and maturity. 
Finally, also domestic policies can be adjusted symmetrically by finding a middle ground 
between a painful fiscal and monetary retrenchment in deficit units and an inflationary 
expansion in surplus countries. The problem though, is that in cases of symmetrical 
adjustment autonomy is put in a secondary place, as states are supposed to sacrifice 
their domestic needs to govern cooperatively the spillovers of trade and financial 
interdependence. Instead, in the following pages I illustrate how adjustment strategies 
actually turn out to be when are states are considered as unequal actors, with monetary 
leaders, by assumption, supposed to get their own way by pushing other countries to 
bear a greater cost for managing external imbalances.  
 
2.4.1 External policies in an asymmetrical perspective 
External policies tend to be rather efficacious in correcting trade imbalances, since they 
hit directly the absorption capacity of indebted actors while making export 
competitiveness decline and people to consume more in surplus countries. For this 
reason, for example, monetary leaders in a deficit position frequently resort to the 
asymmetric application of external policies to cure deep payment imbalances between 
them and potential followers. The decennial US-Chinese diatribe on the alleged 
undervaluation of the yuan and its supposed detrimental effect on the US 
manufacturing is probably the most recent and evident instance in this respect. In that 
case, the American request was formulated so as to preserve the dollar’s resilience vis 
à vis other currencies while forcing the Chinese to bear the consequences of a 
revaluation on their export competitiveness in North America and Western Europe. The 
asymmetrical application of external policies manifests itself in two elements: first, 
which country actually makes the intervention and second, the magnitude of the 
intervention, whether on currencies, tariffs or restrictions. Usually, leaders require other 
actors to undertake an exchange rate realignment, so as to preserve the home country’s 
purchasing power against the rest of the system and avoid being blamed for bargaining 
weakness by domestic constituencies. Furthermore, past cases suggest that the 
required adjustment would probably be less intense than the discrepancy in 
macroecomic fundamentals suggests, and would take place at a slower pace than if 
market forces would have realised it.  
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 On the contrary, when tariffs and restrictions are applied asymmetrically, they are 
usually realised domestically by a deficit country in the attempt to reduce imports or 
stop the drain on domestic capitals caused by currency misalignments. Large countries 
usually reduce imports to enjoy an ‘optimal tariff’ effect, which makes their terms of 
trade improve due to the feedback effect on global prices (Conybeare 1984; Gowa and 
Mansfield 1993; Norrlof 2010; Pahre 1999). Small countries resort to tariffs and 
restrictions on trade to reduce their import absorption (although they pay a price in 
terms of greater costs), and resort to capital controls to avoid an abrupt currency 
depreciation and a painful credit crunch during balance-of-payment crisis. Recently, 
exchange controls have been heavily rediscovered by small countries affected by 
disruptive financial crisis: Malaysia and Thailand imposed comprehensive capital 
restraints during the Asian crisis of 1997, while China had never relaxed the panoply of 
controls on its financial account that have long restricted the inflow or outflow of 
capitals from the country (Bussiere et al. 2013; Cohen 2003, 2007). Intuitively, while the 
imposition of an optimal tariff is a leader-biased form of external adjustment, the 
unilateral imposition of trade and exchange controls is one of the few weapons in the 
hands of small countries to cushion the effects of a currency crisis at the detriment of 
the leader’s investments in the country.  
 However, the implementation of these recipes faces also a set of political and 
economic disincentives that make it sometimes problematic when an asymmetrical 
leader-follower relation is in place. Firstly, it is not always possible, nor desirable, 
blocking trade in services and commodities that might be essential for a country’s 
economic life, highly valuable for its industrial supply chain, or necessary to fight a 
military campaign and maintaining an effective military instrument. When imports like 
energy products, military equipment and other raw materials, for example, play the 
lion’s share in dragging down a country’s current account, the impracticability of this 
perspective sounds over-clear. Exchange rates realignment, likewise, might be a 
smoother way to reach the adjustment goal, but it is equally unviable in numerous 
situations. Particularly, both deficit and surplus countries can hold different reasons to 
reject changes in the exchange rate as a solution to payment imbalances. First, weak-
currency states tend to have an ideological bias which considers currency downward 
instability as a ‘shame’, a symbol of weakness and declining international prestige 
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(Eichengreen 2008; Helleiner 1998). Second, actors with relevant military commitments, 
affected by chronic payment deficits, might suffer the consequences of a loss of 
purchasing power on their military efficiency. Third, export-oriented countries can be 
restrained by the detrimental effect of a currency realignment on the international 
competitiveness of their main national products.  
  
2.4.2 Symptom-management policies and the spectre of conditionality 
Moving on to the second group of solutions, foreign-exchange intervention and 
international lending bypass the exigency for a concrete rebalancing of trade and 
investments to face immediate liquidity needs and ward off occasional speculative 
attacks. In principle, their use to increase the policy autonomy of major and minor 
powers facing temporary difficulties with their balance of payment is both possible and 
remarkably effective in the short-run.  
It has to be noted that intervention in currency markets and international 
lending can be applied symmetrically or asymmetrically as well as external policies. On 
the one hand, open market intervention can be realised symmetrically when the main 
actors buy and sell their currencies coordinative on foreign markets. On the contrary, in 
an asymmetrical system the country with the greater monetary power imposes to other 
actors most of the costs and risks of foreign exchange intervention. If the weaker part is 
in deficit, it will burn its wealth in foreign assets in the attempt to delay as much as 
possible the day of reckoning with financial markets. Contrarily, if the weaker part is in 
surplus it will bear the risk of capital losses and inflationary consequences on its 
domestic markets to save the stronger state’s purchasing power on international 
markets. On the other hand, bilateral or multilateral lending may take the form of a de-
facto subsidy in case no policy conditions are imposed on the deficit actor in need for 
financing. Big debtors and countries with a high relevance from the diplomatic or 
military point of view usually possess the bargaining chips to achieve this condition. On 
the contrary, financial assistance can be a prime instrument to redistribute the burden 
of adjustments from capital-rich countries to deficit actors by imposing conditions to 
grant the loan. Small debtors are the more likely to be subject to this kind of financial 
blackmail.  
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Overall, both strategies are not exempt from limits and contradictions especially 
in the middle and long-run. On the one hand, foreign-exchange intervention shows 
serious problems of sustainability in the long term for both deficit and surplus 
economies. For the former, the key issue is the evident quantitative constraint given the 
necessary presence of hard currency reserves for the intervention. For the latter, the 
accumulation of foreign exchange is limited by the rise of inflationary phenomena which 
risk vanishing the efforts to keep the real exchange rate stable9. Moreover, foreign 
exchange accumulation on appreciating currencies implies a large credit and exchange-
rate risk on accumulated financial stocks. Indeed, the mass of foreign liabilities that is 
collected in central bank’s vaults is likely to generate capital losses for monetary 
authorities should the exchange rate ratio brake unexpectedly or even be orderly 
realigned. Likewise, foreign debtors may default on their obligations forcing 
governments to intervene to fix the balance-sheet losses of central banks.  
On the other hand, multilateral or bilateral lending (e.g. IMF loans or currency 
swaps agreements) is certainly a viable way to fill temporary shortages of international 
liquidity in deficit countries, but may potentially contradict the idea of autonomy as the 
primary goal of sovereign states in international relations. Past records show that 
unconditional lending is a rare exception marked by high political motives. In any anther 
case, especially when small underdeveloped countries are involved, international loans 
have been made contingent on internal reforms and austere macroeconomic policies. 
Examples range from the Latin American crisis of the 1980’s to the Asian Crisis of 1997, 
characterised by the strong discontent of local populations for the neo-liberal reforms 
and draconian budget cuts requested by the IMF to grant assistance to troubled states. 
More recently, EU-backed financial assistance to Greece, Portugal and Ireland have been 
attached with the same limitations to policy autonomy, subordinating the concession of 
loans to measures of fiscal retrenchment.  
 
                                                          
9 The sterilisation of the increased money supply due to the open market operations can be an effective 
short-term safeguard against this risk, but it is hardly sustainable in the long run. Sterilisation implies the 
issuance of bonds by the central bank and the government that drains part of the oversupply of the 
national coinage consequential to the purchase of foreign currency on the domestic financial market. 
Nevertheless, markets can be flooded with bonds until a reasonable threshold, afterwards their value 
risks falling and economic actors may prefer a more rewarding investment which causes the asset-price 
inflation in any case. 
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2.4.3 Domestic policy adjustments  
Internal adjustments are carried out with both fiscal and monetary policy instruments. 
On the one hand, current account deficits are cured through fiscal measures by raising 
taxes and cutting governments’ expenditures. By reducing state-financed 
infrastructures, cutting public workers’ wages or interrupting ordinary financing to 
public services, the government de facto depresses domestic economic growth, and 
obtains both a reduction of import consumptions and a disinflation of domestic prices 
that, other things being equal, can boost exports and realise a trade surplus. A similar 
outcome is obtained by raising taxes, whose main effect is to divert monetary balances 
out of citizens and firms into the state’s budget, causing households to spend less on 
present and future consumptions and firms to reduce investments. Both behaviours, ça 
va sans dire, are ultimately aimed at reducing the country’s import bill and restore a 
positive current account balance. Should surplus actors apply the same recipe 
symmetrically, they would expand the domestic income by lowering taxes, increasing 
spending and investments and encouraging the rise of salaries and wages.  
 On the other hand, monetary policy adjustments follow a completely different 
logic. While taxation and expenditure modify directly economic actors’ trends in savings, 
consumptions and investments, the stronger effect of monetary policy is to channel 
cross-border financial flows out of surplus economies towards deficit units via a careful 
use of economic incentives. In this respect, the most important of monetary instruments 
is the central bank’s discount rate, which determines the cost, for commercial banks, of 
borrowing money from the central bank to cover their short-term mandatory liquidity 
requirements10. In turn, this cost reverberates on the market interest rate that banks 
apply to one another and on the lending rate at which they extend credit to households 
and firms. Hence, a high interest rate in an indebted economy determines higher yields 
on financial and real assets making investments more palatable to foreign investors. 
Indeed, although central banks are usually supposed to manage interest rates for 
targeting inflation, stabilising financial crisis, and guiding the country’s GDP as close as 
possible to its potential level   ̶  as testified by the most known inward-oriented policy 
                                                          
10 Seldom, other instruments such as REPO rate, refinancing rate and the deposit rate are used as main 
policy instrument or complement of the discount rate. Data from major financial institutions usually 
provide data on the main policy instrument for each central bank. 
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rule for monetary policy, the so-called Taylor Rule  ̶  interest rates have also a powerful 
effect on cross-country capital movements and exchange rates. Whenever a central 
bank increases interest rates, people around the world buy its currency to exploit the 
arbitrage opportunity given by the differential between returns on investments in this 
country and the cost of borrowing in their own economies. This phenomenon brings to 
the appreciation of the demanded currency if the country has balanced external 
accounts, or provokes the stability of the exchange rate when the local currency is 
already under pressure to depreciate. 
In conclusion, both fiscal and monetary policy can be applied symmetrically 
when both parties set a common ground for a cooperative and opposite response to 
currency misalignment which is, simultaneously, expansive in surplus countries and 
restrictive in deficit states. Conversely, asymmetrical systems see one of the two parties 
pursuing policies in tune with its domestic conditions (leader), while the other is forced 
to design over-expansive or over-tightening policies to offset balance-of-payment 
disequilibria (followers). In the next sections, I focus on the specific case of monetary 
policy coordination, in the attempt to identify a policy pattern to be used as univocal 
indicator of cases of followership in monetary policy. 
 
 
2.5  Monetary policy adjustments: Cooperation or Coordination?  
Monetary economists and political scientists have developed different approaches to 
cross-border policy adaptations in monetary affairs. For the firsts, all the acts 
undertaken by states to govern the spillovers of economic interdependence belong to 
the general concept of cooperation, of which policy coordination is nearly a synonym. 
In a seminal policy paper, the economist Ralph Bryant defines cooperation as «an 
umbrella term for the entire spectrum of interactions among national governments 
designed to deal with the […] cross-border spillovers among national economies. 
“Consultation”, “mutual recognition”, various forms of “coordination” and “explicit 
harmonization” are varieties of intergovernmental cooperation» (Bryant 1995, Cit. in 
Andrews 2006).  
Initially, the early IPE reflection on the nature of international economic relations 
offered the same all-embracing notion that, mimicking the conventional wisdom of 
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economics, ignores coordination and subsumes it into this wide umbrella-concept 
(Cohen 2000; Keohane 1984; Milner 1992). In the account of these authors, cooperation 
implies a reciprocal act of policy adaptation that states would not have pursued without 
the prior establishment of a negotiated agreement. Cooperation is preceded by an 
explicit negotiation and is fruit of a mutual strategic decision, entailing at least the 
expectation of mutual gains for the participant countries. Recent works, on the contrary, 
have decisively criticised this narrow definition specifying that subsuming the notion of 
coordination into that of cooperation risks to rule out most of the implicit and unilateral 
policy adaptations that take place every day throughout the global and regional 
monetary systems. As reminded by Andrews (2006), the last formal negotiation aimed 
at coordinating monetary policies among major countries dates back, at best, to well-
known episodes like the Louvre and the Plaza Agreements. It is not a coincidence that 
studies developed around that period endorse such a narrow and formal definition of 
cooperation based on procedural negotiation and reciprocal adjustments, but that kind 
of events, both before and after the 1980’s, are all but commonplace in the politics of 
monetary relations.  
To counter the view of both economists and the first generation of IPE scholars, 
Andrews separates cooperation from coordination, and elaborates the concepts of 
procedural and substantive coordination (Andrews 2006). While the term ‘procedural’ 
designates the concrete act of adapting national policies, ‘substantial’ indicates the 
condition where policies are mutually appropriate according to an exogenous criterion 
set by the parties’ political objective. By focusing on the procedural side of the 
phenomenon, Andrews posits, early IPE scholars would miss that most of the 
substantive coordination that actually underpins interstate payment systems is in fact 
informal, implicit (i.e. non-previously negotiated), and non-symmetrical in the 
distribution of costs and burdens. «Instead, much coordination is constructed more or 
less unilaterally, on the bases of policy subordination simply because the weaker party 
to the interaction considers discord to be excessively costly. […] in such instances 
coordination is definitely not cooperative in the commonsense meaning of the term»11 
(Andrews 2006, 110). On this basement, Andrews reverses previous conclusions and 
defines cooperation (or cooperative coordination) the situations where the burdens of 
                                                          
11 Emphasis in the original text 
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adjustment are equally and substantively (not procedurally) distributed among relevant 
actors. Coordination, instead, would simply designate the general act of policy 
adaptation (procedural definition), which may take a wide variety of substantial forms 
in relation to an exogenous policy goal, from cooperation to unilateral adaptation.  
In last decades, episodes of formalised and negotiated mutual adjustments have 
constantly declined, while informal and unilateral substantive coordination have grown 
increasingly likely as effect of the convergence of economic ideas and the spectacular 
upsurge of financial transactions across national capital markets (Andrews 1994a, 
1994b; Kirshner 1999; Pauly 1995; Rose 1994; Webb 1994). In this respect, monetary 
policy plays a major role in directing the cross-border flows of financial investments, and 
is probably the most relevant domain to be affected by a system-wide expansion of 
capital mobility. Monetary policy coordination, generally, entails the administration of 
interest rates, official reserves and money supply to the achievement of a shared 
politico-economic goal, which in an asymmetrical monetary system is the preservation 
of currency stability against the pressure of financial markets to correct fundamental 
imbalances.  
As predicated by the already-mentioned Mundell-Flaming model, in a system 
characterised by diffuse capital mobility, the autonomy of monetary policy and the 
stability of the exchange rate cannot be pursued together at the same time by all actors 
(Fleming 1962; Mundell 1961, 1963). Whenever two central banks diverge on interest 
rates, investors move their capitals to the market offering the highest return, and cause 
the local currency to appreciate in this country and depreciate in the other, or vice versa. 
In this context, substantive monetary coordination is the adaptation of interest rates to 
the goal of currency stability, which is concretely realised through the compensation of 
macroeconomic imbalances. Notably, substantive coordination of interest rates, 
reserves and money supply should not be confused with a generic cross-country 
convergence of these fundamental monetary variables. In his writing, Andrews 
illustrates the difference between the two phenomena  ̶  coordination and convergence   ̶ 
through the paramount example of British policy during the 1992 EMS crisis.  
«[States] participating in the exchange-rate mechanism (ERM) of the EMS during the 
foreign-exchange crisis of 1992 and 1993 and experiencing speculative capital outflows 
needed to raise domestic interest rates in order to maintain their exchange-rate pegs to 
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the deutschmark. In fact, many of them needed to raise interest rates to level far 
surpassing those in Germany. This constituted an extreme instance of a more general 
phenomenon that Fritz Machlup once called “compensatory corrections” […] By contrast, 
monetary authorities in the United Kingdom demonstrated their policy independence by 
refusing to raise interest rates in order to defend the sterling’s deutschmark parity. 
Somewhat paradoxically, the result was that UK interest rates were (at least temporarily) 
more convergent with German rates than were those of several of the states remaining 
within the ERM» (Andrews 2006) 
Therefore, while convergence entails the act of two countries aimed at arriving at the 
same point, whether it is a policy position such as financial market liberalisation or a 
quantitative benchmark such as interest rates, to understand whether a policy is actually 
coordinative or not one must solely look at the political goal implied in their realisation. 
Substantial coordination of interest rates can entail a deep divergence rather than a 
convergence if this is consistent with the expected result of such policy move.  
The next two sections analyse how monetary policy coordination is supposed to look 
like according to the very different approaches of monetary macroeconomics and 
International Political Economy. In the first case, a series of different and mutually 
contradictory recipes prescribe optimal policy choices aimed at maximising the general 
welfare of the relevant actors included in complex DSGE12 models. In the second case, 
the IPE framework assumes that currency stability and asymmetrical adjustments are 
the main goals of states engaged in the monetary game, and imagine how monetary 
policy should be coordinated to achieve these targets.  
 
 
2.6  The economics of Monetary Policy Coordination: a brief overview 
As concerns monetary policy coordination, the divide between economics and political 
science goes even beyond the terminological difference between cooperation and 
coordination. The two sides of social science have rather a radically different ontology 
on the main object of research about inter-state monetary policy adaptation. Basically, 
economic theory has always wandered if policy coordination between central banks is a 
                                                          
12 Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium. 
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desirable and welfare-improving practice or, contrarily, a counterproductive and 
groundless attempt driven by misleading political factors. A second and related question 
pertains the magnitude of economic gains that could possibly arise from a coordinative 
response to economic shocks. In this section, I provide a brief account of what 
mainstream economics suggests in terms of optimal practices for a welfare-maximising 
monetary policy coordination. This digression is necessary to exclude that monetary 
followership, rather than being a politically-driven phenomenon, is the simple 
transposition in the practice of the optimal policies suggested by the mainstream of 
macroeconomics. 
 The scholarly debate is usually divided into a first and second generation of 
theories, which produce divergent conclusions about desirability and advantages of 
cross-border coordination of interest rates. The so-called “first generation” research, 
from the pioneering works by Hamada to the dynamic games approach by Rogoff and 
Taylor at the end of the 1980’s, concluded that discretional cooperation, even taking 
into account a wide range of intervening factors, can be frequently counterproductive 
and definitely non-necessary (Rogoff 1985; Taylor 1985). Successively, the so-called 
“second generation” (also known as New Open Economy Macroeconomics), turned less 
pessimistic as regards the positive effects of monetary policy coordination. However, 
most of these studies concluded that the marginal gains of coordinative policies are so 
feeble to make the choice of internationally-oriented rules almost irrelevant (Canzoneri, 
Cumby, and Diba 2005; Eichengreen 2013; Obstfeld and Rogoff 2002; Taylor 2013c). 
Economic theory, in general, prescribes which rules for international monetary policy 
coordination should be symmetrically applied by interacting countries in order to 
improve the overall welfare, generally intended as growth in consumption and wealth 
balances in two hypothetical markets. Balance of payment concerns are assumed to 
adjust automatically under the assumption of rigid prices and wages offset by pure 
floating exchange rates. In the end, the result is a babel of different recipes, most of 
which explicitly sceptical on the desirability of designing outward-oriented policy rules 
with little and uncertain gains expected in return. Nowadays, there is no of central banks 
having ever adopted such specific policy rules oriented at improving the global welfare 
at the expenses of its sovereign prerogatives.  
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The balance-of-payment implications of monetary policy have been discussed in 
a series of recent macroeconomic researches in reaction to the peculiarly large 
imbalances that have characterised the global payment system in the first decade of the 
XXI century. A small group of authors have tried to design policy rules oriented at easing 
the correction of payment disequilibria,  and they turned out increasingly sceptical 
about the usefulness of monetary policy in this respect. In McKinnon (McKinnon 2009, 
2010a, 2010b), Ferrero at al. (2009), and others (Eichengreen 2011a; Rickards 2011) the 
main cause of the ballooning post-Cold War American deficit is identified in different 
patterns of investments and savings between the United States and its creditors 
countries in East Asia, which would be better cured by fiscal retrenchment rather than 
interest-rate coordination or exchange-rate corrections. What different economic 
theories concede, however, is that in case an adjustment through the fiscal channel fails, 
monetary policy would make the big difference of setting the degree of volatility at 
which nominal exchange rates will correct to the global oversupply of a weak currency 
and the shortage of a strong currency. Other authors have written in this respect of the 
choice between ‘slow burn’ and ‘fast burn’ adjustment scenarios, where the second is 
characterised by a catastrophic volatility of exchange rates (Faruqee et al. 2007; Ferrero, 
Gertler, and Svensoon 2009).   
Yet, still little or no political implications can be drawn out of these theoretical 
reflections. In spite of the welfare-maximising rules that the latest NOEM theory has 
tried to design, real-world concerns of political elites show a predominant focus on 
balance-of-payment problems and systematic deviations from ‘optimal’ theoretically-
designed policy rules (Gray 2012; Taylor 2013a). Contrary to the mainstream of 
monetary economics, which assumes the pure-floating exchange rate regime as given, 
reality displays a variety of intermediate regimes other than hard pegs and pure floating 
that presently dominate the stage of currency relations (Klein and Shambaugh 2010; 
Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger 2005). As suggested by unorthodox approaches, the only 
task on which an internationally-oriented monetary policy is definitely effective is on 
controlling the pace of exchange rate adjustments to global or regional macroeconomic 
imbalances. However, the main question of a political-economy analysis of monetary 
coordination is not which policies maximise welfare or reduce volatility, but to explain 
who, how and why surrenders its policy autonomy to guarantee currency stability and 
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slow-burn adjustments to strongly imbalanced monetary systems. The ‘who’ question is 
implied in the topic of this research: great powers in the role of monetary leaders 
systematically get their own way, while just a sub-set of minor countries gets to be 
autonomous. The ‘how’ question is delineated in the next section as regards monetary 
policy coordination and in greater detail in the next chapter with a complete overview 
of alternative strategies of monetary followership and neutrality. Finally, the ‘why’ 
question is answered in the fourth and fifth chapter by established theories of monetary 
followership and the innovations brought by the small/major holder divide.   
 
 
2.7 Monetary policy coordination and the Compensation Rule 
The way monetary policy serves currency stability should be rather clear at this point of 
the discussion: the interest-rate differential between two countries affects the 
geographical allocation of capitals by cross-border investors and supports weakening 
currencies on the Forex market. Countries in need of financing have to widen the 
difference between their return on investments and that of surplus countries to attract 
capitals and cover the hiatus between savings and investments in their economies. 
Countries with a protracted surplus must encourage, through low interest rates, the 
outflow of their excessive savings to provide a fruitful engagement for this financial 
wealth in foreign markets. The mechanism holds equally when central banks centralise 
the management of the country’s stock of foreign assets through foreign exchange 
accumulation and reinvest official reserves directly in deficit-state markets. However, 
the distributive impact of this background in terms of policy autonomy is not given, but 
contingent on the monetary power of states that must choose along a wide policy range 
running from followership by the deficit unit (which tightens monetary policy alone) to 
followership by the surplus part (which relaxes its monetary policy unilaterally).  In the 
middle, the situation that latest reflections in IPE have called ‘cooperative coordination‘ 
or simply cooperation, where surplus countries moderately expand their credit policy 
while deficit countries tighten the belt, but not as much as they would have done 
unilaterally.     
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Monetary power, as defined in the first chapter, is the element determining 
where the outcome of an adjustment bargaining is placed along the scheme. To recall 
previous considerations, monetary power depends primarily on a country’s solvency 
and liquidity position (deficit or surplus) and its influence over the monetary system plus 
the effect of non-financial factors that are more apt to be exploited by currency leaders. 
These exogenous factors  ̶  political, military or economic   ̶  can affect a country’s 
proneness to sacrifice policy autonomy unilaterally without a similar move or concession 
on the other side. Whenever monetary power is structurally and protractedly in favour 
of one actor, a monetary arrangement is defined asymmetric. The stronger part is the 
leader, while the choice of other countries is limited to the alternative among 
followership and neutrality. In asymmetrical systems, followers manage systematically 
their monetary policy to compensate the capital flows generated by balance of payment 
fundamentals, while the leader gains, thanks to this follower’s will to sacrifice domestic 
objectives, the privilege to select its first-best policy among a full range of alternatives. 
Specifically, followers in a deficit position finance their balance of payment 
disequilibria with a positive differential of real interest rates, so as to make investments 
in the domestic market more palatable to international savers and keep the currency 
stability unchallenged. On the contrary, surplus followers foster investments in the 
leader’s market with a zero or negative interest-rate gap that might be unfitting for their 
own economies, but incentivises local firms and banks to find investment opportunities 
abroad for the country’s excess of savings13. The flows of currency generated by these 
                                                          
13 Generally, the purchase of financial instruments denominated in the core-currency follows almost 
naturally given the greater development of leaders’ capital markets in terms of liquidity, depth and 
complexity. 
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policy moves maintain the stability of the leader’s coinage despite its domestic policies 
generate structural imbalance, either in the positive or negative direction. This kind of 
response to macroeconomic imbalances, for its visible regularity, will be defined 
henceforward the Compensation Rule of monetary policy, because it aims at 
compensating unilaterally the followers’ current account position. In accordance with 
the rule, the following scheme sums up the possible policy interactions of a leader-
follower framework under different balance-of-payment conditions. In the boxes below, 
I listed the expected movement of the leader’s currency given any possible follower’s 
move. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In this research, the empirical focus will be on the mechanisms through which 
monetary policy is used to compensate macroeconomic imbalances by surplus 
economies vis à vis a deficit leader. On the one hand, I focus on this situation follows 
three considerations. The first is the understudy of surplus countries by the political-
economy literature, which as I demonstrate in chapter four, is patently biased on cases 
of small deficit countries with weak financial markets and lacking international 
credibility. Second, I look to the deficit leader/surplus followers scheme and not to 
alternative models (surplus leader/surplus follower) because if most of a system’s major 
actors show a substantial current account surplus all at once, it is unlikely that the 
leader, whose market is presumably the largest of the entire system, runs the same 
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performance (for lack of end-markets). Thirdly, in the rare cases where this occurs, 
evidently the deficit market supporting the simultaneous surplus of both followers and 
leaders is placed outside the monetary area, and towards that market the two parties 
experience a convergent of interests rather than a conflict.  
On the other hand, the choice of focusing on monetary policy is not to understate 
the importance of fiscal policy, but simply to provide a wider overlook to the 
phenomenon of monetary followership14. Indeed, focusing on monetary coordination is 
the best way to detect and explain existent asymmetrical relations in the long-run (i.e. 
more years and data) rather than concentrate simply on the two-three years of the 
adjustment conflict. Secondly, monetary policy, because it delays persistently the 
correction of payment imbalances, has been historically the preferred and most 
frequent form of adjustment by monetary followers, which would rather sacrifice their 
autonomy on an obscure and complicated thing like central banking than touching 
directly their citizens’ everyday life by operating on taxes and expenses. Last, but not 
the least, even when fiscal policy becomes a necessary part of the adjustment several 
factors can make it ineffective compared to monetary policy if leaders and followers 
belong to diverse models of capitalism or have a different level of economic 
development. For example, China and Saudi Arabia responded to the 2008 global 
financial crisis with a huge fiscal stimulus, but the impact of these measures on global 
imbalances pales in comparison to their monetary complements, like Riyadh’s low 
interest-rate policy or the spectacular accumulation of foreign exchange by the People’s 
Bank of China (McKinnon 2009; Vermeiren 2013b).  
The next chapter describes in detail the indicators of the dependent variable of 
this research, illustrating the concrete economic-policy strategies that minor states have 
used to remain neutral in the monetary game and the different way in which minor 
states follow a currency leader in monetary affairs.  
 
 
 
                                                          
14 Despite being called ‘monetary’ followership, it is worth reminding that neither in the literature nor in 
this research this phenomenon is intended to exclude fiscal policy coordination or other strategies 
unrelated to interest rates and money supply from the study of the politics of money and exchange rates. 
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3.1  Leadership and Hegemony in International Relations: a brief overview 
The concept of monetary (or currency) leadership arrives relatively late in the IPE 
theoretical reflection, and differs fundamentally from the similar concept of ‘hegemony’ 
that has commonly characterised the discussion on hierarchy and power in international 
relations. In the next sections, a review is provided on the way major theorists in 
different disciplines have dealt with the topic of international primacy or predominance, 
and if this is the case, on how these authors have differentiated leadership and 
hegemony from each other. A special focus will be given to neorealism and the English 
School in IR and to the early debate on Hegemonic Stability Theory in the IPE framework. 
Afterwards, I explore how the same research has been conducted thus far in the specific 
field of the international politics of money and exchange rates. Finally, I elaborate a 
possible classification to distinguish what characterises leadership and hegemony in the 
international monetary system.   
Within the realist theory, hegemony is commonly conceived as one of the 
possible distributions of power and prestige in an interstate system. Traditionally, this 
view counterpoises hegemony with balance of power, and discusses about the 
consequences of the two power distributions on the likelihood of war and peace. 
Concretely, in this perspective the word hegemony designates a particular shape of the 
international political system, structured around the military superiority of a single 
predominant power. For instance, Mearsheimer (2001) defines hegemony as the 
unrestrained control by a single country over its political space. In this condition, no 
state in the system is able to oppose to the hegemon’s will, while the hegemonic power 
is always able to obtain the others’ compliance by using a wide range of levers, included 
military coercion. Hedley Bull (1977) considers hegemonic systems as an intermediate 
form of hierarchical international system, placed between the tighter form known as 
dominance and the looser form known as primacy. As he puts it, «[where] a great power 
exercises hegemony over the lesser powers in a particular area or constellation, there is 
resort to force and the threat of force, but this is not habitual and uninhibited but 
occasional and reluctant.» (Bull 1977).  
After the Cold War, theories of unipolarism have generally used the terms 
hegemony and leadership interchangeably, but have maintained, on the conceptual 
ground, the equation between unipolar and hegemonic systems (Krauthammer 1991; 
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Mowle and Sacko 2007; Wohlforth 1999). If anything, the post-Cold War ‘unipolar 
moment’ was indeed the quintessential of a hegemonic system, concentrating as much 
military, economic and ideational power in the hands of the United States as it was never 
observed before in the history of international relations. In sum, the views of realist IR 
scholars on the nature of leadership and hegemony seem to share at least three 
common elements: first, they see hegemony as a mere condition of the system, 
connoted by the exercise, by a single actor, of an overly superior military capability. 
Second, it is widely irrelevant how the stronger state exerts its military predominance, 
while the hegemonic condition is merely defined by the incapacity of other states to 
challenge, or even simply resist, the hegemon’s will. Lastly, the concept of leadership is 
either subsumed into hegemony or simply not used.  
An alternative view on the issue emerged after the Cold War when a renovated 
interest for the topic brought scholars to ask for a purposeful action of the dominant 
power in order to forge and govern a pattern of institutional relations beneficial to the 
whole system. For this second strand, the mere exertion of power preponderance is not 
sufficient to make a hegemonic country.  Rather, a major state should «purposefully 
[exercise] its overwhelming power to impose order on the international system» (Layne 
2006), or engage actively in «building, developing, and sustaining […] international 
institutions […] which reflect the negotiation and renegotiation of hegemonic bargains 
with other states in the system» (Jesse et al. 2012). Furthermore, a wave of interest for 
the concepts of hegemony and leadership has come with the rise of regional powers in 
the non-western world. The authors dealing with this topic have frequently emphasised 
the distinction between hegemons and leaders based on the extent of force and 
coercion, rather than economic incentives and ideational convergence, which the 
strongest states uses to advance its own interests. Accordingly, hegemony would be the 
coercive and exploitative face of an asymmetrical power relation, while leadership 
involves a reciprocal flow of benefits, a pre-existent convergence on shared interests or 
the socialisation of followers through the internalisation of common norms and ideas 
(Burges 2008; Destradi 2010; Malamud 2011; Nabers 2010; Schirm 2009; Wiener 1995).  
Finally, it is worth noting that the concept of leadership has received a special 
attention in the field of alliance politics. Here, the term ‘leader’ refers to asymmetric 
alliances where military and diplomatic assistance is unidirectional, with a major power 
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providing most of the alliance’s common resources, and one or more minor powers 
consuming the leader’s security in exchange for some valuable compensation (Cesa 
2010; A. F. Cooper, Higgott, and Nossal 1991). In this context, the leader is the state ‘in 
command’ of an alliance, which retains the last word about the exercise of force against 
the enemy and the organisation of the alliance’s armed forces in peaceful times 
(Colombo 2001). In this minority, but relevant perspective, leadership implies an 
outcome of political subordination   ̶  originated out of a situation of asymmetrical 
vulnerability  ̶  between a single strongest state and one or more minor actors playing 
the role of ‘followers’. For example, no one would deny the United States is the 
hegemonic power in the American continent or the Persian Gulf. Likewise though, no 
one would ever argue it is the leader of such countries like Venezuela, Cuba or Iran, 
which are subject nonetheless to the influence of the American hegemonic power.  
 
 
3.2   Hegemony and Leadership in the monetary system: the early debate 
Thus far, I explored how the literature has dealt with the concepts of leadership and 
hegemony looking mostly at IR, realist-minded, authors. However, the topic of 
asymmetrical relations in monetary and exchange-rate affairs has been one of the most 
discussed in IPE theory since its establishment as early as the 1970’s. Essentially, two 
approaches to the study of hierarchical monetary systems have been developed. One 
aims at identifying the international role of national currencies to infer power relations 
from this positioning. The other analyses directly the patterns of economic interaction 
between great powers and minor states to understand preferences and strategies of 
leaders and hegemons.  
A noteworthy contribution in the first field is undoubtedly Susan Strange’s “The 
Politics of International Currencies”, where the British scholar elaborates a four-tailed 
taxonomy of national currencies based on their status on international markets 
including, trade, finance and central banking. In order of relevance, national coinages 
are defined as: a) Top Currency; b) Master Currency; c) Negotiated Currency; d) Neutral 
Currency (Strange 1971). These conditions, in Strange’s view, are useful to indicate the 
currency’s market-based role in international transactions, but include also the political 
influence of the issuer country over the actors conducting most of their transactions in 
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its core-currency. For example, the difference between Master Currency and Top 
Currency is illuminating in this respect. On the one hand, with the first Strange describes 
those coinages enjoying a vast international use thanks to the leader’s recurrent 
politico-military pressure. On the other hand, the condition of Top Currency is about the 
use that international market actors make of a certain currency, in particular, as a store 
of value by investors and central banks, as a means of exchange in international trade 
and foreign exchange interventions and as unit of account for internationally traded 
commodities. Today, the US dollar is the only money enjoying this pivotal position, 
which is more commonly defined international key currency. Exactly like Strange’s Top 
Currency, the greenback is characterised by a massive worldwide use as unit of account, 
means of exchange and reserve of purchasing power by worldwide private and public 
actors. Regarding the other two categories, a Negotiated currency follows more or less 
the dynamics of a Master Currency, but this kind of political construction emerges when 
the followers’ compliance is bought through ad-hoc side-payments and bribes instead 
of being exhorted by means of military threats and economic deprivations. Lastly, the 
category of Neutral Currency would simply collect all the other countries that, for many 
reasons, do not enjoy any political control either on other countries’ policies or on 
transnational economic actors. 
Throughout successive decades, just one major scholar attempted to refine and 
update Strange’s taxonomy. In his ‘The Geography of Money’, Benjamin Cohen extended 
the possible currency positions to seven, ranging from the over-dominant Top Currency 
to the almost inexistent Pseudo-Currency (Cohen 1998). At the top layer, expectably, 
the definition is the same as in Strange’s work. The second layer is labelled ‘patrician 
currency’, and subsumes Master and Negotiated Currencies, plus non-politically 
imposed coinages enjoying nonetheless a wide international use. Within this broad 
category, the author puts today’s widely-traded currencies like the Japanese yen or the 
euro and core-currencies of monetary aggregations such as the former French franc and 
German deutschmark. The third layer devised by Cohen is that of ‘Elite Currencies’. To 
this group would belong all that coinages «sufficiently attractive to qualify for significant 
international use but of insufficient weight to carry much direct influence beyond their 
own national frontiers». To give an idea, widely known moneys like the British pound, 
the Swiss franc, the Italian lira, the Canadian and Australian dollar, although with 
61 
 
different degrees of strengths and credibility, are considered part of this group. Below 
this level, other categories hardly offer any insight into the concept of leadership or 
hegemony in the monetary system15.  
As regards the second approach to the study of leadership and hegemony in the 
monetary system, the most pertinent theoretical reflection is the longstanding debate 
around the hypotheses of the Hegemonic Stability Theory. Charles Kindleberger is 
unquestionably the main advocate of a clear distinction between these two phenomena, 
which he links to their diverse distributive attitude vis à vis potential followers. In his 
seminal writings, the author identifies two ways for great power to exploit the condition 
of ‘dominance’, namely a preponderant economic power over the rest of the system: 
leadership and exploitation (Kindleberger 1973, 1981). In the first ideal-type, the leader 
is supposed to renounce voluntarily to manage discretionally its own economic policy to 
provide order and stability to an international financial system prone to recurrent 
imbalances and crisis. Kindleberger predicts the non-cooperation of minor actors due to 
the effect of a collective action dilemma for the production of public goods. In 
international monetary relations, the public goods are identified in the stability of 
exchange rates and a safeguard mechanism against the risk of a Great Depression-style 
generalised deflation. Accordingly, in such context the leader is expected to procure 
unilaterally «a market for distress goods, a steady if not countercyclical flow of capital, 
[…] a rediscount mechanism for providing liquidity when the monetary system is frozen 
in panic [and] a degree of coordination of domestic monetary policies» (Kindleberger 
1981). By this way, the larger country internalises the cost of its partners’ defection and 
avoid a worldwide uncoordinated and competitive adjustment of systemic imbalances. 
Conversely, in exploitation the dominant actor abuses of its capacity to treat public 
goods   ̶  such as emergency lending or the access to its domestic market  ̶  as private 
goods, so that it can selectively exclude minor actors from enjoying the advantages of 
being part of the system. By playing on this form of pressure, the ‘exploiter’ extorts 
unequal gains from other countries as a consequence of its pivotal role in a monetary 
arrangement. In some of his successive works, to conform to the existing trend in IPE 
                                                          
15 ‘Plebeian Currencies’ firmly retain the legal tender inside their issuing countries, but play no role outside 
nor generate any significant volume of transactions. Behind this, three residual categories (Permeated, 
Quasi- and Pseudo-Currency) mark different degrees of descent into the hell of currency markets, where 
the market’s distrust for a national coinage affects local users and not solely international investors. 
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literature, Kindleberger redefines exploitation as ‘hegemony’ (Kindleberger 1986). In 
this way, he prefigured that distinction between an egoist and exploitative hegemony 
and a benign and farsighted leadership, underpinned by an ethical and moral afflatus16, 
which informed decades of scholarly debate on hierarchy in the international economic 
system. 
On the fundamental divide between a benign leader and an exploitative 
hegemon, others have built their own interpretation of this dichotomy. Knorr states that 
hegemony implies «supremacy in an area that the hegemonial state controls by superior 
coercive power, whereas leadership would entail a form of one-sided non-coercive 
influence characterised by a mutual flow of benefits between leaders and followers»17 
(Knorr 1975). The same pessimistic view on the distributive outcome of hegemonic 
systems is given by the so-called ‘coercive’ version of the HST. In this context, widely 
known thanks to the works of Robert Gilpin (Gilpin and Gilpin 1987; Gilpin 1976, 1981), 
the conceptual separation between leadership and hegemony is almost irrelevant. The 
economic hegemon, indeed, is intended as a multi-role superpower, which organises 
international economic relations to support its military and diplomatic grand strategy 
with the ultimate end of maintaining a top position in the system’s power hierarchy. 
Intuitively, this kind of actor leaves no or little space for renouncing to its policy 
autonomy for guaranteeing the smooth functioning of the international payment 
system. According to Gilpin, those countries coupling  a hegemonic role in the monetary 
arena and a primary power position in the international system present at least three 
characteristics: a) a large domestic market; b) a dynamic and technologically-advanced 
economy; c) the role of key/top currency for the national money (Gilpin and Gilpin 
1987).  
In the latest part of the debate on hegemonic stability and the monetary system, 
other authors have tried to overcome the dichotomy between an exploitative 
hegemony and a benevolent non-violent leader by considering coercive power as a tool 
                                                          
16 To give an idea of the degree of self-restraint that monetary leaders should possess to make the system 
function as Kindleberger imagined, he blamed hegemonic actors for not leaving «room for conscience, 
duty, obligation, or such old-fashioned notions as noblesse oblige […]». And he continues, referring to the 
exercise of dominance in the monetary system: «A hegemon presumably wants to do it in its own behalf. 
A leader […] is forced to "do it" by ethical training and by the circumstance of position» (Kindleberger 
1986a) 
17 Emphasis mine 
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to enforce established monetary agreements rather than a mere instrument of 
exploitation. In his game-theoretic study on the ‘Hegemonic Stability Theories of the 
International Monetary System’, Eichengreen (1989) identifies an ideal hegemonic 
power of the monetary system characterised by the issuance of the «internationally 
dominant currency» and in a greater relative size compared to its partners. He draws a 
dynamic game of incomplete information where the hegemon devalues its currency in 
mixed strategy to retaliate the episodes of beggar-thy-neighbour devaluation pursued 
by its smaller neighbours. Through this mechanism, it maintains stable exchange rates, 
which for simplicity is assumed as the sole and unique political goal of a monetary 
arrangement.  
Andrew Walter (1991) devoted an entire book to the issue of hegemony and 
leadership in the monetary system  ̶  using the two terms interchangeably. In this work, 
he performs a review of the main forms of international liquidity management, 
conjecturing on two major tasks that would characterise a «hegemonic governance» of 
the monetary system. The first is the establishment of international regimes by the 
definition of specific «ground rules of the game», complemented by the will to spend 
material resources to secure their enforcement. The second would be about 
«encouraging policy coordination» among the system’s members. In the empirical part 
of his work, the author sheds light on how hegemonic powers ought to support policy 
coordination by describing the historical controversy, known as ‘locomotive dispute’, 
between Japan and Germany on the one side, and the United States on the other. 
Walter, along with Eichengreen and, far later, Henning (2006), suggests that exchange-
rate manipulation is the key weapon in the hegemon’s hands to force its partners to the 
symmetric adjustment of systemic imbalances.  
 
 
3.3  Capital mobility and ‘passive leadership’: the second generation of theories 
on asymmetrical monetary regimes  
The set of definitions, regularities and hypotheses accompanying the early scholarly 
debate on asymmetrical monetary arrangements has been shocked, as of the 1990’s, by 
the profound structural change opened by the enormous increment of capital 
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movements across developed and developing countries. Slowly, scholars began to 
observe that public-goods and coercive theories of asymmetric monetary systems 
proved equally ineffective in accounting for some episodes where followers renounced 
to the their policy autonomy to enhance the leader’s or hegemon’s position. For 
example, policy coordination in the European monetary system during the 1980’s was 
led by the German Bundesbank, which set interest rates for the whole continent while 
other countries followed passively. However, contrary to both coercive and benevolent 
ideas on leadership, this was neither the result of military coercion nor an expression of 
Kindleberger’s ‘rational altruism’ from Germany to European neighbours (Andrews 
1994a; Kaelberer 2001). Pairwise, the wave of dollarization, hard pegs and capital 
market liberalisation that invested developing countries in the early 1990’s (especially 
Latin American and South-East Asian countries) has little or nothing to do with colonial-
fashioned bullying or the role of  United States as public-goods provider in the sense 
conceived by Kindleberger. The ‘second generation’ of theoretical works on hegemony 
and leadership in international monetary relations brings a significant contribution to 
this puzzling evidence.  
These researchers have developed radical innovations in traditional models of 
asymmetric monetary arrangements introducing the role of cross-border capital flows 
as an intervening exogenous variable in the conflict between leaders and followers for 
the distribution of macroeconomic adjustments. To simplify the novelty of this 
approach, the studies on monetary leadership (or passive leadership) rely on a different 
heuristic tool than the traditional Prisoner’s Dilemma used in the early debate: the so-
called ‘Game of Chicken’. Unlike the previously over-present dilemma, the Chicken 
Game does not produce a unique and stable Nash equilibrium, but two alternative 
equilibria (the cooperation-defection and the defection-cooperation outcomes) with 
three Pareto optimal solutions (the two NEs plus the cooperation-cooperation case). 
However, if all players are undoubtedly worse-off in case of mutual defection, which 
could be identified in monetary affairs with the consequences of a balance-of-payment 
crisis, as long as the game is static and players are assumed of equal bargaining power, 
there is no way to predict which of the two equilibria prevail.  
 The Game of Chicken sketches a remarkable picture of strategic incentives in a 
monetary system with high capital mobility, but as testified by its dual Nash equilibrium, 
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it remains unable to predict outcomes as long as players are assumed as equal in 
bargaining power. Second-generation authors argue that major players’ key bargaining 
tool is their asymmetric vulnerability to the consequences of currency and financial 
instability. In other words, stronger parts are able to deflect the adjustment onto weaker 
actors not solely by coercing or inducing other countries directly and purposefully, but 
simply by letting market forces work. In the classical example of a deficit country forced 
to follow interest rates of a surplus leader, the greater monetary power of the strong-
currency state lies in the different losses expected with an abrupt correction of exchange 
rates and capital flows to the large systemic imbalances. For a deficit actor indeed, the 
consequences of not preserving exchange-rate stability through internal deflation 
usually entail capital flight, shooting-up borrowing rates, volatile currency depreciation 
and high inflation. Up against its worst-case scenario, the weaker state usually minimises 
its policy autonomy and applies the Compensation Rule in order to make the local 
currency more palatable to international investors and avert the risk of economic 
shocks, even if this can be sub-optimal for its home economy.  
Abdelal tries to reconcile the old HST with the novelty of leadership theory 
distinguishing between an active leadership, which is able and willing to provide the 
public goods proposed by Kindleberger in his works, and a passive leadership, which 
provides a mere focal point around which potential followers must unilaterally adjust 
their interest rates to achieve currency stability (Abdelal 1998). The idea of passive 
leadership as the everyday currency of the international monetary relations has been 
endorsed by Andrews as well, for whom «parties that are better prepared to endure 
[policy] discord’s consequences […] simply by inaction [oblige] their more vulnerable 
partners to adapt their policies instead», then adding «This is what I mean by passive 
leadership» (Andrews 2006).  
 
 
3.4  Monetary Leadership as control over macroeconomic adjustments  
In previous sections, I reviewed how different generations of theoretical studies in IR 
and IPE have defined and distinguished the two phenomena of international leadership 
and hegemony. To summarise the main dividing lines crossing the scholarly reflection 
on the issue, at least three interpretations can be drawn on these two concepts. First, a 
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structural definition common in IR realism and the studies on unipolarism, considers 
hegemony as the material fact of systemic power preponderance, where the military or 
economic power is directly and willingly exerted by the hegemonic power irrespective 
of its distributive implications, tools and outcomes. Leadership, when mentioned, is 
nothing but another, perhaps weaker synonym for hegemony.  In the monetary arena, 
the main problem with this choice is to exclude, or ignore, the non-intentional and 
structural coordination highlighted by the studies on passive leadership, whose 
importance for monetary and exchange rate policy is astonishingly greater than in other 
sectors of international relations. 
Secondly, the distributive definition is the traditional dividing line adopted in the 
early IPE debate and revived by the studies on emerging non-western powers in the last 
decade. At one extreme, the ‘benevolent’ leader remunerates followers’ participation 
in the system by tolerating their free-riding for the sake of financial stability. At the other 
extreme, the ‘coercive’ hegemon exploits the bargaininig tools of its apical position, 
included the use of force, to reap a disproportionate slice of the system’s wealth and 
preserve its relative power position. As an intermediate position, as highlighted by 
Walter and Kindleberger, hegemonic powers can use their overwhelming strength to 
guarantee an equal distribution of the burdens of systemic governance through the 
enforcement of existing agreements. In this strand, the main problem is about 
demonstrating that such a self-defeating leader as the one hypothesised by both 
Kindleberger and recent studies on regional powers could ever appear in the real world. 
As many supporters of coercive theories have stressed indeed, there is a patent 
contradiction between the supposed farsightedness of this actor, which sacrifices 
immediate economic benefits and even its own policy autonomy to avoid currency 
instability and competitive deflation, and the inevitable hegemonic decline that this 
altruistic behaviour implies, which risks to jeopardise its capacity to play the same role 
in the future (Grunberg 1990; Norrlof 2010).   
Lastly, a relational definition can be constructed on the second generation of 
studies in monetary IPE and on the traditional understanding proposed by alliance 
theory in International Relations. Generalising their views, hegemony is identified with 
a capability-based criterion: a hegemon is a single actor exercising a preponderant 
power advantage over second-tier powers, whether in the military, financial or trade 
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arena. Unlike the aforementioned structural definitions, however, relational definitions 
imply also an autonomous idea of leadership grounded on an outcome-based criterion: 
the leader is an actor (not necessarily hegemonic) able to coagulate successfully one or 
more followers around its political goals in a given policy area. Hegemony offers a 
privileged position to exert leadership, but it is neither a necessary premise nor a 
synonym of this status. In concrete, in the politics of monetary relations the literature 
has identified rather clearly two elements characterising a monetary hegemonic 
country: the issuance of the system’s key currency and a vast and open domestic market. 
This are the two key resources allowing a hegemonic actor, also implicitly and 
unintentionally thanks to the chain of transmission of financial markets, to play its game 
for autonomy in the monetary system with an advantage on other major powers.  
For the reasons exposed above, in this research I develop a relational definition 
of monetary leadership, defining this phenomenon as the condition of a pivotal country 
which is willing and able to convince other countries  ̶  by coercion or induction, directly 
or simply by inaction   ̶ to adjust unilaterally their monetary or fiscal policy in order to 
compensate the system’s payment imbalances.  
In the recent history of the monetary system, the most known cases of monetary 
leadership, with mixed success, are Germany in Eastern Europe (1930-1945) and 
Western Europe (1979-1992 and 1999-today), France in Western Africa (1945-today), 
Britain in the global system (1870-1914) and within its colonial space (1870-1960) and 
the United States in the global system (1944-today).   
 
 
3.5  Between Neutrality and Followership: small and middle powers vis à vis 
dominant currencies 
If the nature of international pre-eminence, hegemony or leadership has been one of 
the most discussed, defined and contested issues in international studies  ̶  whether 
economic, political, or even juridical and philosophical   ̶ the position, roles and motives 
of the lower layers of the international hierarchy have always received much less 
attention. Many of the few scholars who analysed the foreign policy dilemmas of small 
and medium powers introduce their works with complaints about the underestimation 
68 
 
that these actors normally receive in International Relations theory. In his ‘After 
Hegmony’ Keohane points out as «concern for the incentives facing the hegemon should 
also alert us to the frequently neglected incentives facing other countries in the system 
[…] Theories of hegemony should seek […] also to explore why secondary states defer 
to the leadership of the hegemon» (Keohane 1984). For Cooper et. al. (1991), who 
authored a pioneering study on the foreign policy of US’s smaller allies during the Gulf 
War, «An examination of different strands of the scholarly literature reveals that the 
focus is almost exclusively on the leader or the hegemon. Smaller states or the 
hegemon’s followers do not occupy a position of prominence in these analyses».  
This deficiency, according to Cooper et al., is due precisely to one of the 
dominant conceptions of leadership and hegemony illustrated in previous sections, the 
so-called ‘distributive definition’. In that perspective, given that an asymmetrical system 
can be organised either on the availability of the leader to provide public goods 
unilaterally, or on the coercive imposition of a stronger hegemonic actor, wandering 
about how and why small and medium states should take a different position than free-
riding, in the first case, or blind compliance in the second instance, is almost a non-sense. 
In the public good framework, the follower has an undoubtable interest in enjoying the 
leader’s cooperative effort, as it consumes the public goods of currency stability, market 
openness and countercyclical liquidity while escaping any contribution for their 
production. By contrast, in coercive models including punishment and side-payments by 
the leader, the question is correctly posed, but the room for a different response by 
followers due to diverse size, position and  domestic constraints is rarely and badly 
discussed (Alt, Calvert, and Humes 1988; Eichengreen 1989). In this models, all the 
attention is drawn away from the minor state’s dilemmas and put on the hegemon’s 
capacity to punish.  
 However, some attempts to rationalise and explain the practice of followership by 
the system’s small and medium powers is present in both IR and IPE, with monetary 
followership being a particularly appropriate domain for studying this behaviour. While 
the abovementioned literature tend to understate minor actor’s range of policy choices, 
and thus to explain their behaviour just as a mechanical by-product of the leader’s 
action, other authors dealt with the issue under the premise that monetary 
followership, as any other political decision, is picked up among a range of multiple 
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policy choices (Abdelal 1998; S. Cooper 2006). This means that the leader’s will and 
capacity to coerce, bribe or punish the system’s minor actors is a necessary but 
insufficient part of the equation, while a huge number of factors  ̶ ideological, 
institutional, positional, dimensional and so on  ̶  determine policy outcomes both at the 
systemic and the agent level.  
In the literature, a few authors gave a comprehensive definition of followership, 
which tend frequently to mirror the definition given by the same author to leadership 
or hegemony. For example, Knorr (1975) mentioned the category of ‘clients’ as the 
lesser members of a patron-client relationship characterised by the absence of coercion, 
a reciprocal flow of benefits and a regular and agreed durability. Cooper et. al. (1991), 
who intend leaders as the ‘organisers’ and ‘coordinators’ of international multilateral 
actions such as Desert Storm in 1991, wrote that «followership involves an 
understanding that leadership necessarily means making political choices for the group; 
followers appreciate that decisions made on behalf of the collective in pursuit of worthy 
goals». Destradi (2010), for whom the leader «guides […] a group of states in order to 
realise or facilitate the realisation of their common objective», defines the follower as 
an actor which voluntarily decides to shadow the leader’s actions and policies because 
the major country’s objectives and goals are in its own interest. Nabers (2010) sees 
followers as states whose political elites «acknowledge the leader’s vision of 
international order and internalise it as their own». Against the tide, Schirm (2009) 
endorses a material definition considering followership as the act of «supporting the 
goals and positions of another country which were not shared previously and/or 
accepting a relative loss of status and power».  
 This puzzling heterogeneity of positions is simply an expression of the same 
confusion ruling on the other side of the coin about the concepts of leadership and 
hegemony. In this research, I mimic the same strategy adopted by major scholars, 
proceeding to define followership from my own definition of monetary leadership. 
Accordingly, Monetary Followership denotes the policy behaviour of a minor state that 
undertakes a unilateral policy adjustment on either exchange rates, monetary or fiscal 
policy to stabilise the international purchasing power of the core-currency.  
In concrete, unilateral policy adjustments consist in the asymmetrical application of 
the wide range of strategies depicted in the first chapter and defined external policies, 
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symptom-management policies and internal adjustments. Generally, monetary 
followership manifests itself with two evident pillars: the stabilisation of the local 
currency around an explicit or implicit exchange rate parity and the adaptation of 
domestic policies to compensate payment imbalances and delay undesired adjustments 
for the leader. However, this definition would not be complete without giving an 
account of what monetary followership is not, or in other words, of how the 
aforementioned policy instruments can be used against or irrespectively of the leader’s 
balance-of-payment exigencies. Considering the whole spectrum of viable strategies in 
which monetary, fiscal and currency policies may combine with one another, two macro-
positions can be identified: monetary followership and neutrality. These two general 
positions, in turn, can be concretely realised with different degrees of intensity ranging 
from the more hostile (monetary coercion) to the more subordinate the leader’s will 
(binding followership), as will be illustrated with relevant historical examples in the next 
sections.  
The three following sections provide an original taxonomy, besides the mere 
dichotomy between free-riders and loyal followers, of the different policy patters that 
minor actors adopt to deal with the cumbersome presence of hegemonic top currencies 
and would-be monetary leaders. First, in the next section I describe how small and 
medium countries can challenge monetary leaders and hegemons by means of currency 
weapons. In section 3.7 I illustrate the two most common strategies used by minor 
states to preserve some extent of policy autonomy without necessarily riseing to the 
status of monetary leader. Finally, I provide in the last section an overview of how states 
combine their currency and monetary policy to tie themselves to major monetary 
actors.  
 
 
3.6  Targeting the leader’s money: currency warfare and monetary coercion 
In this first situation, the minor state plays as a hostile actor18 striking the leader’s 
coinage through exchange rate manipulation, inflationary policies or threatening the 
                                                          
18 The term ‘hostile’ should not be considered as synonym of ‘enemy’. Currency warfare may well take 
place among allies, as case studies like the American currency attack to Britain in 1956 testifies. 
Nonetheless, one could hardly deny both that the US was hostile to British major political objectives at 
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counterpart’s foreign exchange reserves in order to undermine the collective trust in 
the value and the acceptability of the core-currency on international markets. The 
broader category of currency manipulation implies two different strategies diverging on 
means, intensity and political objectives. In the first, known as ‘strategic disruption’, the 
follower acts with the political purpose of gaining some privileges or rebalancing the 
burdens and responsibilities inside an existent monetary arrangement. In the second, 
known as ‘subversive disruption’ (Kirshner 1995), the acting country aims at provoking 
the collapse of a currency system or jeopardising the target’s purchasing power on 
international markets with the ultimate end of weakening its military and economic 
power in the conduct of foreign policy.  
Given the strongly hierarchical nature of international monetary relations after 
World War II, episodes of this last kind are extremely rare. Disruptive monetary warfare 
is indeed hardly practicable by small countries, and is mainly an instrument for rising 
powers which find themselves in the position to challenge an incumbent monetary 
leader. The paramount example of this process is the American policy of creeping 
demolition of the British sterling’s transactional network in the aftermath of the Second 
World War, when the US exchanged their extensive financial support with the early 
dismantlement of the thick normative web underpinning the dominance of the sterling 
within the British colonial space (Cappella 2013a; Hudson 1972; Schenk 2010).  
Actually, the most common form of currency warfare fought by minor states, 
which by the way represents an example of monetary neutrality, is not the disruptive, 
but the strategic manipulation. To recall it briefly, strategic disruption consists in 
manipulating the leader’s core currency devaluing or revaluing its exchange rate, 
undermining the trust of financial markets and exhausting the country’s official reserves 
in order to obtain, rather than a collapse of the leader’s power, a rebalancing of benefits 
and burdens within an existent monetary system. Concretely, the dumping of foreign 
exchange reserves (namely, the massive sell of balances in the core currency on 
international markets) is the privileged strategy to put pressure on deficit monetary 
                                                          
that time and that they were close allies against the Soviet threat. In addition, an all-out currency warfare 
among allies, as the attack on sterling suggests, is much more likely to take place between an established 
leader and its followers than as a form of challenge to an existing leadership. In this last instance, the 
practice of currency warfare by minor states is much more likely to characterise as strategic disruption or 
‘boatrocking’. 
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leaders by threatening to withdraw followers’ fundamental support to the core 
currency. Historically, cases of this fashion characterised the policy of recalcitrant 
followers in both the sterling area and the Bretton Woods system.  
For instance, in the period 1945-1960 the weakness of the pound and the 
presence of the US dollar as a reliable alternative fostered the appetites of the newly 
independent British colonies, which rushed to gain a series of economic and political 
concessions in exchange for their continuing permanence in the sterling area. The most 
cited case is perhaps the tense diplomatic game that opposed, on the one side, South 
Africa and former Rhodesia, and on the other side the black-ruled state of Zambia, in 
their reciprocal attempt to influence Britain’s policy towards South-East Africa (Kirshner 
1995; Schenk 2010). On the one hand, Zambia hoped to convince Britain to intervene 
militarily against the hostile government of Rhodesia by threatening the conversion of 
its massive sterling balances into dollars and cause a sharp depreciation of the British 
currency. On the other hand, the white-led regime of South Africa supported Rhodesia 
with exactly the same threat and together with the Portuguese colony of Mozambique 
provided its white-ruled ally with oil and food. In the end, both South African counter-
threat and the disastrous financial conditions of Britain made it desist from surrendering 
to Zambia’s boatrocking. However, the small black state obtained side payments and 
aids for its unfortunate geographical position, resulting in an overall win-win game for 
African countries at the expenses of the British leadership.  
 
 
3.7  Monetary Neutrality though structural accumulation of current account 
surplus 
When a country lacks the necessary power resources, the market size, the political will 
or a favourable economic and geopolitical environment to threaten currency 
manipulation, the strategy of monetary neutrality is still available to middle and small 
powers provided a favourable international environment and the implementation of a 
consistent set of policies. Neutrality, in general, does not guarantee the same extent of 
unbounded autonomy characterising monetary leaders, and yet allows neutral 
countries to manage their economic policies much more freely than monetary followers 
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do. Concretely, minor states can engage in monetary neutrality in two ways: the first is 
a long-term accumulation of current account surpluses and the second is a structural 
policy of investment attractiveness. This section is definitely devoted to the first 
strategy, while the second is addressed in the next one. 
As Janet Kelly remarks in her seminal contribution on the relationship between 
national security and the monetary system, «while economists continue to berate them 
for it, most states continue to follow mercantilist theory when they can […]. Within any 
system, states will work to grant them the most reserves even while using liberal 
rhetoric to declaim the virtues of free markets and non-interference» (Kelly 1977). In 
previous sections, the advantages of surplus countries in the international rush for policy 
autonomy have been extensively outlined. Countries with a positive balance of foreign 
assets over foreign liabilities are less subject to speculation given their strong position 
of solvency. In case of turmoil on currency markets, they retain the possibility to 
preserve an export-led growth or turning to one driven by domestic demand and state 
intervention. If they are concerned with an undue exchange rate appreciation, short-
term symptom-management measures such as foreign exchange intervention are more 
effective and durable for these actors given the absence of a reserve constraint. In 
particular, small countries can be thought as specifically advantaged by this strategy. In 
facts, the smaller the market size of a country, the more it is free of practicing surplus 
accumulation, since the compression of its domestic investments and consumption does 
not drain a significant share of the world’s aggregate demand, has little effects on global 
growth, and does not generate political pressures to adjust.  
However, surplus accumulation is subject to some evident limits and one 
fundamental condition, which must be necessarily present to consider this policy option 
as a form of neutral strategy. The first limit, already recalled in previous chapters, is that 
countries can find necessary to intervene in the foreign exchange market to curb their 
currency’s appreciation in order not to threaten a strong record of current account 
surplus. Nevertheless, this may cause inflation when the monetary agency is not able to 
sterilise the excess of liquidity, and shift on the real exchange rates the effect of 
appreciation that the intervention is aimed to avoid in nominal terms. The second limit 
is that the perpetual hoard of foreign exchange by central banks, and foreign assets by 
the private sector, makes the country’s financial wealth vulnerable to the ups and downs 
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of currency fluctuations and credit risk, generating potential mismatches between 
domestic liabilities and foreign-currency assets. For example, several banks and financial 
firms were bailed out or bankrupted in rich autocracies such as the Persian Gulf 
monarchies, Singapore or Malaysia during the subprime mortgage crisis. After the 
‘Lehman shock’, indeed, their foreign-currency assets, especially financial instruments 
denominated in US-dollar, turned from a safe source of cash flow and collateral for 
domestic borrowing in a mass of potential non-performing loans.  
The third limit of this strategy concerns the whole idea behind surplus 
accumulation, representing a paradigmatic example of fallacy of composition. For 
someone with a positive balance between purchases and sales on international markets, 
indeed, there must be other units mirroring this position with an excess of imports over 
exports. Should all actors in an international system aim at collecting a protracted 
payment surplus, the risk is that no one, in the end, could achieve this goal satisfactorily.  
Finally, the condition for surplus-accumulation strategy to be a cornerstone of 
monetary autonomy is a careful and risk-averse diversification with regard to currency, 
maturity and typology of foreign assets and reserves. On the contrary, when assets and 
reserves are mostly denominated in the core-currency, the build-up of current account 
surpluses plays as the most powerful support to a leader’s macroeconomic autonomy. 
For instance, when countries like China, Saudi Arabia, or Hong Kong19 realise current 
account surpluses for as much as seventeen percent of their annual GDP, but invest the 
bulk of that savings in US dollar securities, the whole strategy has no beneficial effect on 
their policy autonomy, while it supports the American privilege to print as much money 
as necessary to revive an economy in crisis or avoiding cuts on military spending.  
Contrarily, monetary neutral countries avoid making themselves vulnerable 
through the excessive exposure on one single country or currency by acting on three 
main variables. First, their investment portfolio, both in the private sector and the 
central bank, should be equally distributed between real commodities and financial 
assets, and these, in turn, ought to be diversified into bonds, equity and derivative 
instruments denominated in multiple currencies. Second, Monetary policy should be 
conducted looking exclusively at domestic exigencies about inflation, output and the 
                                                          
19 Hong Kong, although politically dependent on China, has so far conducted an autonomous currency and 
monetary policy. 
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solvency of the banking system, so to avoid that financial institutions find economically 
convenient investing their capital surpluses in a single country attracted by arbitrage 
opportunities with foreign markets. Thirdly, the node of exchange-rate policy. Generally, 
surplus actors deriving their export revenues from a single large market prefer fixed 
exchange rates to preserve their market share. In other cases, like the currency baskets 
adopted by countries such as Russia, Kuwait or Singapore, they prioritise the 
preservation of purchasing power vis à vis a multiplicity of world markets so as to 
diversify trade patterns. Notably, the first positon should not be confused with 
monetary followership, where subordinate actors do not simply peg their currency to 
the leader, but are also prepared to adjust asymmetrically their domestic policies or 
hoarding reserves in a single currency to defend the established parity regardless of 
domestic exigencies. Neutral surplus countries, when fixing nonetheless the exchange 
rate to an external anchor, practice a sort of ‘opportunistic followership’, exploiting the 
advantages of a currency peg without bearing any balance-sheet risk on financial assets 
or any constraint on their domestic policy autonomy. Historical evidence of such a 
possibility is abundant, and today is represented by surplus countries like Singapore, 
Venezuela, Norway, Russia, Philippines and many others.  
Among these, a particularly noticeable case is that of the extraordinary shift 
occurred to Norway in the last twenty years. As the largest oil and gas producer in 
Western Europe, Norway experiences a constant and substantial current account 
surplus, which skyrocketed at the onset of the 21st century following the generalised rise 
Figure 1 – Norway current account balance to GDP (annual 1995-2014)  
Source: IECONOMICS.com 
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of energy prices. The Norwegian state is the largest shareholder of Statoil, the eleventh 
oil-and-gas company worldwide, and has chosen to manage the immense foreign-
currency inflows that flooded the country with the explosion of energy exports through 
a careful portfolio diversification through the world’s third largest sovereign wealth 
fund, the well-known ‘Government Pension Fund of Norway’. The 863 billion dollar 
worth of assets allocated by the government’s fund have been distributed by 60% on 
high-yielding and liquid equities, by 35-40% on fixed income instruments and bonds, and 
by 5% on real estates20. Europe and North America represent the 45% and 35% of total 
investment respectively, while the rest is distributed on the other continents, mostly in 
Asia. The currency composition shows an almost equal repartition, with about one third 
invested in euros, one third in US dollars and one third in other major currencies. 
Moreover, this composition has consistently changed through time following markets 
trends and big geopolitical events. For example, as shown in Figure 2, the euro was 
prevalent until 2010 due to the structural weakness of the dollar, but the greenback has 
significantly regained ground after the breakup of the sovereign debt crisis in the 
Eurozone. To give an idea for comparison, a conservative estimate of Saudi Arabia’s 
investment policy says the Arab kingdom concentrates at least 80% of its foreign assets 
in US Treasury bills and similar instruments denominated in US dollars  (Institute of 
International Finance 2007; Samba Financial Group 2008; Setser 2008a).  
                                                          
20 All data in the following pages are from (Bakker 2014) 
Figure 2 – Currency composition of foreign assets at the Government Pension Fund of Norway, in %  
Source: (Bakker 2014) 
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The exchange rate and 
monetary policy of Norway have 
been adapted to the domestic 
exigencies of inflation control 
and to the necessity to maintain 
a stable flow of profits from the 
fund’s foreign investments in 
terms of local currency. The 
Norwegian krone floats freely 
against both the euro and US dollar, and is just occasionally managed against the euro 
to avoid damaging the country’s tradable firms (in case of excessive appreciation) or the 
import bill (in case of excessive depreciation). Usually, currency fluctuations offset 
effectively the ebbs and flows of energy market prices, avoiding the overflow of local-
currency liquidity in good times and a liquidity drought when oil and gas prices plunge. 
Monetary policy does not follow the compensation rule against either the Fed or the 
ECB. Despite the mounting current account surplus and the appreciating currency, the 
Norwegian authorities has constantly kept interest rates higher than the Eurozone, and 
recently, the Norges Bank has not followed Mario Draghi’s hyper-expansive strategy to 
revive European economy, and kept interest rates fixed at 1.5% against the 0.05% 
reached in autumn 2014 by the ECB.  
 
 
3.8  Monetary Neutrality though Investment Attractiveness 
When countries want to be autonomous but have a political constraint in practicing 
surplus accumulation, or their economy is at a developmental stage requiring structural 
inflows of foreign capitals, the strategy of investment attractiveness can be a useful 
alternative allowing states to run larger and more extended current account deficits 
than would be usually permitted to indebted economies. Contrary to the ordinary weak-
currency state, the capital attractive country exploits the exchange rate flexibility and a 
competitive and dynamic economic system to preserve a large extent of its policy 
Figure 3 – Norges Bank’s discount rate against ECB main policy rate 
(2000-2014; in % monthly)  
Source: IMF – International Financial Statistics 
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autonomy in spite of the necessity to appease international financial markets and get a 
continuous flow of financing to cover the excess of importations over exports.  
The structural elements drawing foreign investors into the local economy pertain 
both economic fundamentals and the domestic institutional architecture. As to the 
firsts, economic soundness is characterised by a stable and low inflation, low public 
indebtedness, the ability to orient foreign investments in productive, long-term 
directions, and a substantial endowment of productive factors or natural resources. The 
level of development of capital markets is another primary feature of this strategy, as 
investors turn out attracted by liquid, complex and deep financial markets where they 
can enjoy a wide range of structured financial instruments and liquidate their positions 
quickly without generating substantial price variations. Obviously, a temporary trend of 
economic soundness is barely enough to appease market concerns on a country’s 
capacity to pay back its foreign liabilities. Rather, a past record of reliable economic 
fundamentals, especially as far as inflation is concerned, is a starting to be 
complemented by an appropriate institutional structure that may assure financial 
investors that such policies will be followed in the future irrespective of governments’ 
biases, economic cycle and other possible deviating factors.  
Accordingly, some scholars argue that a liberal-democratic government with a 
strong system of check and balances, and especially, in this field, with an independent 
central bank, would be the real value added in countries’ ability to withstand the balance 
of payment constraint from a deficit positon (Schultz and Weingast 2003; Walter 2006). 
Their rationale is that the role of the national parliament and the central bank as 
permanent ‘veto players’ against inflationary surprises, and the development of the 
judicial protection of creditors’ rights would convince domestic and international 
investors that it is worth lending to western-style liberal-democracies in spite of the 
possibly higher returns offered by alternative emerging markets.  
Just like the strategy of surplus accumulation, also investment attractiveness 
present limits and underlying conditions if compared to monetary leadership. The first 
limit is that in order to preserve the country’s policy autonomy the local exchange rate 
must be at least partially flexible against major wold currencies, but in this way deficit 
countries are never really shielded from the consequences of policy autonomy. A bright 
example of how currency flexibility is able to loosen the pressure on long-term deficit 
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economies is that of Sweden during the 1992 currency devaluation. Before that date, 
the krone was fairly stable 
and largely overvalued 
against major European and 
world currencies while the 
country was experiencing a 
boom in foreign investments 
that lasted until the sudden 
stop of 1992, pushingn the 
current account at its all-time 
low of 10 billion dollars in 
1991. Flooded by the wave of 
depreciations hitting European currency markets in 1992 and by the rise of German 
interest rates, the small Scandinavian country, which was neither in the EMS nor a 
follower of the German Bundesbank, maintained an expansive monetary policy to 
address its own banking crisis and the stagnating growth while devaluing the krone by 
30% against major trade partners to restore a positive current account by the end of 
1994.  
The second limit that ‘attractive’ states must accept when trying to run a 
persistent current account deficit is that, to some extent, their range of policy autonomy 
will be limited by their desire to appease financial markets. An exemplificative case of 
this problem is the 40-year long current deficit run by Australia in spite of a mounting 
nominal debt to foreign holders. This underpopulated country has so far exploited its 
large endowment of resources  ̶  like oil, coal and iron but also the abundant land and a 
continued flow of migrants   ̶  to increase its GDP year by year and offset the growing 
foreign-indebtedness. Meanwhile, it lets the Australian dollar fluctuate freely on 
foreign-exchange markets to allow for policy divergence between its monetary 
authorities and major world counterparts as well as to correct the NIIP through valuation 
changes whenever necessary. The main point to underline for this sub-type of 
investment attractive economies is that they obtain to run persistent trade deficits 
precisely by following a set of anti-inflationary, capital-friendly policies, and provided 
that the current deficit never gest as large as to make international investors doubtful 
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about the actor’s ability to repay foreign liabilities. In other worlds, what ‘investment 
attractiveness’ gives to deficit counties in this case is not full autonomy  ̶  since it does 
not free these actors from the necessity to somewhat appease markets through ‘sound’ 
macroeconomic policies  ̶  but the mere possibility of running longer-than-usual current 
deficits.  
Finally, the functioning of the whole strategy, and especially the role of exchange 
rate flexibility within it, is subject to two underlying conditions highlighted by economic 
theory: borrowing in one’s own currency and realising the so-called Marshal-Lerner 
condition. The first condition is valid for both the private sector and the state. The 
practice to borrow from international markets in foreign currency, who Eichengreen et. 
al. have significantly called the ‘original sin’ (Eichengreen, Hausmann, and Panizza 2002), 
has indeed the effect of nullifying the positive consequences of a currency devaluation 
on the country’s net international investment position. Rather than reducing the value 
of debts (normally expressed in local currency) and increasing the value of foreign 
credits, the original sin makes the burden of liabilities skyrocket in nominal terms, and 
does not adjust its value net of foreign assets in case of currency devaluation. The 
second condition concerns the country’s ability to restore a positive or balanced current 
account through an ordered exchange rate adjustment. In macroeconomics, this 
requirement is known as the Marshall-Lerner condition, and implies that both exports 
and imports react, in an opposite direction and with an elasticity greater than one, to 
currency movements. If, indeed, exports should rebound insufficiently to restore a 
positive ratio with national imports, the currency devaluation could even worsen the 
country’s balance-of-payment problems by increasing the cost of imports and 
aggravating the shortage of foreign currency.  
 
 
3.9  Three typologies of Monetary Followership between exchange rates and 
domestic policies 
In this section, I move on to the less autonomous actors illustrating the different degrees 
of tightness in the relation between monetary leaders and their followers. According to 
three indicators  ̶  the way domestic policies follow the Compensation Rule, the rigidity 
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of the exchange rate peg to the core-currency, and the level of formalisation of the 
monetary arrangement  ̶  three sub-strategies of monetary followership can be 
identified: policy followership, exchange-rate followership and binding followership. 
 
3.9.1 Policy Followership 
In the first type, domestic policies are oriented to the leader’s balance-of-payment 
exigencies, but the follower’s currency is not necessarily fixed or strongly managed vis à 
vis the leader’s core-currency. Since exchange-rate fluctuations, if not excessively large 
and prolonged, are not necessarily a taboo for the leader   ̶  what is important is their 
direction (depreciations are generally less desirable), and their pace (slow fluctuation 
are better than sharp ones)   ̶ monetary followers do not necessarily need a hard peg to 
stabilise the core currency. Every exchange rate regime other than hard pegs is equally 
eligible for policy followership, from intermediate solutions such as oscillation bands, 
crawling pegs and crawling bands, to more flexible solutions such as flee floating, 
currency basket or soft-managed rates. Rather than using the exchange rate as a focal 
point, in policy followership central banks manage monetary variables to mitigate the 
fluctuations between the leader’s money and the local currency unit, so as to favour a 
moderate and ordered adjustment of exchange rates and stabilise the core-currency 
against other major coinages. Changes in interest rates, money supply and foreign 
exchange reserves are more likely to play the lion’s share in this weaker typology of 
monetary followership in that less politically sensitive compared to fiscal policy.  
An exemplary case of this strategy is Japan’s policy of constant support to the US 
balance of payment, mitigated by the possibility to let the yen float in response to 
specific trends of the Japanese economy. Indeed, especially since the beginning of the 
two-decade stagnation of the Japanese economy after the 1989 bubble, exchange rate 
devaluations have been used as a short-term relief valve to revive exports and preserve 
the country’s international solvency vis à vis the plummeting national product. 
Nonetheless, monetary policy remains the real cornerstone of the Japanese strategy to 
support the dollar’s role as an international key currency. In particular, interest rates 
show a visible application of the Compensation Rule, with a constantly expansive policy 
by the Bank of Japan aimed at encouraging the investment of the gigantic Japanese 
surplus in the United States’ financial market. This trend is not simply a result of the 
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deflationary tendency of the Japanese economy, as a comparative approach suggests, 
but it started well before 1989 when the asset-price bobble was powerfully overheating 
the Japanese economy (Mastanduno 2009).  
 
3.9.2 Exchange-rate Followership 
Exchange-rate Followership denotes the case when both domestic policies and 
exchange rates are fully tied by the leader’s moves. While both monetary and fiscal 
policies relax to offset the leader’s indebtedness or get tighter to compensate the 
leader’s surplus, the exchange rate is artificially maintained at implicit or explicit target 
vis à vis the core currency through recurrent and unilateral foreign exchange 
interventions. The main rationale behind this tightening form of monetary followership 
is to avoid speculative attacks and market pressure on the exchange rate by showing 
visibly to financial markets the country’s commitment to the leader’s currency stability. 
Examples of this policy are remarkably abundant, making this intermediate form of 
monetary followership de facto the most pervasive among the three categories. The 
Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency and the other central banks in the Persian Gulf play 
exactly this strategy, mimicking the Federal Reserve’s moves in interest-rate setting and 
defending the established parity of their currency even from insignificant intra-day 
movements. Other examples are Malaysia from 1997 to 2005, China from 1995 to 2005 
and Bangladesh in the last twenty years against the US dollar; Denmark, Croatia and the 
African countries members of the CFA21 towards the euro.  
 
3.9.3 Binding followership 
This last case is equal to exchange-rate followership in practical terms, but contrary to 
the former, comprises just those official, formalised, and institutionalised structures of 
monetary coordination. Empirical cases range from ad-hoc agreements such as the 
Louvre or Plaza accords of the 1980s’, to those arrangements when currency parity are 
lawfully established, and macroeconomic adjustments are handled within the 
agreement’s institutional framework. The variable making this phenomenon the tighter 
form of monetary followership is the network of institutional controls which guarantees 
follower’s behaviour in presence of surveillance procedures and periodic feedbacks. On 
                                                          
21 Communautés Financières d'Afrique 
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the one hand, external institutional structures like international organizations can be 
entitled to obtain from national authorities data and reports on their financial situation, 
and are provided with the necessary prerogatives to punish violators by either concrete 
sanctions or by blame-and-shame statements. Similarly, currency boards and 
dollarization22 represent the unilateral version of this stringent monetary cage, more 
frequently observed in small countries and underdeveloped economies. Historical cases 
embrace such global currency agreements as Bretton Woods and the decennial 
experiment with fixed exchange rate and institutionalised coordination among western 
European countries, especially after the establishment of the single-currency in 1999. 
As to currency boards and dollarization, some paramount examples are Ecuador and 
Panama in their unilateral adoption of the US dollar as legal tender, Montenegro and 
Kosovo’s adoption of the euro, and currency boards in Hong Kong and Argentina (1990-
2001).  
To summarise the multifaceted policy range of small and middle counties in 
international monetary affairs, the scheme below puts the five policy positions 
illustrated in this section on a graphical continuum based on the level of policy 
autonomy expressed by the different strategies. 
 
The overview given so far to the strategies for managing external monetary relations is 
a mere a taxonomy of possible options. Therefore, they show which strategies small and 
medium countries can follow to remain autonomous against the pressures of would-be 
monetary leaders, hegemonic currencies and market forces. No insight, however, has 
                                                          
22 Currency boards are autonomous governmental agencies, which manage a country’s monetary policy 
in order to maintain a rigid ratio between foreign reserves and domestic money supply (usually 100%). It 
is completely independent from both the executive and the central banks, and acts under a strict juridical 
mandate. Dollarization indicate the unilateral and passive adoption of a foreign currency by a sovereign 
states which renounces to all the privileges of seigniorage and to the autonomous management of its own 
money supply. 
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been yet given on the reasons why states select neutral or follower positions given this 
baseline range of alternatives. In the next chapter, I provide a cogent review on how 
scholars have explained monetary followership through different levels of analysis, with 
a particular focus on existing explanations for the choice between surplus accumulation 
and the three forms of followership in surplus states. Contextually, I illustrate the 
persisting theoretical gap about monetary followership in these countries, which I 
previously divided in small holders and major holders. 
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 CHAPTER IV 
The causes of Monetary Followership and the ‘puzzle’ of Surplus 
Countries.  
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4.1  Why do states follow in monetary affairs? Theories and Hypotheses on 
monetary followership 
The choice to focus scholarly research on the political and economic reasons behind the 
choice of monetary followership emerges out of at least two considerations. The first is 
the relevance of this behaviour for the very existence of monetary leadership and 
hegemony. If all countries managed their official reserves, exchange rates and monetary 
policies looking exclusively at domestic indicators, no major actor would enjoy the 
privilege of full autonomy from the balance-of-payment constraint. The second reason 
is that monetary followership embraces all the most important prerogatives of national 
governments, such as the value of the currency, the cost of credit and the levels of taxes 
and public spending. That is to say that monetary followership can be economically, 
politically and ideologically costly for the ruling elite, and it is precisely for this reason 
that it deserves an explanation much more than alternative behaviours like challenge or 
neutrality. Especially, this is true in an anarchical arena of self-reliant actors such as the 
Westphalian international system, where I argued that autonomy emerges as the top 
priority as well for great powers as for minor states. Theories of monetary followership 
have been developed to detect those factors which contribute to coerce, induce, or 
convince central banks and governments in medium and small countries to give up policy 
autonomy and bear asymmetrically the burden of macroeconomic adjustments in an 
interdependent economic system.  
 According to Walter (2006), monetary followership can be explained by means of 
two alternative approaches. On the one hand, the rationalist approach assumes that 
minor states, although intentioned to preserve their autonomy other things being equal, 
follow when their cost-benefit assessment shifts due to economic incentives or the 
threat of induced costs by the leader. On the other hand, in the constructivist approach 
followers would rally around the core-currency and its policies because of the 
«normative socialisation» of political and academic elites in minor countries. For 
example, past literature has put in the spotlight the cases of relatively small countries, 
with fragile institutions and a history of hyperinflation as the more prone to use 
monetary followership as a safeguard mechanism against domestic financial instability 
and a precondition for economic development. Such an choice, however   ̶  lacking a 
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precise and shared understanding on the desirability of low inflation and the link 
between exchange rates and domestic prices (Kirshner 2001)  ̶  would be essentially 
political, driven by the anti-inflationary mentality and the supposed causal chains that 
has pervaded the epistemic community and public servants since the early 1980’s (Calvo 
and Reinhart 2002; Fischer 2001; Giavazzi and Pagano 1988; McNamara 1998).  
Other scholars have expanded the realm of material incentives dividing it further 
into negative or positive incentives. For Malamud (2011), the ways in which major 
powers can pressure minor states to bandwagon with their political objectives are 
essentially three: the coercive-military way, the material-economic way (bribes and 
cooperative incentives), and the ideological-normative way. Another author on the 
same path is Destradi (2010), who wrote of three sub-types of hegemonial control: hard, 
intermediate and soft. In hard control systems, the followers’ compliance is obtained 
mainly through negative sanctions, threats and political pressures. The intermediate 
control is based on exclusively positive and material incentives: side-payments, bribes 
to political elites and perspectives of future economic or political rewards such as 
military protection, membership to international organizations and preferential 
treatment in trade and foreign investments. Finally, in the soft-control case, leaders 
modify and reshape norms and values of the followers through normative persuasion. 
The concrete instruments of this ‘ideational entrepreneurship’, generally, include 
privileged diplomatic contacts, incentives to cultural and academic exchanges, and the 
diffusion of the leader’s scientific orthodoxy through think tanks and global media 
(Ikenberry and Kupchan 1990).  
Another interpretation have proposed a similar distinction increasing further the 
number of potential levers fostering a state’s will to adapt unilaterally its monetary and 
currency policies. Jesse et. al. (2012) list up to five explanatory factors that could 
determine a followership behaviour. The first is reciprocity, namely the fact that leaders 
and potential followers can coordinate in search of a fair exchange of mutual benefits. 
The second, similarly to constructivist scholars, stress the cases where «the leader 
transforms the interests, priorities and expectations of would-be followers». Likewise, 
in the third hypothesis, «followers might follow because of the perceived legitimacy of 
the leader and its leadership ability». However, the more interesting and original factors 
are the last two: one considers the international system and its characteristics, 
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especially the necessity to use an external leader for balancing a local threat that is 
perceived as more damaging and riskier. The other considers domestic politics, and 
particularly the party affiliation of the follower’s top officials, in determining the 
likelihood of minor countries’ followership in fields as diverse as military and economic 
cooperation.  
Among the few general hypotheses described in previous pages at least two 
models can be identified. One the one hand, followership can be thought as essentially 
a by-product of the leader’s capabilities to punish, bribe or persuade minor actors. This 
is not wrong in principle, of course, and most of the hypotheses that in this section and 
the next chapter will be reviewed are essentially linked to the leader’s ability to increase 
the follower’s costs of non-compliance, to increase its benefits in some area of economic 
or political concern, or to modify the way decision-makers and their advisors perceive 
and predict the costs and benefits of a possible followership. Nevertheless, the proposal 
by Jesse et. al. explores originally, although in a preliminary way, the other factors 
intervening between the leader’s attempt to attract followers and the minor actors’ 
expectable aspiration to maintain its autonomy and enjoy the advantages of an open 
international economy. At least two variables mentioned by these authors, the presence 
of international threats, and the follower’s domestic politics are indeed independent 
from the leader’s ability to modify the cost-benefit structure of minor states. In this 
research, I design the two main hypotheses precisely on these premises, guided by the 
intuition than not all followers are equal, and not all international systems are equal. 
Accordingly, on the one hand the same material or immaterial incentives provided by 
leaders are thought to have a different impact on small states with respect to middle 
powers. On the other hand, international systems characterised by thick interactions at 
the regional level show a greater tendency of small holders to follow despite baseline 
disincentives.  
In this chapter, I review the main theoretical contributions concerning the 
general phenomenon of monetary followership, focusing then on those branches that 
seem to explain better the behaviour of surplus economies. Indeed, monetary 
followership by surplus actors represent an objective conundrum for most of the current 
literature, and so far, few hypothesis, coming mostly from realist IPE, have been 
developed to cope with this situation. As an illustrative criterion, theoretical hypotheses 
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are grouped in with the level of analysis to which they belong. Firstly, at the agent-based 
level I analyse the constructivist hypothesis and the approach of Comparative Political 
Economy. Secondly, at the international-structural level of analysis I considered 
exogenous variables such as the states’ hierarchical position, the link between security 
issues and the politics of money, and the web of economic dependencies characterising 
international economic relations. The traditional divide between positive or negative 
material incentives is deemed unimportant in this context, as well as quite difficult to 
assess in numerous situations (for example, economic bonds or military links can be 
seen as both negative and positive at the same time). It is more intuitive, conversely, to 
explore all the incentives provided by the leader with a classification based on the level 
of analysis and the kind of interaction promoting followership (economic, military, or 
institutional).  
 
 
4.2 Constructivist approach: cognitive and cultural variables  
Hypotheses from constructivist IPE rely on the cultural and cognitive biases of epistemic 
communities and decision-makers to explain state choices and systemic outcomes. On 
the one hand, cultural variables connect monetary issues with the symbolic aspects of 
politics such as legitimacy, national pride, self-perception of state leaders and 
bureaucracies. Many studies, for example, have stressed the aversion of finance 
ministers and executives for currency devaluations and downward realignments of the 
exchange rate (Eichengreen 1992, 2008). Indeed, a sense of defeat, shame and outrage 
seems to have historically accompanied what, in principle, should be nothing more than 
a neutral price adjustment. Helleiner (2003) and Abdelal (2003) explain monetary 
choices led by nationalism and identity made against the rationality of economic 
incentives. On the other hand, the phenomenon of cognitive biases affects an actor’s 
perception on the desirability of policies and outcomes in the monetary system, not on 
the base of values and sentiments, but on rational beliefs on the cause-effect 
mechanisms governing currency markets and economic phenomena in general.  
It is widely recognised that economic ideas shape the decision makers’ behaviour 
just because they frame the interpretation of the political and economic incentives of 
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any policy decision (Adler and Haas 1992; Eichengreen 2011b; Gavin 2003; P. M. Haas 
1992; Kirshner 2003a, 2003b; Moschella 2011; Widmaier 2003, 2004). Undoubtedly, the 
phenomenon that is most studied through the lens of constructivist IPE is the decade-
long experience of monetary cooperation in Western Europe. In that context, the 
followership by European powers such as France, Italy and Spain  ̶  which anchored their 
monetary policies to the anti-inflationary ortodoxy of the German Bundesbank   ̶  has 
been explained through the sharp decline of post-Keynesianism in economic theory, and 
the parallel rise of Friedmanian monetarism in the aftermath of the two Oil Crisis 
(Kirshner 1999; McNamara 1998). According to this interpretation, interest-rate 
compensation and currency stability vis à vis the German benchmark would be the result 
of a convergence of analyses, objectives and prescriptions by national monetary 
authorities, coordinated by the new technical orthodoxy about the priorities and 
strategies of central banking, both at the national and the supranational level.  
 The constructivist approach has been undoubtedly an innovative and insightful 
research path for the last twenty years, as well in International Relations as in IPE. In the 
context of this research, though, it may not be the most fitting perspective from which 
to analyse monetary followership and the divide between major and small holders. The 
example of western Europe, on which most of this literature is in fact tailored, is 
particularly illustrative of the limits of ideational convergence in explaining the timing 
and the magnitude of specific choices of unilateral policy coordination. Although the 
whole continent had absorbed, as early as the 1980’s, the German deflationary 
orthodoxy, many other factors like political-electoral pressure for expansive policies, the 
exigency to refinance sovereign debts and the calls from the United States for a more 
accommodative monetary policy, contributed to weaken, and frequently to delay, minor 
countries’ efforts to respect their commitments inside the European Monetary System 
(Bearce 2007; Clark and Hallerberg 2000; Webb 1995). As other studies from realist IPE 
put in evidence (Abdelal 1998; Andrews 1994a; Kaelberer 2001), for the Germans to be 
successful in export their deflationary model, some extent of side-payments and the 
sanctioning mechanism provided by currency markets turned out as fundamental as the 
ideological complicity of practitioners and economists in other countries. Without this 
material incentive, even the most rooted consensus within political elites and the 
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broader public support towards economic orthodoxy can be accompanied by delays and 
reticence by supposed followers in applying symmetrical adjustments.  
The other puzzling weak point of this approach is related to the consequences of 
selection-bias on the models proposed by the constructivist framework. All the best 
works on the ideological contagion of neo-liberal ideas and its consequences on 
exchange rate policy in minor countries, if not looking at the European case, draw on 
the recent experiences of Latin America  and East-Asia between the 1980’s and the late 
1990’s (Grabel 2003; Hirayama and Woo 1996; McKinnon and Schnabl 2004; Schamis 
2003). In each of these scenarios, small underdeveloped countries in search of credibility 
to attract financial resources abandoned the idea of a discretional management of 
economic cycles invested by the new academic consensus on the efficiency gains of less 
universalistic welfare benefits, FDI inflows and market deregulation, especially in the 
financial sector. As far as effective this narrative might be for these instances, it is 
sufficient imaging the same scheme applied to a developed country, possibly with a 
positive net external position, to make the whole causality mechanism much less 
explicative.  
A surplus country, averagely, does not need to appease financial markets with a 
monetary orthodoxy made of currency stability, liberalisation of capital markets and low 
inflation to avoid incurring in a balance of payment crisis. If anything, problems may 
arise when this actor faces the pressures of a deficit leader to do exactly the converse, 
namely a fiscal and monetary expansion or an ordered revaluation of the local currency. 
In this case, a Keynesian like-mindedness between the deficit leader and its minor 
followers would be of much greater help in generating a coordinative attitude in the 
minor country23. Nevertheless, although cases of this kind are not rare in the history of 
the monetary system, empirical evidence do not seem as convincing about the role of 
ideas as neo-liberal consensus was for weak-currency countries. Even in an age of 
widespread post-Keynesian consensus like the post-war ‘Glorious Thirties’, the 
numerous disputes between the United States and Britain on the one side, and surplus 
countries such as France, Japan and Germany on the other, show surplus states 
                                                          
23 Drawing on Keynes’ proposals at Bretton Woods, the so-called ‘Bancor Project’, the Keynesian doctrine 
on international macroeconomic adjustments would be based on a symmetric correction of payment 
imbalances, necessary to induce both surplus and deficit countries to reach full-employment by state-led 
stimulus to the aggregate demand. 
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systematically unprepared to reflate their domestic economy and promote full-
employment in other markets. On the contrary, whenever the attempt by monetary 
leaders turned out successful, the common scientific background framework focused on 
full-employment and financial repression played almost no role, leaving rather the stage 
to material variables such as economic coercion (Henning 2006; Kirshner 1995; Sterling-
Folker 2002), financial entrapment (Kirshner 1995), or issue-linkages with security affairs 
(Gavin 2003; Hanrieder 1989; Hudson 1972; Mastanduno 1998; Zimmerman 2002).  
 
 
4.3  Comparative approach: domestic institutions, economic systems and interest 
groups  
The second group of agent-based theories looks at the institutional architecture, the 
interest-group dynamics, the economic characteristics and the party-politics forces of a 
country’s domestic arena. Here, frankly, most of the literature has focused exclusively 
on the exchange rate regime, while the distribution of domestic adjustments has 
received a limited and insufficient attention. Nonetheless, the conclusions reached by 
this vast research program can be of great help also to interpret minor states’ behaviour 
in the broader issue of monetary followership, and fulfil the objectives of this research 
as regards exploring the differences among followers and their impact on monetary 
policy coordination. To make the comparative argument clearer, the main hypotheses 
can be gathered into five groups.  
Firstly, numerous researches on the institutional architecture of sovereign states 
has focused on the democracy-autocracy divide and the role of an independent 
monetary authority. Some studies, in particular, have tested econometrically the effect 
of political institutions on the exchange rate regime on a vast panel of countries, and 
concluded that autocratic governments are more likely to peg their currency to an 
external anchor compared with established democracies. The same results are observed 
for the role of independent central banks, whose presence reduces sensibly the 
likelihood of adopting a hard peg or any other fixed exchange rate regime (Bernhard, 
Broz, and Clark 2002; Broz 2002; Leblang 1999; Steinberg and Walter 2012). If anything, 
different interpretations emerge when it comes to formulate an explanation for this 
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robust regularity. Here, while the mainstream interpretation advocates for an 
endogenous role of domestic institutions   ̶  that is, non-transparent institutions (i.e. 
central bank and budget policy controlled by politicians) would generate the need for a 
visible currency peg as an alternative source of credibility vis à vis international markets 
(Bernhard, Broz, and Clark 2002; Broz and Frieden 2001; Broz 2002)  ̶  another hypothesis 
considers the autocratic regime and a government-controlled monetary authority just 
as more efficient transmitters of external pressures coming from monetary leaders 
(Leblang 1999; Li 2003). 
The second strand of research is the party-politics hypothesis, developed in IPE 
by David Bearce (2007) after many studies, in previous decades, had denied any role for 
this variable in the decision-making process on monetary issues . This author performed 
a longitudinal test on 23 OECD countries since from 1973 to 1997, and found a significant 
relation between the presence of same-coloured parliamentary majorities in two 
countries (e.g. both leftist or both right-wing), and the degree of policy convergence 
between by the country’s authorities. Particularly, left-wing governments would be 
more inclined to couple fiscal expansion with a restrictive monetary policy and flexible 
exchange rates, whereas rightist executives would apply fiscal austerity coupled with a 
relaxed monetary policy and a strong commitment to exchange rate stability. As 
carefully documented by the author with a series of qualitative case-studies, in many 
cases the substantive coordination of monetary policies would emerge out of a 
fortuitous convergence of political preferences instead of a strategic will to adjust 
national policies towards a shared goal.  
The third research path in the comparative approach is interest-group politics. 
This set of hypotheses, also known as policy-demanders approach, has identified which 
economic sectors could have a stake in the choice of a country’s exchange rate regime. 
Bernhard, Broz, and Clark (2002) identified two policy cleavages on which economic 
sectors, interest groups and electoral coalitions tend to conflict with one another. The 
first opposes pro- and anti-inflation actors, i.e. those who tolerate or even prefer a 
moderate inflation and those preferring prices to grow slowly and close to zero. Anti-
inflationists tend to prefer currency stability and tight monetary policies, and vice versa 
for the pro-inflationists. The second cleavage lies between fixed and flexible exchange 
rates. In the end, the two factions almost overlap, as the pro-inflation, pro-flexibility 
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group includes non-tradable producers, debtors, low-skilled workers, small businesses, 
the agricultural sector and all the economic sectors driven by domestic and public 
investments. The second coalition, anti-inflation and pro-currency stability, 
encompasses the banking and financial sector, bondholders, pensioners, tradable 
producers, import-export intermediaries, and generally, the public opinion in countries 
with a history of high inflation (Broz, Frieden, and Weymouth 2008; Frieden 1991; 
Hefeker 1997; Steinberg and Shih 2012). The transmission of these actors’ preferences 
to the actual policy-making is expected to follow the interest-groups’ capacity to capture 
regulators and politicians in the domestic arena, mostly given by their economic 
streghth in the national productive system and other path-dependent connections 
between politics and economic sectors.  
Fourthly, a deeply rooted tradition in economics and political economy tries to 
predict political choices with the characteristics of a country’s domestic economy. The 
most robust of this links connects the size of the actor’s domestic market with its 
exchange-rate policy. Specifically, small and open economies are expected to peg their 
local currency to a major trade partner with a much greater likelihood than large states 
with a low trade-on-GDP ratio (Broz and Frieden 2001, 2012; Calvo and Reinhart 2002; 
S. Cooper 2007; Fischer 2001; Meissner 2002; Plümper and Neumayer 2011). When the 
attention is moved from trade to finance, many authors have hypothesised a negative 
relation between the development and efficiency of a country’s financial markets and 
its proneness to give up a large share of policy autonomy by renouncing to exchange 
rate flexibility (Bordo and Flandreau 2003; Bordo 2003; Lin and Ye 2011). Open, large 
and developed financial markets, conversely, would enhance a country’s credibility at 
the eyes of cross-border investors, making less essential the need to block the exchange 
rate against major currencies.  
 
 
4.4  The limits of the Comparative approach against surplus countries and 
systemic outcomes 
The research path investigating the role of domestic institutions, sectorial interests, 
national politics and the characteristics of the local economy is undoubtedly one the 
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widest and more developed inside comparative political economy. Its insights and 
findings will be of paramount importance in this research when the final case study will 
be deeply illustrated, especially by contributing to exclude country-specific effects when 
testing the major hypothesis of the fundamental divide between small and middle actors 
in the international system. However, the explanatory power of the comparative 
approach in the specific research question of this work is limited in at least three 
dimensions that are common to all the aforementioned theories and hypotheses.  
The first is that they rarely, if ever, investigate the determinants of monetary and 
fiscal policy according to the Compensation Rule, focusing instead on the simple 
dichotomy or trichotomy between fixed, floating or intermediate currency regimes. Yet, 
observing a fixed exchange-rate between two countries can say almost nothing on how 
those actors have distributed the burdens of the system’s maintenance among 
themselves. The second limit is an epistemological one, and relates to the scarce 
predictive power of the comparative approach on the distributive outcomes of 
multiplayer bargaining. If the analysis is limited to the strict logics of comparative 
political economy indeed, the outcome of a distributive conflict at the systemic level can 
be determined almost exclusively by the phenomenon known as harmony. Harmony is 
the name given by Keohane to a systemic condition where substantive coordination is 
not the result of a strategic and willing adjustment of national policies, whether 
cooperative or not, but simply of the accidental fitness of independent and 
uncoordinated actions (Keohane 1984). The different countries, in other terms, would 
manage economic policies according to their own domestic preferences, and the fact 
that this polices, every so often, turn out substantively coordinated with the balance-of-
payment conditions of a leader state would be the mere result of the fortuitous fitness 
of the others’ macroeconomic policies. Finally, the comparative approach suffers from 
an overvaluation and excessive generalisation of the experience of small deficit 
countries. Here below, I provide some examples of this tendency, which makes the 
comparative approach a useful but limited tool for the objectives of this research.   
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Firstly, the democracy-autocracy hypothesis is a clear example of difficulties in 
dealing with surplus countries. As mentioned before, democratic countries with a solid 
central bank independence would be more credible against capital markets, and 
therefore less incentivised to fix their exchange rate. However, most of the problems 
with foreign financial markets arise when a country’s current account balance falls into 
deficit. Conversely, in numerous developing countries autocratic regimes have avoided 
the distrust of western-led 
financial markets for the 
ostentatious 
patrimonialism of their 
economic governance 
precisely by running 
extensive and permanent 
trade surpluses. Usually, 
their currency policy leans 
towards managed-floating 
exchange rates, while the 
fixed exchange rate against the dollar or other core-currencies has often taken the form 
of what in previous chapter I defined opportunistic followership.  
Another evidence of pro-deficit bias comes from policy-demanders theories, 
linking currency choices to the politics of interest groups and economic sectors. For 
example, it has been argued that tradable producers, importers and the financial sector 
prefer stable exchange rates in order to avoid that currency volatility refrains their 
foreign counterparts to transact with them. However, this attitude could conflict with 
the expected direction of currency movements in case some extent of flexibility is 
guaranteed to the exchange rates. In a deficit country, for example, tradable producers 
could feel lamed by an overvalued currency, and would rather bear the price of a 
depreciation to regain competitiveness than preserve stability at all costs, especially 
considering how far hedging instruments have gone in financial markets to protect trade 
operators from short-term exchange-rate risks. Likewise, exporters and financial firms 
in a surplus country would be irremovable on currency stability simply because the 
expected change in exchange rates is going to damage their activities while advantaging 
Figure 5 – Accumulation of official reserves assets in autocracies and liberal 
democracies (1999-2008). Image from (Setser 2008b) 
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foreign competitors and debtors. Recent direct surveys on economic actors have 
confirmed indeed as the direction of change, and not necessarily the change per se, is 
much more important in the stance of economic sectors towards a country’s exchange-
rate policy (Broz, Frieden, and Weymouth 2008). 
To conclude, the comparative approach has demonstrated itself as an efficient 
hypothesis in accounting for cross-country variance in interest-rate and exchange-rate 
policy. However, it shows various deficiencies in explaining why those divergences 
disappear, with the practice of monetary followership, also among countries with 
different domestic characteristics. To explain a recurrent outcome such as monetary 
followership, which is a systemic phenomenon emerging from both actors’ preferences 
and their strategic interaction, the analysis must take into account also those structural 
variables defining a players’ bargaining power, the leader’s potential for influencing 
others’ policy-making and the characteristics of the international system in both the 
economic and security field.  
 
 
4.5  International-structural approach: interstate politics, security issues and 
monetary followership 
The international-structural approach is the approach generally adopted by realist IPE 
to explain minor actor’s behaviour vis à vis monetary hegemons and would-be currency 
leaders. Structural theories imply that the interactions among units in a political system 
produce, without any intentional move or coordination by major actors, a series of 
‘scope conditions’ defining constraints and opportunities for the countries operating 
within that system by means of an automatic and impersonal mechanism of 
punishments and rewards. Accordingly, changes in the structure of the international 
monetary system   ̶ such as the number of potential leaders (polarity), the flows of trade 
and investments, the existence of hegemonic currencies, and the extent of capital 
mobility   ̶  foster changes also in the opportunities for autonomy of smaller states. In 
some systems, an autonomous economic policy brings more easily to negative 
consequences for minor states, while in other structural configurations they would have 
more opportunities to enjoy open markets while retaining control on domestic 
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economic policies. According to the structural view on monetary relations, the 
international structure of the monetary system, analogously to the broader political 
system, would be characterised by an anarchical order and undifferentiated functions 
among units, further complicated by the presence of autonomous financials flows. In 
addition, as in Waltz’s structure, the distribution of (monetary) power in the system, 
defining the position of any state within the systemic hierarchy, determines the actors’ 
possibility to advance their own interests in the monetary arena. ‘Monetary powerful’ 
states enjoy greater room for neutrality or extort concessions to reluctant great powers, 
while monetary weak states surrender their autonomy to stronger states for governing 
macroeconomic imbalances in their place.  
In giving a brief overview of structural theories of monetary followership, the 
main variables will be grouped into five core hypotheses. First, minor states would be 
more prone to currency followership when affected by structural bargaining 
asymmetries related to the specific realm of financial markets. Here, on the one hand, 
the passive leadership hypothesis impinges on the different reaction of international 
markets towards weak and strong currencies in case of economic distress. On the other 
hand, Kirshner’s entrapment theory analyses the same mechanism from the point of 
view of surplus and creditor countries ‘forced’ to follow their leader’s policies to 
preserve the nominal worth of their financial wealth. Secondly, followers’ behaviour is 
explained by their commercial dependency on an external actor   ̶ especially regarding 
export destinations  ̶  which is associated to their choices about the exchange-rate 
regime and the anchor currency. Thirdly, in the ‘precautionary surplus accumulation’ 
hypothesis, states’ followership is seen as a preferential way to gain foreign exchange 
reserves given a crisis-prone and financially unstable global economy. Lastly, the 
monetary-security nexus investigates the relation of monetary policy, reserves and 
exchange rates with the broader scenarios of international security.  
Among these five proposals, solely the passive leadership hypothesis can be seen 
as still excessively biased on deficit states, while the other core hypotheses are actually 
the more suitable to deal with the case of monetary followership in surplus countries. 
Partly, this is true because some of them has been explicitly conceived to explain long-
term patterns of surplus accumulation (the precautionary and the export dependence 
hypotheses) or to describe the specific bargaining environment of creditor countries 
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(entrapment). Partly, because they imply a level of abstraction that makes irrelevant a 
country’s balance of payment position, like the military-monetary nexus.  
 
 
4.6  Polarity, capital mobility and asymmetries in monetary power 
Monetary power has been defined as an actor’s capacity to delay or deflect an undesired 
macroeconomic adjustment via a set of strategic interactions based on a country’s 
bargaining chips. According to structural theories, a minor country’s proneness to 
subordinate its economic policy to an external leader can be affected by the structure 
of the international monetary system, and especially by the role played by financial 
markets in the bargaining environment. In this section, I explain specifically how the 
structure of the monetary system is defined by the literature on passive leadership, how 
it affects the phenomenon of monetary followership, and what are the limits of this 
approach when applied to surplus economies.  
Following the argument of passive leadership theorists, in a context 
characterised by a high level of cross-border mobility of financial capitals, the uneven 
distribution of monetary power among states is essentially a function of the preferences 
of market actors for using one or more core-currencies as safe haven for their own 
financial wealth24. The consequence of this systemic picture is the creation of a hierarchy 
of national currencies, which given the instantaneous, indirect and automatic sanction 
of financial markets, represents per se the most effective instrument of major states for 
charging onto other actors the consequences of uncoordinated policy moves. Moreover, 
alternative measures to cope with systemic imbalances such as external policies 
(restrictions and currency realignments) and symptom-management policies (short-
term loans and open market interventions), result more difficult and more costly than 
in systems characterised by relatively low financial interactions. To the extent that 
market actors tend naturally to pressure the lowest layers of the currency pyramid 
(deficit countries and fragile financial markets) for inducing an undue depreciation of 
their moneys, they also fly to international creditors as a safe haven attracted by low 
                                                          
24 Essentially, this hierarchy of market preferences would be based on the solvency position of issuing 
states, with few exceptions 
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inflation performances, ‘credible’ financial markets and the tendency of their currencies 
to appreciate. Hence, strong-currency actors are able to shift the negative consequences 
of currency instability and capital flights onto their weaker neighbours, and simply by 
means of this ‘implicit threat’, to extort their acquiescence to bear the burdens of 
macroeconomic adjustments in their place, whether to postpone or undertake a painful 
domestic deflation  (Andrews 2006; Cohen 2006).  
The passive leadership approach is certainly one of the most remarkable 
innovations in structural theories of monetary IPE. However, the unequal and indirect 
distributive mechanism put under its spotlight presents at least two faults as concerns 
the focus of this research  ̶  followers with a positive and persistent current account 
surplus. The first is the condition assumed by the model:  a system characterised by a 
predominant surplus leader and multiple weak-currency followers. This assumption is 
patently tailored on the actual case of monetary followership observed in the European 
Monetary System, where the implicit bargaining between Germany on the one side, as 
surplus leader, and the rest of European countries on the other, as deficit followers, fits 
perfectly the causal chain exposed by the passive leadership framework. However, when 
the same causal mechanism is applied to surplus followers, both theoretically and 
empirically, the outcome proves much less favourable to the leader as widely 
documented in previous chapters. Firstly, because the risk of abrupt depreciation of the 
national currency in case of large imbalances regards indebted and deficit countries. 
Secondly, because the capital flight that is supposed to trigger the run on weak 
currencies and the dry up of credit in weak-currency states hits creditor economies in 
the opposite way. Thirdly, because appreciating currencies are easier to stabilise than 
depreciating ones for the absence of the reserve constraint.  
Therefore, this structural perspective on the causes of monetary followership, 
oversizing the role of the solvency position in the broader equation of monetary power, 
seems excessively tied to a specific shape of the same system characterised by the 
dichotomy surplus leader/ deficit follower. In any other systemic configuration, 
especially in the one analysed in this research (deficit leader/surplus follower) capital 
mobility and unipolarity are not sufficient, by themselves, to determine the behaviour 
of minor countries. Surplus followers, both if confronted by surplus leaders or deficit 
leaders, would in any case hold a greater bargaining advantage. Moreover, passive 
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leadership models exclude the possibility to investigate the behaviour of an actor which 
is of paramount importance in monetary systems dominated by deficit leaders: middle 
powers with a net creditor position. As next sections clarify, these states play the key 
role of accumulating and protracting the system’s imbalances, allowing monetary 
leaders to pursue a debt-financed model of economic growth. These countries are as 
exposed to hot money flows as deficit followers. However, their vulnerability does not 
lie in capital flights and depreciation, but in capital inflows and appreciation. Financial 
flows come from weak currency countries attracted by the creditors’ healthy external 
position, and by appreciating the local currency, would seriously damage the nominal 
value of these countries’ financial wealth, which sounds as a powerful incentive to 
followership. In view of that, in the next section I outline the Entrapment hypothesis by 
Jonathan Kishner, who resort to this mechanism as a valuable alternative to explain the 
conundrum of monetary followership by surplus countries.  
 
 
4.7  The accumulation of foreign assets and the entrapment hypothesis 
Entrapment is perhaps the most peculiar form of coercion related to the politics of 
international monetary relations. According to Johnathan Kirshner, who first coined this 
definition in his ‘Currency and Coercion’ (1995), entrapment is a structural condition 
emerging when follower states with persistent current account surpluses start 
accumulating foreign assets and foreign reserves denominated, for a large part, in the 
leader’s core currency. After this first step indeed, most of the ‘entrapped’ country’s 
financial wealth ends up to depend on the exchange rate between the two countries, 
with a depreciation of the core currency affecting negatively the balance sheets of the 
central bank as well as of households, banks and firms throughout the follower country. 
As a result, entrapped surplus followers could do nothing but to apply the Compensation 
Rule in monetary and currency policy in order to minimise the exchange-rate 
fluctuations between the national coinage and the leader’s money.  
Just like the passive leadership theory, this hypothesis is based on a form of 
power that is deeply rooted in asymmetries within the monetary system, as it impinges 
prevalently on the immaterial value of financial assets and the constraining effect of 
financial markets’ decisions. According to Kirshner, there are essentially two channels 
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to rearticulate priorities and preferences of the follower’s decision-makers towards the 
support of the leader’s core-currency. The first is the engagement of sub-national 
economic actors.  
«Entrapment is the transformation of interests that results from participation in a 
currency system. Entrapment takes place at two levels: at the level of the firm (or, more 
accurately, the sector) and the level of the governments […] sectors will respond to 
external economic incentives and […] will form political coalitions to advance their 
interests […] “these regions and industries will exert a powerful influence in favour of a 
“friendly” attitude toward the state to the imports of which they owe their existence”» 
(Kirshner 1995) 
But the strength of entrapment, as highlighted by Kirshner, is precisely to put its implicit 
pressure also on governments in case they hold a large amounts of foreign exchange 
reserves:  
«In contrast to most trade transactions, the member government is likely to have a stake 
in monetary affairs. It will also usually come to hold significant balances of the core 
currency. The government of the member state therefore has a direct interest in the 
fortunes of that currency. For example, in order to preserve the value of its assets, such 
as reserves, it does not want to see the value if that currency decline. This will also give 
member governments an interest in the more general political fortunes of the core state 
itself, which will, especially in the case of war, importantly affect the future value of the 
core currency» (Kirshner 1995) 
Intuitively, this causal hypothesis is one of the most suitable to surplus followers, as a 
persistently positive current account implies a structural accumulation of foreign assets, 
and brings more easily to the entrapment mechanism highlighted by Kirshner.  
In recent times, the entrapment hypothesis has been used to interpret one the 
most discussed monetary relations of the last decade, that between China and the 
United States. China has become one of the world’s major buyers of US securities, 
focusing its holdings on Treasury bonds and other risk-free assets. Whenever the 
perspectives of the Sino-American relations are analysed in the military or economic 
context, scholars raise the issue of the enormous holdings of dollar reserves stored by 
China, and of the most likely effect that this might have on Beijing’s will to challenge the 
United States for regional hegemony. On the one hand, some argue, possessing around 
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fifteen percent of the overall US dollar liabilities places the Chinese government in the 
enviable position of triggering a collapse of the greenback by selling off all of its reserves 
on international markets. On the other hand, many argue instead that precisely the 
overload of dollar assets compared to the country’s income prevents China form using 
its holdings as a credible ‘nuclear option’ against the US hegemonic presence in East Asia 
(Bowles and Wang 2008; Drezner 2009; Layne 2009; McKinnon 2007; Vermeiren 2013a). 
Should China try to dump its dollar reserves to jeopardise Washington’s immunity to the 
balance of payment constraint, it would probably suffer more damages than it causes 
for the exorbitant capital losses on its dollar-denominated assets. Notably, during the 
recent post-crisis expansionary policy of the Federal Reserve, a top banker from the 
China Banking Regulatory Commission complained about this no-way-out situation with 
a Financial Times journalist: «except for US Treasuries, what can we hold? […] Once you 
start issuing $1 trillion-$2 trillion [….] we know the dollar is going to depreciate, so we 
hate you guys but there is nothing much we can do» (Cit. in Stokes 2013).   
Nonetheless, the entrapment hypothesis can also be indecisive in at least two 
dimensions. On a theoretical dimension, the entrapment perspective suffers from an 
evident problem of redundancy. Indeed, the accumulation of net financial wealth 
denominated in the core-currency constraints the follower to adjust its domestic 
policies to the leader, but it remains unexplained in any case why rational self-interested 
actors should tie their hands so strictly instead of undertaking a wise diversification of 
foreign assets. Eventually, if small and medium powers know what the stockpiling of 
single-currency securities implies, they must have other and compelling reasons to bring 
it forward at the expenses of their future policy autonomy. Historical records propose 
at least three hypotheses. The first is the structural advantage of monetary hegemony, 
that is, those countries issuing an international key currency. The strengths of monetary 
leaders in this position is that of enjoying a set of relations, customs and informal 
institutions which oblige minor countries, whether friends or foes, to have a partial stake 
in the functioning and the survival of the system built around the hegemon’s currency. 
Today’s hegemonic role of the US dollar is a privileged seat to observe how the universal 
acceptability of this currency by central banks, market actors and even transnational 
criminal organisations de facto obliges all countries in the world, included the US’s worst 
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enemies, to accumulate a part of their financial wealth in dollars for financing external 
actions.  
The second possibility is the one reported by Kirshner in its preferred case study: 
Germany’s monetary leadership in the 1930’s. According to the author, the shortcut to 
push minor countries in southern and eastern Europe to hoard the unconvertible 
reichsmark was the German availability to pay imports from these countries more than 
their prices on international markets (Kirshner 1995). Hence, generally speaking, a 
weapon of potential leaders to modify the minor country’s cost-benefit calculus is to 
bear temporary economic losses in view of a future gain on autonomy by the time the 
entrapment mechanism is in place. Lastly, the over-accumulation of foreign assets in a 
single currency can be linked to political relations and alliance patterns. Since countries 
tend to trade and invest more with their own military allies, and given the prominent 
role of currency stability in a leader’s military power, it sounds plausible that the 
accumulation of core-currency liabilities be a product of the dilemmas of alliances.   
As regards the theory’s faults on the empirical dimension, a cogent review of 
cases shows that supposedly entrapped actors have sometimes missed scholars’ 
expectations and defected on leaders despite possible capital losses on their foreign 
assets. Recently, such behaviour has been observed in some of the Persian Gulf 
monarchies and in many Asian surplus economies such as Philippines, Malaysia, and 
Taiwan, which despite their financial exposure to the dollar, and the underlying action 
of their security ties with the United States, in the past decade maintained a monetary 
and exchange rate policy steadily focused on domestic needs, allowed currency 
appreciation and disregarded the Compensation Rule in interest rates policy. For these 
and other cases, evidently, other forms of political or economic constraints must 
complement the mechanism highlighted by the entrapment hypothesis.   
 
 
4.8  ‘Bretton Woods II’. The Neo-Mercantilist explanations of currency 
followership in surplus economies 
One of the most developed field of analysis about the external determinants of 
monetary followership is undoubtedly the link between economic asymmetries and 
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minor countries’ exchange rate policy. Contrary to comparative studies on currency 
regimes, the main question of these research strand embraces both the choice of the 
exchange-rate regime (fixed, floating or some intermediate solution) and the choice of 
the anchor currency to which followers decide to peg their coinages. On the one hand, 
studies on large and generalizable samples have stressed the effect of import patterns 
for the exchange-rate decisions of potential followers. Plümper and Neumayer (2011) 
have tested econometrically states’ choice of the currency anchor as a dichotomous 
alternative between pegging to the euro or the US dollar. Their results indicate that 
imports flows from both the leader country and its currency area are strong predictors 
of a follower’s monetary anchor, together with the symmetry in output shocks with the 
leader’s economy. Likewise, Meissner and Oomes (2008) performed a similar test on a 
panel of 100 countries from 1980 to 1998. Their results confirm «that a key factor 
explaining anchor currency choice is the existence of trade network externalities» and 
reiterate the positive effects of co-movement with the anchor’s GDP. When the same 
currency is taken as reference in a circumscribed geographical area, trade network 
effect and output shocks multiply, facilitating the emergence of geographically 
concentrated patterns of monetary or exchange rate coordination.  
 On the other hand, theories of export dependency  ̶  also known in the scholarly 
debate as ‘Bretton Woods II’ or ‘mercantilist hypothesis’ (Aizenman and Lee 2007)   ̶ 
posit that surplus follower countries peg their currencies to an external anchor in order 
to develop a ‘mercantilist’ export-led growth strategy. This research path dates back to 
2004, when Dooley, Folkerts-Landau, and Garber published an article that was destined 
to frame a decade of scienfific inquiry, public debate and diplomatic actions about the 
relation between the United States and the fast-growing economies of East Asia  
(Dooley, Folkerts-Landau, and Garber 2004). In their paper, the three authors draw an 
explicit parallel between the first thirty years of the Bretton-Woods system, 
characterised by fixed exchange rates, accumulation of current surpluses in the 
European and Asian periphery (Germany, France, Japan), and the ‘Dollar Standard’ 
which emerged at the end of the XX century. In the revived ‘Bretton Woods II’ «East 
Asian economies – especially China – and oil exporting countries behave today like Japan 
and Western Europe did under the Bretton Woods system. They peg or soft-peg their 
currencies to the dollar in order to develop a ‘mercantilist’ export-led growth strategy» 
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(Otero-Iglesias and Steinberg 2013). The argument by Dooley et. al. was little more than 
a suggestion for further research, yet affected a generation of American politicians in 
their repetitive calls to China for letting a nominal appreciation of the Renminbi, in the 
hope of reviving the US tradable manufactures and create new high-productivity jobs 
on the american soil (Spiro 2012). 
Besides the paradigmatic case of China and its neighbours, other cases can be 
brought to attention where countries with a positive external position, solid financial 
markets and highly competitive products have given up monetary autonomy in order to 
preserve their share of exports in leading destination markets. In Europe, Sweden and 
Switzerland have abandoned the domestic-oriented monetary policy followed until 
recently to shadow the ECB’s expansive moves decided after the breakup of the 
Eurozone crisis in 2011. In a speech to the Chamber of Commerce and Industry of 
Southern Sweden, in Malmö, the Swedish central bank governor Karolina Ekholm 
explained to an audience of local businesspersons the bank’s early-2014 choice to follow 
the ECB on an increasingly lax monetary policy. In her words, «If the market expects the 
policy rate in Sweden to be significantly higher than policy rates abroad, this can lead to 
an increase in the demand for assets in kronor as a higher Swedish rate, all else being 
equal, increases the return on investments in Swedish currency. This normally 
contributes to a strengthening of the krona exchange rate in the short term. [but] a 
stronger krona has a negative effect on net exports as it means that goods and services 
produced in Sweden become relatively more expensive. This in turn has a negative 
effect on GDP growth and resource utilisation» (Ekholm 2011). In the same period, the 
Swiss National Bank stepped in to stem the sheer rise of the franc by widening the 
negative rate differential vis à vis the ECB rates, and since early 2012, also by declaring 
an explicit floor at 1.20 francs against the euro. Despite having a balanced and diversified 
investment portfolio indeed, both the Swiss economy and the central bank are exposed 
to losses on euro-denominated assets and, above all, dependent on the vast Eurozone 
market as the main destination of national exports. Since mid 2011, over 200 billion 
Swiss francs in foreign assets have been accumulated by the SNB in order to stop the 
local currency’s appreciation at the established threshold, and interest rates, already 
close to zero due to the traditional low inflation, has reached a thirty-year low in 
summer 2011 at 0.25.  
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But the ‘mercantilist’ explanation has not been simply a useful interpretation for 
the public debate. The argument has been subject to severe scientific scrutiny, which, 
however, expressed documented doubts on the robustness of its causal chain as a 
universal explanation for currency followership. In 2007, Aizenman and Lee performed 
an econometric test on a 20-year panel of developed and developing countries, finding 
that «variables associated with mercantilist concerns are statistically significant, but 
economically insignificant in accounting for the patterns of hoarding reserves» 
(Aizenman and Lee 2007). Levy-Yeyati et. al., in their ‘Fear of Appreciation’, tested the 
relation between the mercantilist hypothesis and economic growth. Eventually, their 
«results […] cast doubts on the channel of import substitution cum export stimulus often 
highlighted by [the mercantilist hypothesis]. Instead, […] tests suggest that the 
mechanism [of economic growth] is associated with an increase in aggregate savings 
and investment and decline in labor income relative to capital compensation» (Levy-
Yeyati, Sturzenegger, and Gluzmann 2013). In other words, currency undervaluation 
would be beneficial to economic growth, when this is the case, not because of a 
heightened performance of exporting firms, but because it reduces the purchasing 
power of national workers, and thus increases their propensity to save and reinvest 
domestically. Vermeiren (2012) analysed in detail the case of China, whose export-led 
pattern was taken as prime example by the advocates of the mercantilist hypothesis. He 
found that the country’s capital controls and the pro-US dollar investment strategy were 
certainly functional to keep an undervalued exchange rates, however, this serves to 
push Chinese nationals to save most of their earnings and deposit those savings in 
government-led banks. These, in turn, finance the country’s spectacular growth through 
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Figure 6 – SNB holdings of foreign assets (in billions 
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domestic investments in the so-called SOEs25, having no better alternative because of 
the strict control on cross-border capital flows. A similar work was carried out by 
Moschella (2015) on the Swiss case, where she highlighted that the SNB’s decision to 
peg the franc was as much driven by the need to discourage speculative capital inflows 
to Switzerland as it was to preserve the country’s market share in the Eurozone. The 
January 2015 surprise by the SNB, which de-pegged its currency and let it float despite 
vibrant protests from the industrial sector, sounds as a powerful ex-post confirmation 
of this interpretation. Recently, Cruz (2014) confirmed the uncertain empirical 
consistency of the export hypothesis, verifying a positive and significant relation 
between the accumulation of foreign exchanges and the rise of real exchange rates. That 
is to say, the nominal currency stability would be the by-product of a strategy of forex 
intervention, which was designed for other reasons, but certainly did not contribute to 
make the price of national products more competitive on foreign markets.  
Overall, the mercantilist hypothesis pays its excessive focus on trade relations 
and export-dependent constituencies as opposed to the governance of the banking and 
financial sector. That makes it a valuable, but incomplete tool to analyse the currency 
and monetary policy of surplus countries, despite the intuitive link between export 
performances and the current account. Certainly, as the Swedish central banker 
explicitly admitted, the importance of an accessible export market is paramount for 
economies that, for a reason of the other, suffer the smallness of their domestic market 
and need foreign buyers to lift aggregate demand for tradable products. However, as 
successive researches reveal, this might be one among many reasons to peg one’s 
coinage to the core-currency leader, but as empirical tests, both qualitative and 
quantitative, demonstrate, not the most important for practicing a compensatory 
monetary or reserve policy. Indeed, opportunistic followership still allows neutral 
surplus states to maintain a currency peg without necessarily following another 
countries monetary policy or avoid diversification on foreign assets. The alternative 
view, as expressed in particular by Aizenman and Lee, is that trade surplus was not the 
purpose, but the instrument, of peripheral countries to accumulate official reserves to 
defend themselves against future balance-of-payment crisis. This hypothesis, known as 
the ‘precautionary’ reserve accumulation, will be the object of the next section.  
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4.9  ‘Precautionary’ foreign exchange accumulation: surplus countries’ 
followership after a currency crisis 
On the motives why several 
states, different by area, 
culture, economic 
development and even 
external position have decided 
to accumulate larger-than-
usual foreign exchange 
reserves in the last twenty 
years (see figure 8), dozens of 
empirical and theoretical 
studies have speculated. Giving a complete account of this debate is an effort that goes 
beyond the purpose (and the space) of this research. Nonetheless, the reason why this 
practice, and the explanations that have been given to it, is important also for this 
research is the fact that forex accumulation, purposely or not, can be a form of 
compensatory monetary policy for surplus countries. As already mentioned indeed, 
while some monetary authorities use to let their economic actors choose how to 
allocate foreign investments, but manage interest rates so as to make more palatable 
to invest in the leader’s market, others prefer to handle the country’s foreign assets 
directly. If the leader is deficit, however, the effect on its balance of payment is 
practically the same, with a surplus on the financial account thanks to official investors 
that compensate the country’s steady outflow on the current account. Understanding 
the causes of exchange accumulation, therefore, may contribute in a substantial way to 
understand a possible root of monetary followership. Especially, and this is the most 
challenging hypothesis, it might be shown that this practice is not a willing action of 
support to the leader, but simply a manifestation of farsighted self-interested actors 
that try to safeguard their financial systems from a future liquidity crisis.   
0
2000000
4000000
6000000
8000000
10000000
12000000
14000000
1
9
90
1
9
91
19
92
1
9
93
1
9
94
1
9
95
1
9
96
1
9
97
1
9
98
1
9
99
2
0
00
2
0
01
2
0
02
2
0
03
2
0
04
2
0
05
2
0
06
20
07
2
0
08
2
0
09
2
0
10
2
0
11
2
0
12
2
0
13
Figure 8 – Official foreign exchange reserves – world total (yearly data 1990-
2013), in billion US dollars  
Source: IMF – IFS 
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According to the many works which proposed an interpretation for this 
phenomenon, at least three explanations can be drawn. The first is the manipulation of 
the exchange rate in order to protect the take-off in the tradable sector by avoiding a 
real currency appreciation. The theoretical underpinnings of this mechanism have 
already been discussed in the previous section. Here, it has to be noted that the 
empirical link between exchange rate stability and reserves accumulation has received 
a mixed empirical confirmation by the numerous works published on the issue. On the 
one hand, for some scholars a floating exchange-rate would correctly cause reserves to 
drop, but fixed or highly managed currencies would present no specular effects 
(Bastourre, Carrera, and Ibarlucia 2009). For others, reserve assets would be positively 
related to fixed exchange rates, especially in the form of managed or soft peg (Obstfeld, 
Shambaugh, and Taylor 2010; Vujanovic 2011). For another study, the effect of the 
exchange-rate channel on reserves would be completely absent (Steiner 2013). The 
second explanation for the massive hoarding of reserves around the world is rooted in 
the structural drivers of a country’s propensity to save, that is its demographic and 
economic structure. Bagnai (2009) explained China’s tendency to consume below its 
means in terms of a sluggish domestic demand due to the large share of poor agricultural 
workers in the Chinese productive structure. Likewise, countries with an ageing 
population would be naturally more prone to reduce consumptions and investments. 
Consequently, the mass of savings generated by retired people could hardly find enough 
investment opportunities domestically, and goes to fill the vaults of the country’s 
foreign assets. Other things being equal, this phenomenon alone would have no effect 
on reserves. However, when the country’s authorities want to use part of that money 
to oversize domestic investments, they will induce national savers to sell foreign 
exchange to the government and assume the monopoly of the country’s foreign assets 
(Bussiere et al. 2013; Obstfeld 2012). Lastly, the tendency of an increasing number of 
state actors to hoard an unprecedented quantity of official reserves (and especially 
foreign exchange) has been explained through the vulnerability of emerging and 
developed actors to balance-of-payment crisis.  
Among the three given explanations, this first is simply another face of what has 
been already discussed in previous sections. It maintains here the same strongpoints 
and limits I already illustrated, since the accumulation of foreign assets has no 
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autonomous role if not as an instrument to stabilise the real exchange rate. On the 
contrary, the second and the third explanation reverse this conclusion   ̶  since they 
consider the nominal undervaluation as the unintended by-product of the reserves 
build-up   ̶  and are much more interesting therefore as independent variables to 
understand monetary followership. However, the first is not exactly applicable to all the 
actors of the international system   ̶ because many of the newly emerging countries that 
hold most of the world’s currency reserves are neither ageing (Brazil, Saudi Arabia), nor 
necessarily poor in terms of per-capita income (Switzerland, Norway, Persian Gulf 
monarchies, Singapore, Hong Kong). Secondly, structural causes of reserve 
accumulation can explain just a little extent of a monetary followership policy. Indeed, 
as demonstrated by the case of Norway illustrated above, when a country hoards 
current surpluses because of the over-savings of retired persons, it does not necessarily 
give up its monetary autonomy, nor accumulate reserves or foreign assets necessarily 
in one single currency. All these are political choices on how to manage a structural 
surplus, and cannot be explained through demographic trends. Eventually, the 
hypothesis of reserves build-up as a ‘precautionary’ measure to hedge domestic banking 
systems from sudden stops of external financing remains the most promising. For the 
rest of the section I will focus on this explanation.  
The ‘precautionary’ hypothesis, also according to econometric tests (Aizenman 
and Lee 2007), is the most suitable alternative to trade mercantilism for explaining the 
rapid amassment of foreign exchanges by central banks in the last decade. It comes as 
no surprise, however, that both the phenomenon per se and the mass of studies 
produced to explain it were geographically focused on East Asia and emerging markets 
in general. As early as the 1990’s, a great wave of capital markets liberalisation was 
carried out by ruling elites in a large number of emerging economies (Eichengreen 2004; 
Frenkel 2008, 2012; Hellmann 2007; Schamis 2003). The euphoria that this generated in 
international financial markets, coupled with the diffuse adoption of rigid pegs to the 
dollar, brought foreign investors to invest such small economies with an overflow of 
portfolio and foreign direct investments. As a result, their current account slid into 
deficit, while financial markets were growing increasingly sceptical on developing 
countries’ possibility to repay the external debt that they had rapidly accumulating in a 
few years. When this suspicion became diffuse, it occurred the so-called sudden stop, 
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that is, foreign investors stopped financing short-term loans that made sustainable the 
repayment of existing debts. With no capital inflows nor trade-driven demand, also the 
currency stability against the dollar fall in serious jeopardy.  
Nevertheless, the worst had yet to come. In order to have back their loaned 
money in hard currency, and not in a devalued national coinage, developed countries 
pushed on local governments to ask for an IMF-backed bailout. The Fund accepted to 
cover the short-term liquidity needs of emerging markets in order to support the local 
currencies and restructure the external debt, but asked for draconian austerity 
programs and further reforms in exchange. As soon as these plans, due to the sacrifices 
imposed through domestic deflation and unemployment, proved equally unsustainable 
both economically and politically, the overindebtedness of deficit countries broke out 
into catastrophic depreciations and generalised credit crunch due to capital flights. The 
Mexican peso fell by 50% during the 1994 Tequila crisis, during the 1997 Asian crisis the 
Thai Baht lost 120% of its value, the Malaysian ringgit about 88%, up to 160% for the 
Indonesian rupiah. In 1998, the Russian rouble gave up the 320% in less than a year, 
while the peso fell by another 250% during the 2001 Argentinian Crisis. Many other 
currencies lose ground against the dollar during these episodes, causing painful effects 
to the local populations and refraining international markets from lending to emerging 
markets any longer after these undesirable records.  
The grim experience of the 1990’s affected policy choices for the years ahead, 
even for those countries that had not been directly invested by a currency crisis such as 
China. Most of emerging markets recovered their solvency by running several years of 
trade surpluses, and even those with a balanced or deficit trade account, or especially 
for this reason, started amassing foreign reserves as an emergency self-controlled fund 
on which drawing when external financing stops and capitals flow out of the country. 
Unlike multilateral schemes like the IMF programs indeed, this strategy guarantees to 
each country its own financial ‘war chest’, on which it decides autonomously about the 
conditions to use it. In respect to financial vulnerability, a high level of official reserves 
serves at least three objectives, one related to signalling the country’s solvency to 
international markets, and the other two related to fill the needs of banks and firms for 
foreign currency liquidity, and of the whole country with respect to import essential 
commodities.  
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Obstfeld et al. (2010) described carefully the kind of threat that central banks 
have in mind  ̶  the so-called ‘double drain’  ̶  when accumulating foreign exchanges for 
precautionary purpose. The double drain is the combined run on the national currency 
by both foreign investors and national investors as well. These last, in particular, would 
hit the credibility of the local currency in two ways. First, by withdrawing their money 
from national banks to convert it into foreign currency deposits. Secondly, they could 
even take their own balances of hard currency out of national banks to face immediate 
liquidity needs or avoid being dispossessed of it by the state under emergency rule. This 
perspective is particularly useful to disentangle a challenging puzzle for the 
‘precautionary’ hypothesis, namely the oversize of reserve assets relative to the most 
established rules of adequacy26. Empirical tests confirm that the accumulation of 
reserves is not solely related to the currency account surplus, but also to capital inflows 
(Bussiere et al. 2013; Obstfeld, Shambaugh, and Taylor 2010; Steiner 2013), highlighting 
the obsession of national decision-makers for the potential reverse of short-term 
liquidity flows in both surplus and deficit countries.  
To conclude, a useful implication of the ‘precautionary’ explanation for this 
research is the following: if countries accumulate foreign exchange to avoid and escape 
the consequences of a balance-of-payment crisis, they are more likely to achieve this 
objective via current account surplus. In turn, to preserve the surplus notwithstanding 
mercantilist biases or the interests of the tradable sector, they will apply a 
compensatory monetary policy that preserves the tendency of national savers to invest 
their money abroad instead of increasing the country’s domestic investments. Similarly, 
in those countries when the accumulation is not driven by private actors monetary 
authority control directly the process of reserves build-up.  
However, at least three loopholes cast doubts on the ‘precautionary’ explanation as 
the main driver of monetary followership. The first is its historical contingency. Indeed, 
while the practice itself, as widely pointed out in previous chapters, is as old as interstate 
relations as a toll to gain autonomy from the external constraint, its use to hedge against 
                                                          
26 In this field, the simplest reference is the so-called Guidotti-Greenspan Rule, prescribing a one-to-one 
ratio between foreign reserves and short-term external liabilities with maturity of one year or less. While 
almost all emerging countries would abundantly overcome the adequacy criterion set by Guidotti and 
Greenspan, a double-drain approach would explain the oversize of their official reserves by accounting 
not just for the potential shortage of foreign loans, but also for the potential flight of domestic capitals. 
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financial crisis originated by cross-border capitals emerges out of a recent historical 
path. Hence, although this policy may have played a role in the choices of Asian and 
Latin American countries in the aftermath of their own currency crisis, it can hardly 
explain structural forms of monetary followership that took place out of this narrative, 
both temporarily and geographically. The second problem depends on the limited 
applicability of this hypothesis to developed countries with a solid financial system. In 
2014, for example, among the first ten countries by holdings of foreign exchange 
reserves, just four were developing or emerging actors (China, Brazil, India and Russia). 
Among the others, one is Saudi Arabia, with its underdeveloped financial markets but 
also with no past problems of external indebtedness, and the other five are some among 
the richest nations in the world, comprising Taiwan, Singapore, Switzerland, Japan, Hong 
Kong and South Korea. For this countries, as well the model taking into account the 
threat of ‘double drain’ (Obstfeld, Shambaugh, and Taylor 2010), as the one estimating 
reserve adequacy on the base of external liabilities and import necessities (Vujanovic 
2011) find a systematic excess of foreign reserves on the optimal level prescribed by 
adequacy rules. Finally, the third limit of the theory of precautionary accumulation, 
when used to explain monetary followership, is its imperfect account of why reserve 
‘accumulators’ choose to focus on a single monetary leader instead of diversifying their 
assets into many currencies. The same argument can be made for interest-rate policy, 
where a minor country could follow a multiplicity of potential leaders and hoarding a 
balanced amount of hard currencies instead of focusing on one currency and foreign 
central bank. Precautionary strategies can be equally effective (or perhaps even more 
effective) when the accumulation follows a wise diversification, and monetary policy 
avoids fostering new crisis with an unfitting policy imported from the leader’s 
authorities.  
 
 
4.10  Money and security. Military alliances, alignments and the conflict on 
macroeconomic adjustments  
The realist thinking has ranged across a wide range of positions about the influence of 
security issues on economic policies. Generally, the theoretical reflection oscillates 
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between the marked pessimism of neorealists, for which economic relations, entailing 
a mutual dependency, magnify the endemic mistrust among self-reliant actors (Waltz 
1979), and the moderate optimism of realist IPE, which has more often focused on how 
good security relations provide adequate incentives to improve economic interactions 
(Abdelal and Kirshner 1999; Kirshner 2009; Mastanduno 1998). Empirical studies have 
provided a striking statistical evidence of this effect for any significant sector of 
economic exchange: trade (Baroncelli 2010; Gowa and Mansfield 1993; Gowa 1994; 
Keshk, Pollins, and Reuveny 2004; Mansfield and Bronson 1997; Pollins 1989), exchange 
rates (Li 2003) and financial investments, both portfolio and FDI (Gupta and Yu 2007; 
Rosecrance and Thompson 2003). However, the realist research program has focused 
also on a second, perhaps more important, research question. Since economic 
transactions produce distributive effects in terms of wealth flows and policy autonomy 
that do not disappear within military alliances and alignments, the most recent research 
has tried to link asymmetric vulnerabilities in the security field with distributive 
outcomes in economic relations. In this respect, the general hypothesis is that countries 
with shared security interests should be more prone to adjust their monetary and fiscal 
policies to guarantee the partner’s power to delay the system’s macroeconomic 
adjustments. However, those who need more the ally’s contribution will be also more 
prepared to sacrifice macroecomic autonomy to convince or enable the partner to play 
its part inside the alliance. 
 The idea of realist IPE is that the burden sharing conflict, characterising the debate 
on alliance politics since the 1960’s (Christensen and Snyder 1990; Clementi and Carati 
2010; Duke 1993; Olson and Zeckhauser 1966), could spill over into the field of monetary 
politics because of the constraint imposed by the balance of payment to the military 
efforts of a monetary leader. This undeniable link between the two dimensions allows 
alliance leaders to get their followers adjust unilaterally the system’s imbalances in 
order to preserve its military effectiveness against the common enemy. Johnathan 
Kirshner defined the expected causality between security issues and macroeconomic 
adjustments as follows:  
«to resolve disequilibria as they arise in the international economy, states must accommodate 
their macroeconomic policies. Cooperation can be sustained only if there is agreement about 
how such adjustments are to take place, and, most important, about who will bear the burdens 
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of monetary retrenchment and deflation […] Security concerns can help overcome this problem. 
When national security is perceived to be at stake, the costs of monetary cooperation (the 
adjustment burden) remain the same, while the benefits are increased to the extent that 
monetary cooperation supports valued allies or facilitates and enhances overall political 
cooperation» (Kirshner 2003a)   
In International Relations, the way to measure the asymmetrical demand of 
states for the military assistance or protection by another actor are the so-called 
dilemmas of alliances. The dilemmas of alliances have been devised by G. H. Snyder to 
define the countries’ bargaining power within a military arrangement (Snyder 1984). 
Originally, Snyder’s model comprised two dilemmas. On the one hand, the dilemma of 
abandonment indicates the possibility of an ally’s defection on its original commitments 
to the shared goals. According to Snyder, the risk of being abandoned by an ally when 
its assistance is most needed persuades the most vulnerable part to reinforce its 
commitment to the partner, until the extreme of “chain-ganging” itself to the ally’s 
decision, good or bad they might be. On the other hand, the dilemma of entrapment 
implies, for the ‘entrapped’ actor, the risk of being dragged into a conflict over an ally's 
interest that do not fit its own security concerns. Contrary to the danger of 
abandonment, entrapment induces a country to distance itself from the ally’s strategy, 
for example by defecting on its commitments, or even appeasing the enemy, to de-
escalate a crisis that could potentially turn into a full-scale undesired war. 
Even though Snyder’s dilemmas have been the keystone of alliance theory for 
almost three decades, the range of trade-offs states may come across in military 
alliances has been recently widened by Cesa with the dilemma of weakening and the 
dilemma of strengthening (Cesa 2010). His argument resembles Snyder’s framework, 
but instead of referring to willing inducements by one of the two players, it posits that 
allies abandon or entrap due to impersonal forces related to the unequal growth rates 
of their economic, technological and military capabilities. The strategic response to an 
ally’s strengthening usually entails throwing a spanner into its works, so as to keep 
power relations as equal as possible and avoid becoming a minor partner. On the 
contrary, a weakening ally is expected to be rescued by its partners, both economically 
and militarily, in order to preserve as intact as possible its contribution to the alliance’s 
common objectives. It has to be noted, to conclude, that what is true for permanent and 
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official military aggregations is valid as well for occasional security cooperation and 
temporary alignments that could take place in a self-defence system as testified by the 
ambiguous relation between china and the US in the last decade (Maass, Norrlof, and 
Drezner 2014). 
Monetary followership would be nothing but the economic side of a multi-faced 
response to both Snyder’s abandonment dilemma and Cesa’s weakening dilemma, 
aimed at safeguarding the leader’s effectiveness and will to play as security provider. 
Obviously, the scheme may work the other way round too, pushing minor states to 
safeguard their policy autonomy when they risk to be entrapped by an unduly assertive 
partner or being marginalised by a leader which is growing too strong in relative terms. 
In the scheme below, I hypothesise the causal relations between dilemmas of alliances 
and macroecomic policies following the typologies outlined in chapter three. 
 
DILEMMA FOLLOWER’S REACTION 
 
ABANDONMENT/WEAKENING 
 Policy followership 
 Exchange-rate followership 
 Institutional binding 
          
ENTRAPMENT/STRENGTHENING 
 Monetary Neutrality 
(diversification, floating exchange 
rate, domestic-oriented monetary 
policy) 
 Strategic Disruption (boatrocking) 
 
The scheme is intended to work notwithstanding the leader’s balance of payment 
position, even though the case of a weakening ally is intuitively more related to an 
excessive external deficit, while the second occasion happens more often with surplus 
leaders. At any rate, it has to be noted that monetary policy can be an instrument to 
placate the dilemmas of alliances even if the leader does not show evidence of balance-
of-payment problems, as testified by some instances of strategic disruption. 
The empirical evidence on the link between alliances, alignments and monetary 
followership is presently dominated by a case-study qualitative approach. Especially, 
historical cases on the first two dilemmas (weakening and abandonment) are abundant 
and clearly illustrative of the strategies and moves adopted by leaders and followers in 
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this situation. As a first instance, for example, Murphy (2006) describes the interaction 
between Japan and the Bank of England during the Classical Gold Standard as an 
emblematic trade-off between the Japanese support to the British monetary leadership 
and London’s military cooperation against Japan’s regional threats such as the Russian 
eastward expansionism. Mastanduno (1998) supposes that Tokyo’s pro-cyclical 
monetary expansion of the late 1980’s was ultimately intended to upkeep the price of 
US securities in response to warring Soviet manoeuvres in East Asia, while the same 
argument is presented by Stokes (2014) relative to East-Asian minor partners in the age 
of a rising China. Similarly, Hanrieder (1989), Zimmerman (2002) and Gavin (2003) 
reported the facts of the 1960’s, when the US government, threatening explicitly the 
German Federal Republic to withdraw American troops from Germany’s eastern 
borders, obtained the ally’s commitment to correct the US trade deficit through military 
imports and to withhold their outstanding dollar claims instead of diversifying for gold 
and other currencies.  
In the next chapter, I illustrate how the divide between major and minor 
followers, that is, between middle and small states in monetary relations, impacts on 
the structural elements traditionally associated to monetary followership in the realist 
paradigm (structural asymmetries in trade, military or financial vulnerability). 
Counterintuitively, I suggest that small states gain more autonomy when enjoying a 
structural current account surplus than middle powers, because of their irrelevance for 
price movements in the currency market. Conversely, major followers would be the 
genuine supporters of the leader’s balance of payments, because since their 
contribution is much more valuable to the leader’s grand strategy, their defection will 
also be much more costly both economically (capital losses) and politically (dilemma of 
abandonment). Subsequently, I argue why I expect material and immaterial 
inducements fostering the followership of small holders to be more likely to come from 
major holders than from monetary leaders, and why I expect this dynamics to induce 
effectively small actors to take part to the governance of asymmetrical monetary 
systems.  
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 CHAPTER V 
The divide between Small and Middle Powers in the Monetary System. 
Implications for Autonomy and Followership of Small Holders 
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5.1  The major-holder bias of the literature and the followership of small holders 
This chapter represents the theoretical core of this research. In its pages, I delineate the 
different strategic environment faced by small and middle powers respectively vis à vis 
the moves of the monetary leaders and powerful hegemonic actors. A narrower focus 
will be applied, as anticipated, to countries marked by a significant record of current 
account surplus. These actors are assumed to address a recurrent strategic dilemma 
between using their stronger solvency position to gain autonomy, namely, putting their 
own interests before the necessity to govern the system’s imbalances (monetary 
neutrality) or sacrificing their autonomy to guarantee the stability of the core-currency 
on international markets (via the three forms of followership). The empirical elements 
to measure the followership policy of surplus countries are those already illustrated in 
previous chapters: a stabilising exchange-rate policy and the compliance with the 
Compensation Rule as regards either interest rates or official reserves.  
The first conclusion of this analysis, which will be tested in the next chapter with 
a detailed case study, is that small countries characterised by a significant current 
account surplus enjoy, other things being equal, a greater policy autonomy than middle 
powers. They are supposed, in particular, to be more likely to diversify their foreign 
assets and escape the mechanism of entrapment, to govern interest-rates and money 
supply in accordance with domestic conditions about inflation and production and to 
choose fixed exchange-rate opportunistically when this accrues tangible benefits to the 
country’s economy. On the contrary, their visible systemic irrelevance reduces also the 
power of non-financial means to coerce or induce small holders to coordinate with the 
leader, included the implications of monetary policy for the politico-military sphere.   
The second conclusion concerns the causes of monetary followership rather the 
causes of defection. To identify the factors pushing small surplus states to follow a 
monetary leadership, I resort to the instruments of the decennial theoretical reflection 
on collective action dilemmas and the burden sharing problem in military alliances. 
Eventually, my conclusion is that there are essentially two ways for small holders to find 
followership more convenient than autonomy on the base of a rational cost-benefit 
calculation. The first is the presence of so-called joint goods, namely, goods whose 
benefits go to the shared goal of currency stability while generating relevant private 
gains for its producer as well. In other words, joint goods encompass the domestic 
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variables stressed by  Comparative Political Economy and any country-specific gain from 
monetary followership that is not generalizable to all actors. The second way to favour 
small countries’ followership is the action of neighbouring major holders through 
specific issue-linkages with relevant aspects of regional politics, such as economic 
cooperation and local military balancing.  
On the contrary, the existing literature on the causes of monetary followership 
in surplus countries, as far as scarce and difficult to generalise, is strongly biased on the 
case of middle powers and their capacity to influence the core-currency. In the first 
place, mercantilist theory considers all countries as equally vulnerable to trade 
dependence. Instead, small countries, while on average more dependent on foreign 
trade than larger states, are better placed to exploit opportunities for diversification. 
Moreover, the lower systemic impact of their financial wealth implies a greater viability 
of opportunistic followership, where exchange-rate stability is oriented to the purpose 
of export promotion while domestic policies and reserves management are oriented to 
self-interested objectives.   
In the second place, the connection of monetary issues with military affairs 
assumes the coincidence of monetary and military leader in an asymmetric alliance, and 
implies that followers’ actions are able to increase or decrease, by affecting the strength 
of the leader’s currency, also the effectiveness of a great power’s military instrument 
within the security arrangement.  However, this hypothesis suffers from the same 
complications affecting the burden-sharing bargaining on countries’ contribution to 
military alliances. Indeed, in early studies on this topic military deterrence was 
considered as a public good27 (Olson and Zeckhauser 1966; Olson 1965), which suffered 
precisely from the tendency of small countries to under-produce it given the scarce 
effectiveness of their conventional forces on the overall balance of power with rival 
great powers. Analogously, if the influence of small holders on the price of the core-
currency is null or scarcely significant, the fact that balance-of-payment difficulties of a 
monetary leader may spill over on its efficiency as security provider does not provide 
any incentive whatsoever to small holder for sharing the costs of the system’s 
maintenance.  
                                                          
27 A public good may be consumed without reducing the amount available for others (non-rivalry in 
consumption), and cannot be denied to those who do not pay for it (non-excludability). 
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Lastly, the tendency to address the problem from the perspective of major 
holders is evident above all in game-theoretical works dealing with the effects of 
financial entrapment on the strategies of major Asian countries managing a huge 
amount of US-dollar reserves. In this context, scholars have taken for granted that, 
notwithstanding the size of a country’s financial wealth, the accumulation of foreign 
assets had eventually turned any actor into a stakeholder of the core-currency on 
international markets. The idea that a financial wealth denominated in US dollars is 
conductive for the political mechanism described by Kirshner is supposed to lead to a 
standoff among follower countries that has been frequently represented as a static 
Prisoner’s Dilemma (Ciorciari 2013; Drezner 2010).  In his writing, Drezner outlines a 
clear definition of this strategic game. As he puts it,  
«Collectively, [followers have] an incentive to hold on to their dollars, so as to maintain 
its value on world currency markets. Individually, each central bank [has] an incentive to 
sell dollars and diversify its holdings into other hard currencies. This fear of defection 
[leads] to a classic prisoner’s dilemma and the risk that these central banks will 
simultaneously try to diversify their currency portfolios poses the greatest threat toward 
a run on the dollar» 
Evidently, in these models all actors play equally as market movers of the core-currency, 
and the defection of even one of the dollar holders is deemed able to cause a collapse 
of the system of which only the first defector could escape the consequences. 
 However, this model faces some striking theoretical and empirical inconstancies. 
First, because the Prisoner’s Dilemma is famous for predicting a single Pareto-inefficient 
Nash equilibrium of mutual defection, but this is not what we observe in the real world. 
Countries in the so-called Dollar Standard, the implicit worldwide monetary 
arrangement based on the greenback, have continued to accumulate dollar reserves in 
the last fifteen years, and have been willing to absorb the overhang of dollars created 
by the Federal Reserves in the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis as widely 
documented in recent articles (Norrlof 2014; Stokes 2014). Second, not all the creditor 
countries, both presently and historically, have behaved as responsible stakeholders of 
the core-currency on international markets. For instance, France attempted at systemic 
destruction many times in the past from the position of major holder of gold 
(Accominotti 2009; Kirshner 1995), and many actors defected the US leadership during 
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the 2008 crisis all across East-Asia, the Persian Gulf and Latin America (Drezner 2009; 
Mehrotra and Koźluk 2008; Taylor 2013a, 2013b). These inconsistencies suggest the 
presence of a significant area of unexplained variance that is particularly strong for small 
holders, but invests also the motives behind the unwavering support given by major 
holders to the prostrated US economy and the declining dollar before and immediately 
after the last global crisis.  
 In the next chapter, I illustrate the baseline scenario of the bargaining between 
minor and major holders for the distribution of the burdens of adjustment in a system 
characterised by a deficit leader. Especially, I draw a parallel between this conflict and 
the burden sharing debate in military alliances addressed by the early literature on 
collective choice and its evolution in the last decades. In accordance with the ‘small-
exploit-the-large’ hypothesis of this first writings, I first give a game-theoretical 
representation of the bargaining, and successively I discuss the elements that may shift 
the outcome out of the baseline scenario into cases of monetary followership by small 
surplus countries.  
 
 
5.2  Modelling the baseline scenario of intra-follower relations 
The theoretical reflection that is closer to the study of the conflict on macroeconomic 
adjustments, in terms of strategic dilemmas and bargaining problems, is that of burden 
sharing in military alliances. In the literature, this last issue has been analysed through a 
rational-choice approach drawing on the theory of collective choice. The actual problem, 
in the context of military alliances such as the 1960’s NATO or the Triple Entente in the 
run up to the First World War, is that of distributing the economic costs of maintaining 
an effective nuclear or conventional force so that member states ‘gain’ a share of the 
common security which is proportional to their contribution in its production.  
 The first studies on the issue, which substantially equate security with deterrence 
(nuclear or conventional) between opposite blocks, are acutely sensitive to the choices 
of small states. Indeed, they get to the conclusion that countries with a minor economic 
and military potential are the most advantaged in the distribution of the burdens of 
common defence. As cleary stated in one the seminal works on this topic, «There will 
[…] be a tendency for the "larger" members - those that place a higher absolute value 
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on the public good - to bear a disproportionate share of the burden» (Olson and 
Zeckhauser 1966). The main reason behind this outcome is precisely that «small nations, 
which find that even large sacrifices on their part have little effect on the global balance, 
would often be attracted to neutral or passive foreign policies, [while] large nations 
which know that their efforts can decisively influence world events […] emphasize the 
urgency of the struggle in which they are engaged» (Olson and Zeckhauser 1966).  
 The analogy with monetary relation strikes as evident at this point. In particular, 
because both military deterrence and monetary stability are classifiable as non-rival and 
non-excludable public goods, and because the enhanced autonomy of small countries 
and the obliged contribution of major states are determined by the same circumstance: 
the influence of states on the system. However, there is also a fundamental difference 
in the way the scholarly literature has approached the hierarchical aspect of military 
burden sharing compared to relations in the monetary system. In the first context, the 
free-riding behaviour of small countries is intended to damage above all the alliance 
leader, while the contribution, role and behaviour of intermediate actors is scarcely 
considered if not completely ignored. In the second context, addressed by the literature 
of International Political Economy, the relation between leaders and followers has more 
frequently implied the point of view of middle powers. Conversely, the approach of this 
research has unveiled the fact that in asymmetrical monetary relations characterised by 
a deficit leader, the actual public goods producers are not great powers, but major 
holders. Accordingly, the main field of the macroeconomic conflict is not solely between 
minor states as a whole and deficit leaders, where the second wins by definition, but 
above all between major holders and small holders.  
To the extent that the relation between small and middle powers differs from 
the analogous bargaining between producers and consumers of military deterrence, 
two significant differences emerge from this comparison. Firstly, the contribution of 
middle powers to currency stability, contrary to that of military leaders, may be the 
result of coordination among more than one actor with an equal capacity to influence 
the monetary system. For instance, the pivotal role of the sterling in the former British 
colonies in the years 1945-1960 was made possible by the implicit agreement among 
major holders of sterling balances, while the US dollar has passed successfully through 
its recurrent downward cycles on currency markets thanks to the coordination of a few 
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major creditors such as Saudi Arabia, China, Japan, Germany, South Korea or Hong Kong. 
Nonetheless, this simply means that current modelizations based on the Prisoner’s 
Dilemma provide a rather imprecise representation of the so-called ‘reserves game’. The 
strategic interaction among major holders is rather closer to a coordination game than 
to a mixed-motives situation. This is the case for mainly one reasons: the rapidity and 
strength with which financial markets react to the defection of a major holder makes 
very difficult imaging that the first country to defect have any possibility to escape the 
heavy capital losses caused to its neighbours by this move28.  
 Secondly, the producer of public goods, which in early models of the economic 
theory of alliances was a great power with interests, ambitions and concerns on a global 
scale, becomes in the monetary-system model a lower-ranked power with prevalently 
regional interests. This substantial dissimilarity makes these actors much more prone to 
suffer for the free-riding of small states, even considering the little marginal gains that 
these actors can provide to the production of the public good. A complete overview of 
how this fundamental difference affects the choices of followership in small surplus 
countries will be provided in next sections as part of the second core hypothesis of this 
research. Instead, to conclude this section I ignore this point and I provide a revision of 
the baseline game-theoretical modelization of both schemes of interaction about the 
conflict on macroeconomic policy autonomy among minor states  ̶  the one within major 
holders and the one between major holders and small holders.  
The conundrum of major holders’ coordination is still believed improbable by 
current theories predicting a beggar-thy-neighbour run on the core-currency. Contrarily, 
I suggest that the rapidity and strength of the reaction of financial markets can hardly 
allow any big player to escape the drawbacks its single defection on its own financial 
assets, and that this simple fact is sufficient to turn the game into one of coordination. 
The case of South Korea in 2005 still resounds as the most evident example of such 
mechanism and an evidence of how the expected behaviour of major holders does not 
conform to the Prisoner’s Dilemma expectations. South Korea was then the third major 
                                                          
28 This characteristic of the game is sufficient to also to confirm the unsuitability of iterative or dynamic 
games to represent the current strategic posture of main actors. Indeed, once the coordination in support 
of the core-currency fails for the defection of one player, the system leans toward collapse too rapidly 
and radically for leaving any space to retaliation, punishment and signalling typical of dynamic games 
situations. 
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holder of dollar assets in East Asia after Japan and China. In February 2005, the central 
bank discussed with the parliament about strategies to diversify its reserves away from 
the dollar into other currencies such as the Canadian and the Australian dollar that were 
more coherent with the country’s trade pattern. Although the real plan did not imply a 
complete abandonment of the dollar by South Korea, at worst a slight diversification, in 
a single day the greenback fell so much against the Asian currencies that the 
spokespersons of every central bank in major creditor countries, from the Middle East 
to East Asia, spent the rest of the week running around to reaffirm their commitment to 
accumulate US dollars as receipt of their huge trade surpluses (Dougherty 2005). What 
is surprising in this affair is not simply the implicit and immediate coordination of major 
central banks, but above all the fact that the supposedly advantaged fist-defector, South 
Korea, had to renounce to diversify its foreign reserves as well.  
 Proceeding from these scope conditions, I propose a new the game-theoretical 
scheme describing the interaction among major holders as a static coordination game. 
In this first model, the leader is assumed to play autonomously as nature move, and 
small followers are kept momentarily out of the picture. Major holders hold the 
following utility functions:  
𝑈𝑖 = 𝑆 − 𝐹𝑖 − 𝑘𝑖𝐶𝐼𝑁𝑆 + 𝛾𝑗𝐹𝑗   
𝑈𝑗 = 𝑆 − 𝐹𝑗 − 𝑘𝑗𝐶𝐼𝑁𝑆 + 𝛾𝑖𝐹𝑖 
Where 𝑖 , 𝑗 are two major holders in a deficit-leader system. 𝑆 = 𝛾𝑗𝐹𝑗 + 𝛾𝑖𝐹𝑖  is the 
payoff for currency stability, assumed to be beneficial to all actors in any case. As widely 
discussed in previous pages, it results from the joint effort of major holders’ 
coordinating their policies through monetary followership. Indeed, 𝐹𝑖,𝑗 represents the 
binary policy move of each actor, valued 1 if states follow the leader and zero if they 
remain neutral. Since autonomy is deemed to be a priority of economic statecraft, 
monetary followership (F=1) is considered a disutility in the actors’ utility function, while 
neutrality implies no costs on autonomy (F=0). On the contrary, 𝛾𝑖,𝑗𝐹𝑖,𝑗  describes the 
utility, for each player, of the other actor’s cooperation in the system maintenance, 
which is of course positive (i.e. states prefer at any rate to share the burden). The 
parameter 0 ≤ 𝛾 ≤ 1 measures the actor’s market power on international financial 
markets, whose most effective proxy is a country’s share of the total core-currency 
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liabilities held by foreign actors. As the leader’s external indebtedness is a finite 
quantity, in the model I assume that  𝛾𝑖 + 𝛾𝑗 = 1, and I set 𝛾𝑖,𝑗 =
1
2
 since both states are 
major holders and thus are both necessary to the complete stabilisation of the core-
currency through cooperative coordination.  As regards the variable 𝐶𝐼𝑁𝑆 , it measures 
the disutility (i.e. the cost) of systemic instability following a scarce provision of 
monetary coordination by one or both major holders. By assumption, 𝐶𝐼𝑁𝑆 = 0 𝑖𝑓 𝑆 ≈
1, otherwise 𝐶𝐼𝑁𝑆 = 1. The parameter 0 ≤ 𝑘 ≤ 1 describes the importance attached by 
the two players to systemic stability. Although generally related to the variables 
described in chapter four, in this model I assume 𝑘𝑖,𝑗 = 1 for both players. That is, either 
major holders have a strong political, economic or country-specific interest in 
maintaining the stability of the core currency and the survival of the asymmetrical 
monetary arrangement. When actual policy moves are inputted into the functions, this 
is the resulting payoff matrix for the game between major holders. 
              
                             
 
           
            
 
  
  
Nash equilibria in (F,F; N,N) 
 
This game represents the interactions among major holders in systems characterised by 
a multiplicity of surplus middle powers necessary to support the leader’s coinage on 
international markets. However, there are two pure strategy Nash equilibria as none of 
the two players holds a dominant strategy in either neutrality or followership. 
Followership is convenient if players consider the other part to be reliably committed to 
play followership as well. Otherwise, neutrality is the less risky strategy if the other 
player’s will to support the core currency is uncertain in the near future. In technical 
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words, (F,F) payoff dominates (N,N) being the pareto efficient solution of the game. 
However, (N,N) is said to be weakly risk-dominant over (F,F) since the product of the 
difference between the two players’ payoffs in their last- and third-best scenarios, 
respectively -1.5 and -1, is equal to the product of the difference between their payoffs 
in the second- and first-best situations, respectively 0 and 0.5, as long as there is 
uncertainty on other players’ will to cooperate29. In practical terms, this means that 
states have no evident incentives in playing either a prudent, but less rewarding strategy 
like neutrality, or a risk-taking but potentially more fruitful strategy like followership. In 
this kind of symmetric games, a pure strategy solution is impossible unless players are 
able to assess other actors’ intentions.  
In this case, for (F,F) to be the Nash equilibrium of the game, like we observe, for 
example, in the Dollar Standard among major holders of dollar securities, it is sufficient 
for major holder (1) that  𝑝(𝐹, 𝐹) + (1 − 𝑝)(𝐹, 𝑁) > 𝑝(𝑁, 𝐹) + (1 − 𝑝)(𝑁, 𝑁), where 
p is the probability that major holder (2) plays followership simultaneously. The 
equation must hold equally for major holder (2) with inverted moves30 and p equalled 
to the expected probability that major holder (1) plays F. As long as p is greater than 
1
2
  
for either players  ̶  that is, other major holders are deemed more likely to follow the 
leader than to remain neutral  ̶  playing followership accrues higher payoffs with lower 
risks, and becomes the pure dominant strategy for both players. As regards the factors 
affecting the value of p, at least three variables can be identified under conditions of 
common knowledge of rationality. First, a bad economic health of other major holders 
can cast doubts on their ability, notwithstanding their political will, to support the leader 
in the near future. Second, a very troubled, hopeless situation of the core-currency, due 
to excessive imbalances and extreme market pressures can waver the trust of other 
major holders in their own possibility to avoid a collapse. Third, an assessment of other 
player’s political relations with the leader can reveal increasing hostility due to 
geopolitical and military rivalry, reducing the possibility that a rising major holder 
supports the leader in the long run.    
The second model is relative to the bargaining between small countries and 
intermediate actors in a deficit-leader monetary arrangement. As in the previous model, 
                                                          
29 (−1.5 + 1)(−1.5 + 1) ≥ (0 − 0.5)(0 − 0.5) ==>  −0.5 ∗ −0.5 ≥ −0.5 ∗ −0.5 ==> 0.25 ≥ 0.25 
30  𝑝(𝐹, 𝐹) + (1 − 𝑝)(𝑁, 𝐹) > 𝑝(𝐹, 𝑁) + (1 − 𝑝)(𝑁, 𝑁) 
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the leader is assumed to defect by nature, supposing that it is always willing and able to 
maximise its own policy autonomy at the expenses of other actors. Conversely, minor 
states are prepared to bear unilaterally the burden of adjustments to preserve the value 
of the core-currency, providing their contribution impacts significantly on international 
markets. The formalisation of utility functions is the same as the previous one, but with 
a significant change in the feedback effect of F on systemic stability given by an 
asymmetric value of the parameter 𝛾.  
𝑈𝑖 = 𝑆 − 𝐹𝑖 − 𝑘𝑖𝐶𝐼𝑁𝑆 + 𝛾𝑗𝐹𝑗   
𝑈𝑗 = 𝑆 − 𝐹𝑗 − 𝑘𝑗𝐶𝐼𝑁𝑆 + 𝛾𝑖𝐹𝑖 
In this model, 𝑖 is a small holder while 𝑗 is a major holder. As before, 𝑆 = 𝛾𝑗𝐹𝑗 + 𝛾𝑖𝐹𝑖 , 
representing the payoff for currency stability. 𝐹𝑖,𝑗 represents the policy move of each 
actor valued 1 if states follow the leader and zero if they remain neutral. Contrary to the 
previous model, 𝛾𝑗𝐹𝑗  describes the utility of small holders for the followership of major 
holders, while 𝛾𝑖𝐹𝑖  describes the utility of major holders given by the coordination of 
small holders. However, in this model the parameter 0 ≤ 𝛾 ≤ 1 𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ 𝛾𝑖 + 𝛾𝑗 = 1  is not 
assumed equal for both players, but dissimilar mirroring the extensively larger influence 
of major holders on currency markets. Numerically, I assume 𝛾𝑗 ≈ 1 since the core-
currency stability is guaranteed solely with the unilateral coordination of major holders. 
Conversely, 𝛾𝑖 ≈ 0 in small holders, since their effect on market prices, by definition, is 
slightly positive or null. This change has a big influence both on states’ contribution to 
stability (S depends almost exclusively on 𝐹𝑗) and to the utility assigned by any actor to 
its counterpart’s cooperation (𝛾𝑖𝐹𝑖 ≈ 0 for major holders) As before, the variable 𝐶𝐼𝑁𝑆 
measures the cost of systemic instability following a scarce provision of monetary 
coordination by major holders. Practically, in this case 𝐶𝐼𝑁𝑆 = 0 𝑖𝑓 𝐹𝑗 = 1, otherwise 
𝐶𝐼𝑁𝑆 = 1. The parameter 0 ≤ 𝑘 ≤ 1 is assumed 𝑘𝑖,𝑗 = 1 for both players. That is, both 
the major holder and the small holder have a political, economic or country-specific 
interest in maintaining the stability of the core currency and the survival of the 
asymmetrical monetary arrangement. When actual policy moves are inputted into the 
functions, the resulting payoff scheme is the following:  
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Pure Nash Equilibrium in (F,N) 
 
Remarkably, the game between middle and small powers implies a largely different 
result with respect to the previous model. Indeed, given the lower value of 𝛾 for small 
holders, on the one hand these actors have a dominant strategy in N, forcing the major 
holder to a dichotomous choice between provoking a systemic collapse (N,N) or bearing 
the burden of adjustments alone (F,N). On the other hand, the major holder attaches a 
very small, perhaps negligible, utility to small holders’ coordination per se (𝛾𝑖𝐹𝑖 ≈ 0). 
However, the existence of a dominant strategy for one of the two players is sufficient to 
compute a pure strategy equilibrium even without specifying that for major holders, 
since 𝑦𝑖 is slightly greater than zero when small holders follow, (F,F)>(F,N) and 
(N,F)>(N,N), while their values have been approximated in the payoff matrix. 
Apparently, this two schemes cover the whole set of conflictual interactions 
between the two categories of potential followers. Now, just the question of monetary 
followership in small countries remains unanswered. The problem arises in a similar 
fashion for military alliances, where after decades of observation on the behaviour of 
the small NATO members, scholars have concluded that free-riding behaviours are rarer 
than is commonly predicted by the baseline scenario of collective choice theories. 
Rather, small allies’ contribution in terms of military spending and conventional forces 
has been found disproportionately greater compared to the security gains of their 
alliance membership. Hence, the search for new variables determining a different 
burden distribution in military alliances has brought scholars on two parallel routes. On 
the one hand, they coined the categories of joint goods and ‘impurely public goods’ to 
identify those situations where the development of one’s military instrument can 
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provide both public and private goods. On the other hand, recent studies have explored 
the potential of issue-linkages as a possible rebalancing factor in the bargaining between 
small and big players. In next sections, both hypotheses will be analysed and adapted to 
explain the distributive outcomes of monetary relations.  
 
 
5.3  Joint Goods and Issue Linkages: the causes of monetary followership in small 
holders 
In the field of military burden sharing, the main theoretical innovation reconciling the 
empirical evidence (small states do contribute as well as or more than major states) with 
the theory of public goods (which expects them to free-ride) is related to the concept of 
joint goods or joint products (Coneybeare and Sandler 1990; Cornes and Sandler 1984; 
Murdoch and Sandler 1984; Sandler 1993). This intuitive idea entails that conventional 
military capabilities developed by small states generate benefits that go beyond the 
pure public good of deterrence, supplying the contributing state with other two 
categories of benefits  known as private goods and ‘impurely public goods’.  
With the first instance, scholars allude to the compresence of specific national 
exigencies, beside the general scenario, which could be benefited by additional 
investments in the military sector (Sandler 1993). Such concept encompasses country-
specific security threats but also domestic interests related to the industrial complex or 
the conflict for resources among burocratic bodies. A crystal-clear example of this 
phenomenon is the trend of military spending in Greece and Turkey, which regularly 
exceeds their equal-contribution quotas inside the NATO thanks to their reciprocal 
territorial disputes over the islands of the Aegeus and Mediterranean Sea. Paradoxically, 
this inter-allies rivalry enhances the overall production of deterrence within the Atlantic 
Alliance by overcoming the underproduction problem of small countries. Differently, the 
concept of ‘impurely public goods’ concerns the damage limitation in case of actual 
enemy invasion, attack or other military moves. Indeed, in this case the advantage given 
by an already strong military is both beneficial to the producer and partially sharable 
with other countries at a declining rate depending on distance and length of the 
battlefront. Major examples come from countries very close to the border between the 
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two blocks during the Cold War, like the former Czechoslovakia or Baltic countries in the 
post-Cold War NATO. 
  A first idea to reconcile theory and empirical evidence in monetary relations can 
be the adaptation of these aspects of the theory of alliances to the conflict on policy 
autonomy. However, on the one hand it is doubtful that any ‘impurely public good’ may 
be related to the monetary followership of small holders. Those phenomena that 
enhance the general systemic welfare indeed, such as economic growth or financial 
stability, are more easily associated to domestic-oriented policies and a careful asset 
diversification, that is, they cannot imply followership. On the other hand, the literature 
review in the previous chapter has given a cogent account of the country-specific factors 
(private goods) that may bring to the fortuitous coordination of monetary policies: 
domestic institutional structure, economic and demographic trends, party politics and 
interest-group dynamics. Pairwise, all the numerous shortcomings of this approach have 
been stressed with regard to small surplus countries, to conclude that domestic-based 
hypotheses can be largely used as control variables in the empirical parts of this study, 
but do not represent the priority of its research design for their strong limits in dealing 
with the case of small holders. 
 Rather, to understand the peculiar fact of monetary followership in small holders 
it is more useful looking at those structural variables that the academic reflection has 
put under the spotlight as alternative to public-goods models of international economic 
relations (Axelrod and Keohane 1985; Keohane 1984; Kindleberger 1986; Oye 1985). 
Realist and liberal institutionalist scholars have elaborated at least four factors 
increasing the possibility to overcome collective action dilemmas  ̶  a low number of 
players, the presence of international institutions, the density of linkable issues and the 
opportunity to play iterative games. A further analysis of recent findings in the theory 
of alliances and the direct observation of monetary relations suggest identifying regional 
major holders as the most likely actors to exploit the opportunities granted by these 
structural factors. I particular, I advance the hypothesis that middle powers are the most 
likely and most effective subjects to connect the followership of small countries with 
issues and tables at the regional level, allowing these actors to privatize some of the 
benefits of currency and monetary coordination that would be otherwise dispersed by 
their scarce systemic influence.   
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 The four elements usually emphasised in the literature on international 
coordination are not equally applicable to the debate on macroeconomic adjustments. 
Firstly, scholars argue that the lower the number of actors in a system, the greater the 
probability that countries coordinate for the production of public goods. However, the 
core question in the conflict between major and minor holders in hierarchical monetary 
systems is not about favouring cooperation among multiple equally-seized actors. 
Rather, the production of public goods is assured unilaterally by middle powers, which 
may cope with the free riding of small holders on a bilateral base vanishing the 
usefulness of this approach. Secondly, the possibility to provide coordination through 
the iteration of the game is limited by the unusual payoff structure of strategic 
interactions in asymmetric monetary systems. As shown in previous sections, the game 
between major and minor holders is solved by a Pareto optimal Nash equilibrium 
representing the first-best of small surplus powers. Consequently, the applicability of 
two strategies that have demonstrated their efficacy with the Prisoner’s Dilemma  ̶  such 
as the Grim Trigger and the Tit-for-Tat   ̶ is severely limited by the fact that the payoff of 
the major holder is higher when it accepts the free-riding of small holders than when it 
tries to ‘punish’ them by playing defection. If anything, these strategies might work in 
presence of valuable assets external to the monetary game to use as a punish-reward 
mechanism to induce small countries to follow the leader’s priorities.  
 Following this suggestion, the other two variables highlighted by past studies 
result quite more promising. The first pertains the role of international governmental 
institutions. In the rational-choice reflection, formal institutions contribute to the 
ritualization of interactions among the actors through periodic meeting, issue-to-issue 
connections in multiple negotiating tables and supposedly unbiased flows of 
information about the payoffs and the actual behaviours of other member states 
(Keohane and Martin 1995; Keohane 1984). Although the realist critique to this 
hypothesis argues that the institutional context, by itself, is hardly sufficient to 
guarantee the cooperative coordination among participant states (Grieco 1988; 
Mearsheimer 1994), it remains the uncontested importance of this variables in 
favouring the link between separate issues. It is indeed this last point to play the lion’s 
share in the attempt to identify those structural variables that may push supposedly 
autonomous actors to give up their freedom in the macroeconomic field. Accordingly, 
136 
 
small holders will be more likely to participate in the support of the core-currency when 
major holders are willing and able to exploit regional issue-linkages to modify the cost-
benefit calculus of their reluctant neighbours31.  
The study of issue-linkages has been deep and extensive in past years, both in 
the liberal and the realist-minded literature. Overall, the theoretical reflection in the 
field of rational-choice theories has identified many different typologies of issue linkage. 
Haas (1980) proposes a tree-fold partition distinguishing among tactical linkage, which 
exchanges a partner’s concession with an element that has no intellectual or technical 
link with the issue at stake; Fragmented Linkage, which establishes a link between the 
partner’s cooperation and a side-payment which is not presented as a quid quo pro but 
as technically necessary; Substantive Linkage, which refers to cases where the linkage is 
pursued with a shared and substantial knowledge on the interdependency of two issue-
areas. According to McGinnis (1986), «Two different types of linkage strategies are 
shown to allow for cooperation in different circumstances; one is a simple extension of 
tit-for-tat, the other entails a quid-pro-quo arrangement in which each player sacrifices 
on some issues in order to gain more on others». Likewise, Oye (1985) considers issue-
linkages essentially as a tool for increasing the opportunities of game iteration and for 
providing punishing moves for a tit-for-tat scheme.  
Axelrod and Keohane identify three typologies of issue-linkages denominated 
backscratching, blackmailing or contextual (Axelrod and Keohane 1985). The first two 
are the faces of a same coin based once again on the known mechanism of tit-for-tat. In 
backscratching scenarios, a state A modifies the cost-benefit ratio of state B acting on 
the benefits side, that is, with a promise of remuneration in case of conformity with the 
requests of state A. A clear example is that of a country exchanging the settlement of a 
monetary agreement with the promise to open its domestic market or promoting the 
membership of its partner to an international organisation. In the case of blackmailing, 
a state A threatens a retaliation on state B in case of non-conformity to its desired 
policies, therefore acting on the cost side. A clear example is represent by Eichengreen’s 
game-theoretical model of Hegemonic Stability Theory applied to currency relations 
                                                          
31 This process is naturally passible to work the other way round. Namely, the number of small surplus 
followers may be decreasing when a regional major holder has a political or economic interest in not 
sharing the burden of followership with its regional neighbours. 
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(Eichengreen 1989). In that context, the leader punishes the cases of exchange-rate 
devaluation by small countries with a specular move on its own currency coupled with 
commercial restrictions. Lastly, in a situation of "contextual" issue-linkage, «a given 
bargain is placed within the context of a more important long-term relationship in such 
a way that the long-term relationship affects the outcome of the particular bargaining 
process» (Axelrod and Keohane 1985).  
 Among the many proposed typizations, both the so-called tactical linkages 
(whether negative or positive) and the contextual link of two issues within a regional 
political and economic framework, may be useful tools to coerce or induce small surplus 
states to follow in monetary affairs despite the lack of baseline incentives. In next 
sections, I explain why regional major holders, and not monetary leaders as commonly 
assumed by rational-choice theories, are more likely to resort to issue linkages and 
successfully induce small states in the same regional system to monetary followership 
towards the leader.  
 
  
5.4  Systemic stakeholders or regional leaders? Major holders as mediators 
between monetary leaders and small countries 
The impact of spatial variables on political relations in the monetary system, especially 
the different weight of regional and global issues for minor states, has received so far 
scares attention in the IPE literature. Obviously, a notable exception is the vast group of 
studies on the cases of regional leadership, like the European monetary integration or 
the analyses on the regionalisation of economic relations (S. Cooper 2007; Hellmann 
2007; Kenen and Meade 2008). However, theoretical studies have usually assumed 
global and unified monetary systems in their elaboration, mainly due to the peculiar 
nature of financial transactions, almost unaffected by space distances compared to 
trade and military relations. Yet, there are issues in international monetary relations 
where the spatial dimension, namely the geographical scale of state-to-state 
interactions, is frequently a more influencing factor than is commonly thought. In 
particular, with the progressive reduction on a regional scale of the web of diplomatic, 
economic and military relations among states in the post-Cold War, the number 
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opportunities to link issues on multiple regional negotiations has risen as well, opening 
new widows for states to advance their interests in the monetary arena.    
 In the theory of International Relations, the post-Cold War reflection has given a 
great thrust to innovate on the geopolitical complications of the concept of power, 
especially considering the increased weight of ‘regional security complexes’ (Buzan 
2004; Lake and Morgan 1997) in the strategic calculus of major actors. In other words, 
scholars have detected a widespread tendency by all the relevant systemic actors 
(excluded perhaps the American superpower) to prioritise threats, conflicts and 
opportunities within their immediate neighbourhood when pondering about the nodes 
of their strategic planning, including military, financial and commercials issues (Colombo 
2010). About this, it is worth mentioning the great effort by Berry Buzan to reframe the 
concept of international hierarchy, incorporating a geopolitical criterion in the 
traditional scheme devised by Keohane and based on each actor’s capacity to exert a 
significant influence on the system. In brief, Buzan’s hierarchy includes three major 
actors: a) superpowers, characterised by top-ranked economic and military capabilities 
with a genuinely global presence; b) great powers, connoted by the possibility to exert 
influence in a few regional context other than their own; c) regional powers, including 
all those states which exert a significant influence on interstate relations, define a 
system’s polarity and are considered important by other major actors,  but solely within 
their own regional system (Buzan 2004).  
 This new conception of the relation between space and state power can be 
usefully employed to grasp the relative importance of regional issues when observing 
states’ behaviour in monetary relations. On the one hand, great powers and regional 
powers, if not playing as monetary leaders, are able to play the role of major holders (or 
big debtor, more in general) in a regional or global monetary system. On the other hand, 
if major actors are currently re-orienting their interests from global issues to regional 
scenarios, this process is likely to be even stronger for small states, which in the previous 
bipolar global system had already shown a remarkable tendency to prioritise conflicts, 
relations and equilibria within their relevant strategic area. This widespread roll-back to 
regional politics, together with the greater priority attached to regional issues by small 
and middle powers, has also opened a wide potential for influence to those actors, like 
major holders of financial assets, that are willing and able to exploit their stakes in 
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regional politics as a bargaining weapon to induce small states to participate in the 
governance of an international monetary system.  
 For instance, the theory of alliances has already noticed some of the most evident 
consequences of this epochal change on the bargaining for the distribution of the 
burdens in military cooperation. Carati and Clementi (2010) have identified one of these 
processes in a study on the new-entered NATO members after the Cold War. They 
noticed that the contribution of the small countries, formerly members of the Warsaw 
Pact, to the out-of-area missions of the Alliance (Balkans, Iraq, Afghanistan) is not simply 
disproportioned with respect to their gains in terms of deterrence (so denying the 
expectations of the economic theory of alliances), but also that the hypotheses of joint 
goods and impurely-public goods are insufficient to explain this pattern. Their 
conclusion is that the countries of the former soviet bloc were deeply convinced that 
their remarkable contribution to all NATO-led missions, notwithstanding the scarce 
connection to the common security threats (e.g. Russia), would have been sooner or 
later remunerated by major European powers with the inclusion in the dense 
institutional structure characterising western Europe, and especially with a rapid 
accession to the European Union.  
Analogously, the observation of the patterns of international monetary relations 
reveals that great powers or regional powers characterised by a creditor position 
towards the leader have frequently exploited their political, economic or military power, 
within their own region, to obtain from small states the surrender of policy autonomy, 
functional to the preservation of currency stability against the system’s inevitable 
imbalances. In these cases, the major holder play the role of ‘intermediaries’ between 
the monetary leadership  ̶  which may be an extra-regional superpower as well as a local 
great power such as Germany   ̶ and small states within their regional neighbourhood. 
This position, however, may be exploited in another way, which is less relevant to this 
research but is worth a mention to avoid theoretical misunderstandings. Major holders 
can monopolise the support to the core-currency while promoting a detachment of 
smaller states’ economic relations with the monetary leader when they are politically 
interested in weakening the ties between regional small states and an external power.  
These two paradigmatic cases are well represented by the opposite strategies 
followed by Saudi Arabia on the one side and China on the other during the recent 
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monetary shock conveyed by the Federal Reserve after the burst of the housing bubble 
in the American market. The first behaved as the chain of transmission of the American 
hegemony on its reluctant small neighbours in the Persian Gulf. The second played 
exactly the opposite, with Beijing’s authorities accepting their role of major holder of 
dollar securities, but also maintaining an autonomous monetary policy thanks to capital 
controls. This policy stance, accompanied by a widespread action of economic 
diplomacy by Beijing, has gradually driven many regional small holders out of a strict 
followership to the dollar. For example, econometric tests reveal that regional 
developing states, since the breakup of the crisis, have started weighting the renminbi 
more than the dollar in basket-pegged exchange rate regimes (Girardin 2011; Henning 
2012), have used more frequently the Chinese currency to settle cross-border trade 
transactions (Campanella 2014), or have stopped tracking the Fed to follow the People’s 
Bank of China in the monetary tightness of 2011 (Ciorciari 2013; Johansson 2012; 
Mehrotra and Koźluk 2008). China’s project is indeed a long-term one, which accepts 
the US hegemony for the moment but works to replace it in the future as a regional 
monetary leader.  
The action of middle powers in the monetary system is thus a major determinant 
of monetary followership in small holders. On the one hand, middle powers have a 
greater interest in the followership of small actors compared to the monetary leader. 
Indeed, while the leader’s unique interest is the preservation of its autonomy vis à vis 
the balance-of-payment constraint, regardless of how followers distribute the burden 
of currency stability among themselves, major holder have two motives to want a more 
cooperative distribution of that burden with small holders. Firstly, for not incurring the 
risk of being considered the losers of the economic conflict by their public opinions. As 
shown by numerous case-studies indeed, even autocratic rulers cannot be completely 
isolated from regional news on the main economic and financial events, thus generating 
legitimate claims for policy reversal by interest groups and political factions damaged by 
the possible consequences of monetary followership when neutral choices are taken by 
similar neighbouring economies. Secondly, major holders are more interested in small 
country’s choices because the geographical proximity of financial centres in small 
countries increases the burden of monetary followership on the major holder’s 
monetary authorities. Indeed, if neighbouring countries present comparable financial 
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markets offering higher yields than the leader’s market, the middle power would also 
have to avoid its residents’ capitals to be invested in these alternative markets rather 
than being channels to support the core-currency.  
On the other hand, middle powers are not solely more interested than the 
monetary leader in small countries’ behaviour, but are also better endowed with 
bargaining chips for the greater density of issue-linkages potentially controllable inside 
and outside the monetary-financial arena. Trade networks, the military balance, the 
stability of domestic political regimes in small states are much more affected by regional 
major actors than by the action of external powers distracted by compelling global 
interests. The bargaining weapons in the hands of major holders are essentially a subset 
of those previously enlisted with regard to monetary leaders, but with a greater 
opportunity for small countries to privatise some of the gains from their contribution to 
the stability of the core currency.  
The first is the link between external security and monetary issues. In this 
context, the geographic proximity of the major holder and its prominent stake in the 
regional power balancing allows it to exchange monetary followership in small states 
with a damage-limiting strategy in case of a hostile invasion. This good may be extremely 
valuable to small holders even if the regional security is ultimately guaranteed by an 
external superpower. The second bargaining chip is the link with small countries’ 
internal security and domestic consent, where the major holder can provide military 
assistance in case of actual or probable overthrowing of the government in charge, or a 
declaratory support with ideological coverage for friendly governments. In all these 
policies regional powers would be more reliable and more likely to be effective given 
their greater interest in regional stability, the aversion to (hostile) ideological contagion 
and the greater affinity of political or religious language with their neighbours. Thirdly, 
economic relations are tighter and less subject to diversification among countries 
sharing a common border or belonging to the same region. Overall, regional schemes 
for economic cooperation, whether concerning trade, money or other fields (like cartels 
of raw material producers) offer a wider range of opportunities for tit-for-tat strategies 
as well as for ‘contextual’ issue-linkages given the greater connection among economic 
sectors. Fourthly, regional major holders can exert a greater control over regional 
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intergovernmental institutions, and use this power to exchange its preferred policies for 
the enhanced role of small states within these institutional arenas.  
In the next chapter, I compare the different policy responses of the six members 
of the Gulf Cooperation Council to the decline of the dollar in the 2000’s and the 
monetary shock of 2007-2009. Through a detailed analysis of their decision-making 
process, I highlight the functioning of the strategic mechanisms illustrated in previous 
chapters, first about the great monetary-power divide between small and large holders 
and second about the causes for monetary followership in small actors. Data, 
documental evidence and historical records show the undeniable autonomy gap 
between the medium-sized country, Saudi Arabia, and the minor monarchies vis à vis 
the United States, while confirming that small states’ followership has been mostly 
induced by Saudi Arabia’s mediation through linkages with relevant regional issues 
regarding economic and security cooperation. 
 
 
 
 CHAPTER VI 
The GCC monarchies and the 2008 financial crisis:  the small/major 
holder divide and the role of Saudi Arabia 
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6.1  Case selection and methodology 
In this chapter I illustrate the results of an original case study carried out between 2013 
an 2014 on the exchange-rate and monetary policy of the six member countries of the 
Gulf Cooperation Council: Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain, United Arab Emirates 
(UAE) and Oman. The key purpose of this work is to test the two major hypotheses of 
this research  ̶  the greater autonomy of small holder versus major holders and the 
leading role of regional powers in causing the followership of small holders   ̶  on a 
significant sample of state actors. The selection of the case is grounded on three 
methodological considerations.  
 On the one hand, the strong homogeneity of the six countries as regards the main 
variables that, according to the most recent literature, affect the proneness to monetary 
followership in small and middle powers. Other conditions being equal indeed, the 
observation of a different behaviour between small and major holders appears much 
more robust. Hence, in the first place, all the six countries have enjoyed a wide and 
persistent current account surplus from the late 1990’s to the outbreak of the global 
financial crisis in 2008. This turned them into net creditors vis à vis the rest of the world 
economy and primary protagonists of the international financial system through their 
huge stocks of reserves and the actions of sovereign wealth funds. In the second place, 
all the relevant countries are characterised by strong and symbiotic relation with the 
United States in the field of security and military cooperation. From this alliance, all 
actors gain protection against Iran and other regional threats, while minor states see it 
also as a guarantee against the danger of a Saudi regional hegemony. In the third place, 
all countries share a great number of economic characteristics that may potentially 
impinge on monetary-policy decisions. Their commercial exchanges take place 
prevalently with the European Union and East Asia, while none of them has been subject 
to financial or balance-of-payment crisis in the last thirty years. Overall, their economic 
development is based on a classical rentier-state model dominated by the production 
and the sale of energy products (mainly crude oil and gas) and of related activities in the 
service sector. In the last place, the perspective on political systems shows a 
homogeneous model characterised by monarchic, autocratic and strongly centralised 
governments, whose grip extends to monetary authorities that are completely 
subordinated to the political power.   
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 On the other hand, the second reason making this instance particularly suitable 
for a study on the burden sharing of macroeconomic adjustments is the historical 
moment considered in the analysis. The six countries of the GCC have indeed tightened 
their link to the dollar in a particularly unpropitious moment of the so-called dollar 
cycles, characterised by a deep crisis of the key currency that led its value to depreciate 
by about 50% against major world currencies from 2002 to 2008. The monetary policy 
of Saudi Arabia and other GCC states has significantly contributed to moderate this 
plunge, especially through the great mass of liquidity channelled towards the US market 
to recycle the huge inflow of ‘petrodollars’ that flooded to oil-producers in those years. 
However, the overflow of investments in the United States played also a big role in 
causing the boom and the bust of the housing bubble in 2007-2008, with all its painful 
consequences for the American and the global economy. Consequently, the US 
authorities tried to shift as much as possible of the costs of deleveraging on peripheral 
creditor economies such as Asian developing countries and oil producers. On their part, 
the GCC actors addressed the misalignment between policy priorities in the leader and 
the followers’ market differently: on the one hand, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain and the United 
Arab Emirates followed the Fed’s hyper-expansion of the money supply despite their 
booming domestic markets required a strong tightening of monetary conditions. On the 
contrary, Kuwait, Qatar and Oman managed their exchange rate, their interest rates or 
both disregarding the US policy and in accordance with the urgent domestic problems 
such as a rampant inflation on asset prices and base commodities. In a nutshell, the GCC 
case-study presents a clear instance of macroeconomic conflict, originated by a genuine 
divergence of policy priorities between leaders and followers, where the seconds had to 
face the dilemma between prioritising their own policy autonomy or preserving that of 
the leader country.  
 Eventually, a general element making this case particularly useful to the research 
on the politics of money and exchange rates is its originality. So far, the temporal 
nearness of main events had prevented a genuine political-economy analysis of 
monetary decision-making in the GCC during the subprime mortgage crisis. On the 
contrary, this study represents the first documented account of the decision-making 
process in the six Arab monarchies as regards monetary and exchange-rate policies, and 
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gives a further contribution to the large number of case-studies relative to the 
macroecomic conflict in asymmetric monetary systems. 
 The purpose of this analysis is to demonstrate that the bargaining divide between 
small and middle states   ̶namely, between the small monarchies and Saudi Arabia   ̶ has 
been the main determinant of the choices of defector countries. Contrarily, the small 
holders which did not exploit their position to gain autonomy (UAE, Bahrain and to a 
limited extent Qatar) have been constrained by an effective intermediation by the 
regional major holder, Saudi Arabia. Empirical evidence of these two processes will be 
given by a comparative analysis of economic data aimed at excluding the influence of 
other domestic or international variables that may have conditioned decision-makers in 
their macroeconomic choices. In addition, press articles, insider-analyses of 
practitioners and specialists and diplomatic cables from US authorities will be used to 
reconstruct the political, economic and ideational origins of public policies in the six 
countries32.  
 
 
6.2  Background of the crisis: macroeconomic imbalances, the subprime 
mortgage bubble and the repercussions on the GCC countries 
The onset of the 21th century has shown a remarkable shift in the international economic 
position of the Persian Gulf’s Arab monarchies. Due to the soaring price of the crude oil, 
these countries have enjoyed a steady and large current account surplus, developed a 
net creditor position vis à vis the major world economies, and improved sharply their 
public budgets. At the beginning of the 2000’s decade, their currencies had been 
officially pegged at a fixed rate to the US dollar, as an intermediate step towards the 
creation of a single currency for the six members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). 
However, the healthy situation of the state budgets fostered, all across the region, the 
implementation of massive infrastructural spending programs that overloaded the small 
local economies with a sudden liquidity shock. Expectedly, inflation soared, supported 
by the constant depreciation of the US dollar and a pro-cyclical monetary policy 
                                                          
32 Diplomatic cables come from American embassies and consulates in the countries under scrutiny. They 
are mostly classified as ‘confidential’ and therefore should have been kept unavailable for a period of at 
least ten years. However, the recent release by the organization known as ‘Wikileaks’ has made possible 
to consult them until 2010. 
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imported from Washington. Indeed, since fall 2007, as the first signs of the subprime 
crisis hit the banking sector in the United States, the Fed started an open-ended program 
of monetary expansion that conveyed low interest rates to the whole dollar area. Helped 
by this unfitting credit policy, an asset-price bubble developed in the Persian Gulf, which 
persisted until the last months of 2008. Concretely, inflationary pressure touched the 
highest in the spring and summer of the same year, reaching an average peak of 11% 
monthly rise in the official statistics, and climbing higher than 20% according to 
independent observers. The cost of fundamental commodities such as rice, flour, 
vegetables and fuel followed the same trend, rising from twenty to sixty percent of their 
initial price in less than a year. Eventually, in fall 2008, as soon as oil prices froze also the 
oil bubble burst, and the following financial chaos unveiled the contradictions of such a 
pro-cyclical policy stance. Deflation, bankruptcies and state-backed bailouts spread 
throughout the region. At the peak of the crisis, all the countries tried, unsuccessfully, 
to cure the problem with subsidies and wage augmentations. However, Saudi Arabia, 
Bahrain and the Emirates did not take any further step such as tightening monetary 
policy or revalue the local currency. Contrariwise, Qatar stopped tracking the Fed’s rate 
in late 2007, Oman kept high interest rates for the entire period, and Kuwait dropped 
the dollar peg and revalued its dinar.   
Country Exchange-rate 
Monetary 
Policy 
Policy Outcome 
Kuwait Flexible Tightening Neutrality 
Qatar Peg Tightening Opportunistic Followership 
Oman Peg Tightening Opportunistic Followership 
Saudi Arabia Peg Expansive Exchange-rate Followership 
UAE Peg Expansive Exchange-rate Followership 
Bahrain Peg Expansive Exchange-rate Followership 
 
148 
 
 The aim of this chapter is to explain how the interplay of traditional theories and 
new insights on the small/major holder divide shape the currency and monetary policy 
of the six countries along the two dimensions: the establishment and defence of a fixed 
exchange rate to the US dollar, and  the monetary policy divergence in dealing with the 
external shock.  
 In economic sciences, the empirical indicator marking the run up to financial crisis 
is the accumulation of excessive indebtedness accompanied by inflating price bubbles. 
Normally, different paradigms of economics show no accord on the very sources of this 
undesirable outcome, and the case of the subprime mortgage crisis does not make an 
exception. On the one hand, endogenous explanations have largely focused on the role 
of deregulation and financial innovation in creating the bubble and the web of 
interconnections that expanded its effects well beyond Wall Street (Bhidé 2011; Calabria 
2009; Crotty 2009). Alternatively, domestic-based hypotheses have blamed expansive 
macroeconomic policies in the US   ̶  especially Greenspan’s low interest-rate policy in 
the early 2000’s   ̶ for causing an excess of loanable capitals, which ended up in practices 
like asset-price inflation and subprime lending in a desperate rush to produce fruitful 
investment opportunities (Smith and Gjerstad 2011; Taylor 2009). On the other hand, 
external explanations link the excessive liquidity created by banks and financial firms in 
the United States to the huge inflow of foreign capitals that in those years flooded the 
American market to fill the gap of its persistent current account deficit33 (Bernanke 
2005; Chinn 2005; Frenkel 2008; McKinnon 2009; Obstfeld and Rogoff 2005; Setser and 
Roubini 2005). Considering this ‘external’ side of the problem, it is worth noting that 
during the run-up and the breakup of the financial meltdown of 2007-2008, the GCC 
financial systems were actually among the main providers of the cheap credit to the 
American economy that according to ‘external explanations’ played a significant share 
in causing the subprime mortgage crisis. They did it basically by means of three moves: 
the peg of national currencies to the US dollar, the systematic shrinking of their interest-
                                                          
33 In reality, this explanation is in fact a tale of two. It encompasses both the so-called ‘savings deficiency’ 
hypothesis  ̶  for which the root cause of the American current account deficit lies in a lax fiscal and 
monetary policy (Chinn 2005; McKinnon 2009; Obstfeld and Rogoff 2005; Setser and Roubini 2005)  ̶  and 
the so-called ‘savings glut’ hypothesis, blaming rather the structural propensity of emerging economies 
to save and reinvest in the dollar-based market due to precautionary motives, high prices of 
internationally-traded commodities, underdeveloped local financial intermediaries and demographic 
trends (Bernanke 2005; Frenkel 2008) 
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rate differential with the Federal Reserve (see Figure 9) and in the case of Saudi Arabia, 
with the accumulation of huge foreign exchange reserves denominated almost 
exclusively in US dollars.  
Nevertheless, as long as the 
business cycle in the leader 
economy was in tune with the 
periphery, the exchange between 
global creditors and the big 
American debtor did not generate a 
genuine political conflict on the 
distribution of costs and burdens of 
debt deleveraging. Surplus 
economies, included the GCC 
monarchies, exported their capitals 
to fill the gap between savings and investments of the US economy, contributed to lift 
global growth, and boosted their exports to earn new profits to be rolled over again in 
the US capital market. The consequent build-up of symmetric piles of international 
assets and liabilities generated the widely discussed phenomenon of excessive global 
macroeconomic imbalances. However, even this great exchange between global 
debtors and creditors in the Dollar Area eventually came to a showdown with the 2008 
financial shock. The subprime crisis caused a vertical fall in the import absorption of the 
US domestic market, and thus a significant reduction of its external indebtedness rate. 
While this process generally implies a painful shock for deficit economies, in this case 
the Fed (and the Government) had the rare privilege to cushion the adjustment with a 
combined fiscal and monetary stimulus. The main goal of such concerted effort was to 
support firms’ profits through state-led aggregate demand and prop up the prices of 
financial assets through the central bank’s rounds of quantitative easing coupled with 
near-zero interest rates. Moreover, QEs and low interest rates devalued the dollar vis à 
vis major world currencies. This had a double benefit for the US economy: on the real-
Figure 9 - Central Bank policy interest rate in GCC countries (except 
UAE) plus US Fed, in % (monthly data). Monthly data for UAE not 
available.  
Source: IMF – IFS 
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economy side, the aggregate demand generated by deficit spending was absorbed by 
domestic producers rather than increasing imports. On the financial side, the value of 
foreign assets held by American 
residents rose in relative terms, 
facilitating the reimbursement 
of existing overseas debts 
(Vermeiren 2013b). For the GCC 
countries though, the US 
monetary stimulus meant above 
all a surge in worldwide dollar 
liabilities, which pushed the 
price of raw materials to a 
record level, and, combined with 
their structural supply bottlenecks, hard-press inflation in local markets (see Figure 10). 
However, by following the Fed on its expansive policy and refusing to revalue their 
currencies to counteract inflationary pressures, loyal GCC followers paid a good part of 
the measures decided in Washington to mitigate the effects of the crisis through lower 
real yields on financial assets and lower real wages. This process of deleveraging 
between international debtors and creditors is the core of the asymmetric distributive 
conflict known as macroeconomic adjustment, and at this round, the burden fell 
conspicuously on follower countries.  
To sum up the terms of the conflict, on the one hand the US were reducing their 
overindebtedness with an appreciation of foreign assets and a reorientation of 
consumptions towards the domestic market, while a ‘normal’ country would have 
suffered a massive capital flight and had to compress import flows with austerity 
measures. On the other hand, the sharp rise of domestic prices in foreign economies, 
and the GCC monarchies were not alone in experiencing that, is the way Washington 
made other countries pay the adjustment through the lower real value of their financial 
assets, salaries and wages. Indeed, to allow the Federal Reserve to print as much dollars 
as necessary to prop up the US economy  ̶  without making the dollar collapse together 
with its key currency role and the US global power  ̶  followers had to track the hyper-
expansive Fed’s stance even though it was patently ill-designed for their booming 
Figure 10 – GDP deflator index (2010=100)  
Source: IMF – International al Financial Statistics 
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national markets. Domestic prices simply reacted consequently, with the effect of a real 
exchange rate depreciation of the greenback that went on far beyond its nominal 
recovery as of fall 2008.  
In the next sections, I first analyse separately the six countries’ decisions on the 
exchange rate regime and the nominal peg to the dollar, and successively I try to identify 
the determinants of their monetary policy. The assessment of current theories will be 
outlined according to their level of analysis, discussing first the domestic-based 
explanations of monetary and currency policy and then, in a separate section, the 
international-structural ones. The scheme will be the same for the two issues. Initially, I 
propose a brief review of the theoretical reasons that are supposed to affect the regime 
choice, the anchor currency and interest-rate policy. Then, I compare current theories 
with the actual policy of GCC countries, trying to assess the limits of traditional 
explanations and the room for new insights about the difference between small and 
middle-sized powers. To conclude, I analyse those situations where the small/minor 
holder divide seems apparently ineffective to assess the role of regional dynamics as 
illustrated in chapter five. Indeed, all the region’s small countries except Kuwait have 
maintained a fixed exchange rate with the dollar, while Bahrain and the United Arab 
Emirates did not even change their monetary policy despite the limited influence of their 
decisions on the weakening dollar. For these instances, I provide evidence that the 
ongoing path towards the creation of the GCC single currency and the leading role of 
Saudi Arabia within that process played as unexpected and stronger constraints 
compared to societal pressures and rational incentives to defection.   
 
 
6.2  The domestic political economy of the exchange-rate regime in GCC 
countries 
In chapter four, I reviewed how the main approaches from Comparative Political 
Economy and the constructivist paradigm explain choices about the currency regime 
and the cross-country coordination of interest rates. For constructivist scholars, the 
convergence of governments and central banks on exchange-rate stability is contingent 
on a prior ideational convergence among central bankers, academics and politicians on 
the economic desirability of these policy stances. For comparative political economists, 
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there are four within-country dimensions affecting policy outcomes. First, autocratic 
governments would be more prone to adopt hard-pegs than democracies and hybrid 
regimes. Second, right-wing governments are more easily attracted by currency stability 
and monetary expansion than leftist ones. Third, the prevalence of anti-inflationary 
economic sectors in the domestic politics of interest-groups leads to fixed exchange 
rates as a bulwark against inflation. Fourth, small, open and financially underdeveloped 
countries are more apt to exchange-rate followership in order to attract foreign 
investments and stabilising trade flows.  When applied to the current cases, 
characterised by countries with a strong record of current account surplus and a peculiar 
resource-based economic system, the abovementioned traditional explanations show a 
series of limits and inefficiencies.  
Firstly, cognitive and ideological biases among the GCC’s central bankers and 
academics are very difficult to assess and, whenever present, do not show any 
unanimous theory-driven consensus on the viability and desirability of the dollar peg. 
Central banks’ statutes in the six countries are indeed very similar to one another, and 
put an equally strong emphasis on price stability, output management and exchange-
rate stability. As to actual beliefs and analyses during the crisis, in their meetings with 
top US officials and diplomats GCC central bank governors revealed very different 
readings on the desirability of the dollar peg and its link with the impressive rise of 
inflation. Kuwaiti monetary officials, who decided to detach from the dollar in May 2007 
and let the dinar appreciate by 15 percent in the following months, emphasised the 
«detrimental effects of the pegging system to the national economy», and defined the 
decision to drop it as «a move that "had to be done" to address rising inflation» (U.S. 
Department of State 2007b, 2007e). Contrarily, in a conversation with the US Secretary 
of Treasury Paulson, Qatari minister of finance Kamal argued that currency flexibility 
was uninfluential on inflation statistics (U.S. Department of State 2008d). Nevertheless, 
the frequent calls to Washington, by all countries, to revive the declining dollar (U.S. 
Department of State 2007d, 2008d, 2008e, 2008g) demonstrate that the peg was 
perhaps not the main driver of the price overheating, but it was neither a completely 
non-influential element of the economic mess and a huge factor of concern for local 
policy-makers. Presumably, in absence of other constraints to a radical change in the 
currency regime, revaluation could have been a more efficient option than subsides and 
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wage increases to relieve the inflationary pressure on imported goods and distribute a 
greater extent of purchasing power to low-income workers.  
 Secondly, GCC countries’ policy of rigid dollar peg comes as no surprise looking 
data on the transparency and accountability of public institutions. The most used 
dataset for the classification of political regimes, the so-called Polity IV, grades all the 
GCC members below -6, which is the minimum threshold to be considered even partially 
democratic. Central Bank Independence, although there is room for a slight cross-
country difference, is generally low if compared to developed countries, and the 
management of exchange rate and credit policy takes place entirely under the control 
of the executive power. Following the argument of the autocracy/democracy divide 
hypothesis, the exigency of the poorly legitimised GCC governments to enhance their 
credibility against international markets and their own citizens plays the greatest role in 
their adamant decision not to move away from the dollar in the last decades. 
Historically, after the troubled years of the first oil crisis and the breakup of Bretton 
Woods, Kuwait maintained the dinar anchored to a basket of major currencies until 2002 
and Oman pegged the Rial to the US dollar as early as 1975. Bahrain, Qatar and the 
United Arab Emirates made the same decision around 1981, while Saudi Arabia was the 
last to join the club, in 1986, after having managed the Riyal’s floating for almost fifteen 
years. Small monarchies switched their exchange-rate regime in a period characterised 
by a strong dollar, because of high-interest rates in the United States, and falling oil 
prices after the politically-driven peak of the late 1970’s. Luciani (2011) reconstructed 
that milieu in a cogent historical analysis, pointing out that the newly established 
national currencies were being challenged by instable oil prices, domestic inflation and 
exchange-rate volatility. In such context, implicit pegs were adopted as a bulwark 
against currency substitution34, which had become an immediate and concrete threat 
as early as the Second Oil Crisis.  
 A third strand of comparative literature looks at party-politics dynamics on a left-
right scale. However, this can hardly explain anything relevant in neo-patrimonial 
absolute monarchies like the ones analysed here.  
                                                          
34 This phenomenon occurs when citizens start using hard currency for their daily transactions instead of 
the local money 
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The fourth causal process highlighted by the literature is the power of domestic 
interest groups in influencing decision-making during the crisis. In this respect, two 
problems arise when the politics of exchange rate in GCC monarchies is observed from 
this perspective. On the one hand, powerful societal interests have strongly voiced their 
opinion on currency issues during the crisis. Nonetheless, their requests were partially 
different from the theory’s predictions. On the other hand, despite the thick web of 
connections with the political power and the continuous pressure, their requests went 
largely unheeded. The peculiar nature of the GCC crisis indeed split the link between 
currency volatility and inflation underpinning most of the current analysis based on this 
hypothesis. The interests of the banking and financial sector, for instance, was strongly 
anti-inflationary as expected35, but contrary to the typical situation taken for granted by 
the literature, top bankers and investors hard-pressed politicians for a revaluation of 
local currencies and a tighter monetary policy (Andrew and Khalaf 2008; Arabnews.com 
2008; Al Asoomi 2011; Drummond 2008; Garnham 2007; Ghafour 2007, 2008; Karam 
2008; Mezarban 2007). In Saudi Arabia, press reports talk of societal pressures coming 
from a group of prominent clerics, who blamed the royal family for the rising prices. In 
December 2007, Bahraini central bank governor Al-Maraj said to US diplomats that 
«Bahrain's political authorities were feeling the heat of public pressure to de-peg from 
the dollar» (U.S. Department of State 2007c, 2008b). In Doha, Qatar, a widespread Arab 
newspaper wrote furious comments on the inability of the government to tackle the 
situation, even calling for the resignation of the people in charge (U.S. Department of 
State 2007g). Similar scenes could be found all through the Gulf, but little or no results 
are observed on the actual governmental policy except from Kuwait.  
 Finally, agent-based theories stress the role of economic characteristics in guiding 
a country’s exchange-rate policy. Trade openness and financial backwardness are two 
main factors highlighted by current theories as determinant for the adoption of rigid 
pegs, and apparently, they have both a strong influence on the GCC economies (AlKather 
2012; Bourland 2007; Khan 2009; Looney 2009). On the one hand, recent research 
findings on newly available data (Naceur and Ghazouani 2007) show that the six 
countries score far below the average of high-income OECD economies in terms of 
                                                          
35 Inflation in facts reduces the real yield of securities and other fixed-income assets, and the declining 
dollar hit particularly their large US-based investments 
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depth, liquidity and efficiency of financial markets (Figure 11). On the other hand, 
dependency on trade, both in regard to exports and imports, is also very high across the 
region, justifying, at a first glance the firm position in defence of the dollar peg (Figure 
12).  
However, the debate among economics professionals has also raised serious 
doubts on the desirability of the fixed peg solution for the peculiar case of countries that 
are open to international trade, but strongly dependent on commodity exports. Many 
well-renowned economists claim that precisely the unstable nature of energy markets, 
for example, would rather recommend the adoption of managed flexible currency 
regimes (Feldstein 2008; Frankel 2008; Saab, Roula, and Ayoub 2011; Setser 2008a). 
Accordingly, mainstream economics suggests to oil-exporting countries to peg their 
coinage to a basket including both their major trading partners and the price of oil 
(Frankel and Saiki 2002; Saab, Roula, and Ayoub 2011; Setser 2008). On purely economic 
grounds, this system proves much more efficient than the present one. On the one hand, 
the need to shield local economies from the ebbs and flows of energy market nominal 
prices would be achieved with a predictable and stable system. On the other hand, the 
enhanced flexibility would allow both a more autonomous monetary policy and a 
smoother adjustment of the external accounts via exchange rate instead of fuelling 
inflation (when oil prices are high) or deflation (when oil prices are low). The inclusion 
of the oil price in the basket is a key element, for it allows local governments to sterilise 
the flow of oil revenues whereas, in the current system, they are forced to tighten the 
budget excessively when oil prices stagnates and overspend when revenues expand. It 
is not a coincidence, in this respect, that practically all the other oil and gas exporters 
-0,8 -0,3 0,2 0,7 1,2
Figure 11 – Index of financial market development 
(average 2007-2009).  
Source: World Bank – Global Development Index, 
Author calculations 
Figure 12 – Volume of Imports and Exports on GDP 
(average 2007-2009).  
Source: World Bank – Global Development Index 
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except the five GCC countries did opt for a flexible basket-peg instead of focusing on a 
single currency.   
To conclude, domestic-side predictors for the hard-peg regime offer mixed results 
in explaining the currency policy of GCC countries in the first decade of the XXI century. 
On the one hand, hypotheses on the institutional system, the openness of trade and the 
development of capital markets show accordance with empirical data. On the other 
hand, societal pressure (advocating for revaluation) seems to push policy-makers in the 
opposite direction, while a deeper analysis of the trade pattern of GCC markets suggests 
that exchange-rate instability is an actual problem, but also that adopting an excessively 
rigid peg to address it may create more problems than it solves. An oil-currency basket 
solution, through predictable and moderate exchange rate fluctuations, would preserve 
local currencies’ purchasing power from the instability of international commodity 
prices much better that the actual system. Similar doubts and perplexities on the 
desirability of the dollar peg emerge also by approaching the question from the 
perspective of international theories on economic dependency, assessing not simply the 
GCC countries’ incentives to fix their exchange rate, but also the reasons to choose 
precisely the dollar as nominal anchor. The next section assesses the problem from this 
point of view.  
 
 
6.3  International economic relations and the dollar peg  
As widely illustrated in previous chapters, international-structural theories explain 
monetary followership in surplus countries by means of three different variables: first, 
economic dependencies relative to trade relations; second, the state of military 
cooperation between allies or aligned countries; third, the allocation of surplus 
countries’ financial wealth and the entrapment mechanism. In this section, the role of 
economic dependencies will be assessed through data on commercial flows, showing 
that the impact of this factor is marginal if not contradictory. Conversely, in the next 
section data and documental evidence will be provided about the role of politico-
military relations at both the regional and the global level and the financial trap 
highlighted by the entrapment hypothesis. In past theoretical reflections, the link 
between trade patterns and exchange-rate policy, with a special attention to the choice 
157 
 
of the currency anchor, has been related to either the direction of exports, the so-called 
‘mercantilist’ hypothesis, or the direction of imports, the so-called ‘network 
externalities’ hypothesis.   
As regards the first, the choice of GCC countries cannot be related to the 
mercantilist narrative mentioned in previous sections, which links currency choices to 
the necessity of fostering an export-led growth through the artificial undervaluation of 
the national money (Aizenman and Lee 2007; Dooley, Folkerts-Landau, and Garber 
2004; Spiro 2012). This negative conclusion comes out of two main considerations 
relative to the peculiar model of growth of oil-producing countries, as well as to the 
observation of actual data on export patterns in GCC countries. The first element 
distinguishing GCC economies from the typical case of Asian manufacturing economies   ̶ 
often taken as prime examples of a mercantilist strategy   ̶  is that the main export 
products of the region   ̶ oil, gas and financial services   ̶ are not priced in local currency 
on international markets. Therefore, their demand is infinitely inelastic to changes in the 
exchange rate since their price is expressed directly in US dollars.  
If anything, changes occur in the local-currency value of revenues from export 
proceedings, reducing gains for governments and state-owned enterprises in case of 
exchange-rate revaluation against the dollar. Actually, this issue has been repeatedly 
raised by experts, scholars and local politicians when discussing the GCC currency policy. 
For example, Saudi, Bahraini and Omani leaders have claimed the main reason to follow 
the dollar was that crude oil, on which they depend for government revenues, is priced 
in US dollars and any change in this relationship would cause uncertainties in the draft 
of the country’s budget (U.S. Department of State 2008a, 2008c, 2009, 2010).  This 
objection has been critically addressed by many well-renowned economists, who claim 
that precisely the unstable nature of the energy market prices would advocate for a 
flexible currency regime (Feldstein 2008; Frankel 2008). Setser (2008a), in particular, 
vibrantly rejects the claim that getting paid in dollars is a good reason to peg to the 
dollar. Many oil-exporting economies, he contends, «argue that they peg to the dollar 
because oil is priced in dollars. Linking their currency to the dollar eliminates the 
apparent mismatch between the government’s dollar-denominated oil revenues and its 
local currency spending. This logic, however, fails to accurately diagnose the real fiscal 
problem of oil-exporting economies. Oil-exporting economies’ fiscal difficulties stem 
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from large fluctuations in the dollar price of oil, not from a mismatch between dollar 
revenues and local currency spending». 
A second sub-issue raised by advocates of the mercantilist thesis is based on the 
common economic phenomenon known as ‘Dutch Disease’. The Dutch Disease occurs 
when rapid and large increases in the price of a preponderant export commodity 
encourage a real exchange rate appreciation which destroys the competitiveness of 
other tradable products and prevent productive diversification (Arezki and Hasanov 
2013; Cevik 2006; Looney 2009; Lyons and Maratheftis 2007). In the Gulf region, the 
diversification of production away from oil-related activities has been considered a long-
term priority of decision-makers for the last thirty years. However, this hypothesis 
shows significant gaps in at least two points. Firstly, real effective exchange rates have 
substantially depreciated during the plunge of the dollar between 2002 and 2006, 
favouring in principle the development of economic sectors alternative to oil and gas 
fields, refineries and related services. Yet, the peg to the dollar has been paid with huge 
inflationary consequences that have offset (not completely) the nominal devaluation as 
of 2007, when non-oil products lost some of the price competitiveness gained in 
previous years due to the soaring cost of basic inputs and fixed capital (land, dwellings, 
factories). Secondly, other economical instruments like the proposed oil-currency 
basket can deal with the Dutch Disease more efficiently and cover a wide range of 
situations like, for example, a nominal appreciation of the US dollar. It sounds puzzling 
indeed assuming GCC governments as deeply worried about the Dutch Disease when 
the dollar depreciates against major currencies, and surprisingly unconcerned about it 
when the dollar, in the past, strengthened so much to damage their competitiveness 
against the rest of the world economy.  
Lastly, data on trade flows, and particularly of export destinations, can be 
observed to assess the extent of dependency GCC markets on dollar-related economies 
notwithstanding the peculiar nature of their economic systems. As shown in the graph 
below, I collected data on 37 major economies (plus the Eurozone) having either a 
159 
 
floating exchange rate or a nominal 
anchor other than the US dollar36. The 
dollar-area countries comprise not 
simply the United States, but also all 
that countries using the dollar as legal 
tender, fixing their currency to it, or 
even practicing a managed floating 
against the greenback. For example, 
China, which represents a substantial 
portion of GCC imports and exports, is 
included in the dollar area despite having dropped the fixed peg in 2005. This 
precautionary enlargement of the dollar area, however, make results more robust in 
assessing the real direction of the Gulf monarchies’ trade dependency. As shown in 
Figure 13, results indicate that dollar-based countries are not over-dominant in the GCC 
export basket, nearly equated by East Asian, European and the Middle Eastern countries 
whose currencies float against the greenback.  
However, the second 
strand of studies on the link 
between trade dependency and 
the currency anchor emphasises 
the greater importance of network 
externalities relative to imports 
rather than exports (Meissner and 
Oomes 2008; Plümper and 
Neumayer 2011). Notably, the oil-
rent structure of local economies 
                                                          
36 The complete list of countries comprises Argentina, Albania, Australia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, 
Egypt, the Eurozone, India, Indonesia, Japan, South Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Norway, 
Pakistan, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Russia, South Africa, Sweden, Thailand, Turkey, United 
Kingdom, Switzerland, Libya, Algeria, Iran, Croatia, Denmark, Czech Republic, Syria, Morocco and 
Uruguay. They have been selected listing the forty larger economies not tied to the US dollar. Data on 
their de-facto exchange rate regime are taken from IMF (2009).  In order to infer robust conclusions from 
the analysis of data, China has been included in the dollar area despite having dropped the fixed peg in 
2005 moving on to a gradual and controlled appreciation of the renminbi. According to calculations, the 
main source of imports in absolute terms is the Eurozone, and the main destination of exports is Japan. 
Figure 14 – Share of imports from non-dollar related countries on 
total GCC imports.  
Source: IMF – Direction of Trade Statistics, author’s calculations 
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Figure 13 – Main export destination of GCC countries in 2007 
Source: The Atlas of Economic Complexity - Centre for 
International Development (CID), Harvard University  
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may be more sensitive to import necessities than to exports because of the inelasticity 
of the world demand to local-currency fluctuations. Instead, a loss of purchasing power 
on the main import markets due to the mismanagement of nominal exchange rates may 
exert a greater influence on policy-making. In this respect, I collected and computed the 
value of imports of all the GCC countries for the same 37 major economies (plus the 
Eurozone) having either a flexible exchange rate or a nominal anchor other than the US 
dollar. I compared data on non-dollar imports with the total of GCC countries, with 
results clearly showing that the volume of goods and services imported from countries 
not tied to the American coinage are fairly greater than imports from those countries 
linked, more or less tightly, to the greenback. In conclusion, if network-effect theories 
had worked in this case, Gulf states should have adopted a peg to the euro or to a basket 
of currencies including their main sources of their imports, exactly as Kuwait did for most 
of its history as independent country. 
The next section, I review the other two hypotheses of structural theories in light 
of data and documental evidence, concluding that military relations with the Unites 
States play the lion’s share in the regional currency policy, especially as far as Saudi 
Arabia is concerned. Contrarily, to interpret minor countries’ behaviour current 
theorists must be complemented with the insights from major/small holder approach 
as illustrated in previous chapters.  
 
 
6.4  International political relations and the dollar peg  
The scarce empirical support for hypotheses based on trade dependency begs 
alternative explanations for both the resilience of the fixed exchange rate and the 
anchorage to the US dollar. This paves the way to the role of security ties both at the 
regional and the global level and for the entrapment mechanism. Data and diplomatic 
documents confirm that all this three dimensions interplayed in determining the policy 
position of the five countries that preserved the dollar-peg during the crisis. Specifically, 
the positions of the UAE and Qatar are linked to regional political dynamics, Oman’s 
decision-making seems to suffer the constraints of entrapment, and is tied to the 
peculiar nature of this country inside the regional scenario. Finally, a combination of 
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security concerns and entrapment mechanism had a greater influence on the choices of 
Bahrain and Saudi Arabia. 
As previously discussed in the section on the institutional determinants of 
exchange-rate policy, in the monetary history of the region the six countries addressed 
differently the first decade after the generalised abonnement of fixed exchange rates in 
1973. Kuwait maintained the dinar anchored to a basket of major currencies until 2002, 
Oman pegged the Rial to the US dollar as early as 1975, while Bahrain, Qatar and the 
United Arab Emirates made the same decision around 1981. Saudi Arabia adopted a 
hard-peg to the dollar after letting the Riyal float from 1973 to 1986. Therefore, while 
small monarchies’ choice, at least initially, can be interpreted as economically rational 
due to the risk of depreciation (the dollar was soaring following the ‘Volker Cure’) and 
the negative perspective of oil prices, the case of Saudi Arabia, with its puzzling timing, 
gives the opportunity to observe an interplay of economic and political incentives that 
seem to have had an equal weight in determining its initial policy choice.  
On the one hand, Riyadh’s decision to imitate its neighbours came in coincidence 
with the so-called oil-collapse of the mid-1980’s, when prices plummeted to an all-time 
low since 1973 threatening to drag the Riyal further into a depreciation that was ongoing 
since the early 1980’s. On the other hand, as Figure 15 illustrates, the fluctuations of the 
Riyal stopped overnight on June 1986, about twenty days before President Reagan 
dispatched to the Congress an indispensable written statement to unlock essential 
military deliveries to the Saudi 
Air Force (Gwertzman 1986; 
Reagan 1986). Before the deal 
was finally settled, frictions on 
this weapons transfer   ̶ 
consisting, inter alia, in a series 
of ‘AWACS’ aircrafts equipped 
for airborne surveillance  ̶  had 
precipitated the Riyadh-
Washington longstanding 
alliance in one of its roughest moments since the First Oil Crisis (Bzostek and Robison 
2008).  
Figure 15 – Monthly Ryial/US$ Exchange Rate (right scale) and price of 
Oil (left scale, monthly average current US$)  
Source: IMF – International Financial Statistics 
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Even though GCC countries did have an economic rationale behind the choice to 
peg to the dollar thirty years ago, it is doubtful the same motives may have exerted an 
equal influence in 2007-2008 given the astonishing shift in the underlying economic 
conditions. During the recent crisis, the dollar was falling (while it was soaring in the 
early 1980’s); oil prices were at their highest since 1979 (while they were plunging in 
1981-1986) and the greenback was no longer a salvific anchorage, but rather the source 
of all problems thanks to imported inflation and an ill-suited monetary policy. If 
economic incentives shifted but policies did not, political variables may offer a better 
grasp for today’s loyalty to the dollar for both small states and Saudi Arabia. In this 
respect, traditional theories highlight two influent processes: the nexus with security 
relations and the entrapment mechanism. The case of Saudi Arabia is perfect to 
illustrate a powerful interplay between these two variables, while among small holders, 
Oman’s political and monetary authorities have explicitly mentioned entrapment on 
their official reserves as a key driver of their currency decisions. However, for the other 
small countries of the region this two explanations rise limits and contradictions that 
pave the way to the theoretical insights outlined in this research.  
The Wahabite kingdom has been subject to impressive economic transformations 
in the first decade of the XXI century. The peg to the dollar, initially justifiable with the 
dangers of a riyal’s devaluation (as well as by important military side-payments) could 
hardly be defended today from a purely economic perspective. Recent in-depth 
interviews with top Saudi officials and businessmen explicitly interpret Riyadh’s dollar 
peg as a remuneration for the US security umbrella against the regional threat coming 
from Iran (Otero-Iglesias and Steinberg 2013). In fact, the history of the financial ties 
between Riyadh and Washington dates back to 1974, twelve years before the riyal’s 
anchorage to the dollar was put in place. According to Spiro’s documental 
reconstruction (Spiro 1999), after the First Oil Crisis and the end of the global system of 
fixed exchange rates in 1973, Washington exploited Saudi Arabia’s security concerns to 
extort from its ally two precise concessions in exchange for its military commitment in 
the Gulf. The first was the recycling of the huge Saudi capital surpluses, inflated by the 
oil-price boom, in US Treasury Bills, and the second was Riyadh’s pledge to induce OPEC 
countries to price their crude petroleum in dollars for the years ahead.  
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In recent times, there is considerable evidence that this policy has resurged with 
the explosion of the Saudi current account surplus in the 2000’s, while the peculiarities 
of the current scenario relative to the 1970’s magnify the importance of the exchange-
rate link for both the US dollar and the preservation of Saudi Arabia’s huge financial 
wealth. On the one hand, the dollar is in a much worse shape due to the twin-deficit37 
and the 
overindebtedness of the 
US economy. As widely 
explained in past 
chapters, a deficit leader 
with a great mismatch 
between international 
demand and supply of its 
national coinage 
necessitates the will of 
follower states to preserve as much as possible its purchasing power on currency 
markets. Knowingly, minor states can support the leader’s coinage by propping up its 
value against major currencies through foreign exchange intervention, reserve 
accumulation and a compensatory interest-rate policy. All this factors are over-present 
in the Saudi monetary and exchange-rate management of the last decade. The rigid peg 
to the greenback determined the necessity to intervene heavily with dollar purchases to 
stop speculative upward moves towards the Saudi riyal. Foreign exchange reserves have 
been hugely amassed and denominated for at least the 80% in US dollars according to 
independent estimates (Samba Financial Group 2008; Setser and Ziemba 2007). Their 
size widely exceeds the precautionary liquidity holdings of crisis-prone countries, and 
no other economically-rational criterion could justify their steep rise as of 2004. Finally, 
as reported in the opening section, the SAMA has loyally tracked any interest-rate 
movement of the Federal Reserve, preserving a zero or negative differential as 
prescribed by the Compensation Rule.  
                                                          
37 The twin deficit problem refers to the compresence of a chronic deficit condition on both the current 
account balance and the federal budget.  Contrarily, in the 1970’s the worldwide overhang of US dollars 
was caused by role of reserve currency in the previous Bretton Woods system, but the current account 
balance was in equilibrium or moderately positive. 
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Figure 16 – Foreign exchange reserves in Saudi Arabia, in million US$ 
Source: IMF – International Financial Statistics 
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On the other hand, the rigid peg to the dollar turns out even more necessary in 
the contemporary world economy because the reactivity of financial markets amplifies 
the consequences of decoupling monetary and exchange rate policy. From a systemic 
perspective, indeed, «[a] Saudi movement away from the dollar could trigger a panic, 
which could further undermine both the value of [its] overseas assets and the global 
economic system» (Looney 2009, 4). Suffice to remind, in this regard, the 2005 plunge 
of the greenback following South Korea’s announcement of an imminent currency 
diversification to get an idea of what would be the consequence if a pivotal major holder 
such as Saudi Arabia signalled the same intention by de-pegging from the dollar. To 
conclude, from the Saudi perspective even the gradual reform of the exchange-rate 
regime towards a currency basket, given the unavoidable role of this country in that last-
resort buyer of US securities, would result in recurrent capital losses as long as Riyadh 
lacks the possibility to diversify its foreign investments for political reasons. It is worth 
reminding indeed that a collapse of the dollar is likely to make unsustainable the global 
reach of the US military on which Saudi Arabia ultimately relies for its existential security 
needs (Cappella 2013b; Eichengreen 2011a; Kirshner 2008; Norrlof 2010, 2014; Stokes 
2014).  
Yet, once monetary followership has been cogently explained for Saudi Arabia, 
the same variables do not show the same effectiveness on small countries despite all of 
them, and especially security relations, are almost overlapping between Saudi Arabia 
and its neighbours. On the one hand, Kuwait ditched the dollar peg and practiced an 
autonomous monetary policy. On the other hand, Qatar and Oman undertook what I 
previously defined ‘opportunistic followership’, that is, maintained a fixed exchange rate 
to the dollar while weakening the position of the key currency through a tightening 
monetary policy. Therefore, in next sections I explore the potential of the major/small 
holder divide in explaining the deviant cases of small sectors, exploring both their 
exchange-rate and monetary policy vis à vis the monetary leader in light of their weaker 
dimensional constraint.  
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6.5  The international political economy of the dollar peg in small holders  
In previous sections, Saudi Arabia’s choice to remain tied to the dollar during the 2008 
crisis has been explained financial entrapment and security cooperation with the United 
States. Within this picture, though, two puzzling phenomena have been temporarily put 
in the background. The first is the autonomous path undertaken by Kuwait, which 
responded to the misalignment between its own domestic exigencies, the trend of the 
dollar and the American monetary policy by de-pegging its currency and adopting higher 
interest rates than the Federal Reserve. The second is the partial defection of Qatar and 
Oman in the conduction of monetary policy. These two countries have indeed increased 
real interest rates and diversified the currency allocation of their foreign investments. 
They did it while opportunistically maintaining the fixed exchange rate with the dollar 
(which was convenient for them for other reasons), but under this apparent loyalty to 
the United States, they have actually worked to accelerate the decline of the dollar by 
raising the global demand for alternative investment assets such as gold, the euro or 
other hard currencies.  
With the first hypothesis outlined in this research  ̶  the tendency of small 
countries to free-ride on larger public-good  producers  ̶  I explain why these three 
countries followed economically-advantageous policies rather than politically-driven 
ones. Indeed, if the moves of a major holder like Saudi Arabia produce their effects 
instantaneously on the value of the core-currency, the mechanism does not work for 
the GCC small monarchies, which do not hold enough financial wealth to enjoy some 
market power on the international price of the US dollar. As widely documented in 
previous chapters, past research has rarely looked at the intra-follower bargaining 
differences to explain dissimilar policy patterns, and the study of GCC case does not 
make an exception saved for some sporadic and anecdotical mentions38. For instance, 
according to Setser «[the] investment funds of some of the smaller Gulf economies do 
seem to have diversified away from the dollar. Consequently, this constraint is likely to 
be more severe for the large oil-exporting economies than for the smaller economies» 
(Setser 2008a). Data and documents provided in this research contribute to confirm 
                                                          
38 For two noteworthy but incomplete exceptions (Steiner 2013) and (Setser 2008a) 
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empirically the hypothesis that the absence of market power in minor holders has been 
a powerful structural factor in the choices of the three defecting actors.  
Contextually, the second hypothesis of this research  ̶  which expects more cases 
of small holders followership, despite baseline disincentives, when the regional major 
holder is a political stakeholder of the monetary leader  ̶  will be used explain the fact 
that other two, potential, free-riders such as Bahrain and the Emirates did not exploit 
their position to gain autonomy at the expenses of Saudi Arabia. Likewise, Qatar and 
Oman’s preservation of the peg must be explained through new theoretical insights 
given their autonomous stance on monetary policy. In the case of Abu Dhabi, and to a 
lesser extent also for Qatar, Riyadh was an unavoidable actor in the construction of the 
monetary union and for the establishment of the future common central bank in the 
territory of the UAE. Moreover, data on the allocation of foreign investments and 
reserves show that the Dubai Sovereign Wealth Fund is among the major worldwide 
holders of dollar-denominated securities, and the same entrapment mechanism seems 
to have had a huge impact on Oman’s choice. As regards Bahrain, instead, the military 
and economic patronage exerted by Saudi Arabia played the lion’s share in conditioning 
any policy choice that could have had a global or regional impact beyond its borders. 
In previous sections, the strong support given by Saudi Arabia to the dollar has 
been detected in three main policy domains: exchange rate, reserves and interest-rate 
policy. Kuwait is the only actor which followed a different path in all these domains. In 
spring 2007 the Kuwaiti government ceded to months of insistent societal pressures 
reportedly coming from its advisory parliament, the banking sector and press campaign 
for the return to monetary autonomy. The central bank Governor Al-Sabah and the 
Minister of Finance Bader Al-Humaidhi had already expressed their misgivings about the 
decision to peg the dinar to the dollar during a January 2007 visit to Kuwait of U.S. 
Treasury and Federal Reserve officials (U.S. Department of State 2007e), and defined 
the return to currency basket as «a move that had to be done to address the rising 
inflation» (U.S. Department of State 2007b). Remarkably, Kuwaiti officials gave an 
involuntary confirmation to the argument about the greater autonomy of small 
countries when it came to justify the breakup of the dollar peg before American 
diplomats. As reported in US cables, «Central Bank Deputy Governor Dr. Nabil Al-
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Mannanei maintains that this decision will have a negligible impact on the dollar while 
allowing Kuwait greater monetary policy control»39 (U.S. Department of State 2007e). 
Given this state of asymmetric possibilities, it sounds confusing that other small 
holders did not exploit the same window of opportunity. According to an analysis of 
data, press reports and diplomatic documents, the choice of small loyal countries seems 
to have been affected by two factors: the issue-linkage with regional cooperation and, 
limitedly to Oman, the entrapment mechanism.  
The first thing to stress when analysing this historical moment is that the decade 
under scrutiny includes one of the most important events in the Persian Gulf politics: 
the establishment of a road map for the currency unification among GCC members. It 
would be pointless ignoring the effect that this big event had on the regional currency 
policy, especially considering that a cornerstone of this process was the adoption of the 
US dollar as the official monetary anchor by all the six states40. Overall, the process took 
place within the institutional framework of the Gulf Cooperation Council, a scheme of 
regional integration established in 1981 among the six Arab monarchies overlooking the 
Persian Gulf following security concerns raised by the Iranian revolution and the 
successive eight-year war between Saddam Hussein’s Iraq and Khomeini’s Iran. The GCC 
has served through time as a framework for military coordination and commercial 
integration, with the intent of curtailing, through economic growth, the tensions 
between the vast Shiite communities of the Gulf and the Sunni ruling families of the 
Arab Peninsula (S. Cooper 2003; Momani 2008). However, the Council has also suffered, 
as many other schemes of regional integration, from an inevitable tension between 
centripetal and centrifugal forces. On the one hand, external security needs demand 
further integration in the form of policy coordination and sacrifices of sovereign 
prerogatives. On the other hand, a greater economic and political coordination opens 
up the Pandora box of the regional power hierarchy, and revives the omnipresent fears 
of small countries about the hegemonial designs of the locally preponderant actor, Saudi 
Arabia. With the GCC summit of 2001 in Muscat, the economic side of the organisation 
                                                          
39 Emphasis mine. 
40 Previously, the dollar peg was informal in five out of six countries, and Kuwait pegged to a basket of 
major currencies. This choice emerged out of a negotiation at the GCC summit of Muscat in December 
2001(Buiter 2008; Khan 2009), and according to the Saudi monetary agency, «was based on the fact that 
[the dollar] is the intervention currency for all the GCC countries, and their foreign reserves for currency 
cover and balance of payments purposes are largely held in dollar» (SAMA 2003). 
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was decided to expand with the forthcoming adoption of a single currency unit for the 
six countries, to be established by January 2010, and implying as a first step the official 
link of all their exchange rates at the current immutable rate to the dollar. The peg to 
the dollar, and its stubborn preservation in the hottest days of the inflationary peg, were 
also, not exclusively, part of this history of regional integration. 
Actually, the first country to withdraw from the project over concerns for its 
fiscal and monetary autonomy was Oman. This country, with Bahrain, is indeed the less 
dependent on energy-related exports for its revenues and GDP, and enjoys the lowest 
efficiency of monetary policy transmission compared to regional partners (Espinoza and 
Prasad 2012; Pattanaik 2008). Given the country’s peculiar situation, the government 
decided to leave the common-currency project in late 2006, justifying its move with the 
reluctance to «relinquishing part of its sovereignty over monetary and budgetary policy» 
and the intention to pursue the «maximum flexibility» of macroeconomic governance 
(U.S. Department of State 2007d), as in fact it did. Meanwhile, it refused to drop the 
dollar peg despite «[voicing] concerns about the impact of the declining dollar on 
inflation» (U.S. Department of State 2007f). In private meeting with US officials, Omani 
authorities provided a two-fold justification for this choice, arguing that «the dollar peg 
was in Oman's best interests given that most of the Sultanate's reserves were in dollars 
and that the dollar is accepted virtually everywhere»41.  
On the contrary, the GCC common currency project seems to have played a 
major role in the choices of Qatar and the United Arab Emirates. Reportedly, among 
small countries the UAE and Qatar shared the greatest ambitions about the opportunity 
to diversify their economies as global financial centres (Buiter 2008), and hope to use 
the single currency as an instrument to overcome their dimensional constraint and gain 
further autonomy in economic affairs vis à vis the Unites States and Saudi Arabia 
(AlKather 2012; Khan 2009). This idea is well summarised by a Qatari top banker42 during 
a meeting with US diplomatic officials: «under an eventual monetary union, [he 
contends], the GCC would have a more independent monetary policy that best suits the 
regional economic environment. The current peg to the U.S. dollar will be used to help 
                                                          
41 Italics mine.
42 Mohamad Moabi, Executive Manager of Qatar National Bank's Economics and Research department. 
R. Seetharaman, Deputy Chief Executive Officer of Doha Bank has expressed similar opinions in the same 
occasion. 
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standardize all the countries before the monetary union, but [afterwards, it will change] 
to include more of the GCC's economic partners (U.S. Department of State 2007h).  
Given this ambitious project, the resilience of the currency peg emerge as a top 
priority of Doha’s policy-makers. In a 2007 meeting with US diplomats, the head of 
Qatari central bank claimed: «while we cannot rule out a revaluation, it would almost 
certainly be done in concert with other Gulf states» (U.S. Department of State 2007g). 
One year later he reaffirmed that «Qatar is committed to the dollar peg at least until a 
common GCC currency is established» (U.S. Department of State 2008f). Similarly, 
diplomatic cables from the US embassy in Abu Dhabi report of a vivid debate inside the 
UAE during the crisis, highlighting the firm position of the government in favour of the 
dollar-peg against the central bank and powerful societal actors. In details, in a 
December 2006 cable, the UAE Central Bank’s economic advisors told the US envoys 
that the government was not willing to change its policy on both interest rates and the 
exchange rate unless the shift was agreed by all GCC partners (U.S. Department of State 
2006). More specifically, in November 2007 the US Econchief collected opinions from 
top financial managers in the country, concluding that the government was «reluctant 
to change its currency policy in the absence of similar steps by Saudi Arabia» (U.S. 
Department of State 2007a).  
Finally, Bahrain’s monetary and currency policy remains a conundrum for the 
major/minor holder divide. Despite presenting similar values as Qatar in many variables, 
the little kingdom consistently maintained the dollar peg and did not defect on 
monetary policy. Presumably, thereofore, in this case the royal family’s limited 
autonomy in foreign policy played a much greater tole than any domestic-level 
characteristic or the security tie with Washington43. The weakness of the isolated Sunni 
monarchs, under the constant threat of the country’s Shiite majority, has made the 
dynasty a de-facto protectorate of Saudi Arabia, as testified by the pro-status-quo 
military intervention carried out during the spring 2011 uprisings. Furthermore, the 
strong economic and political links with Ryiad, combined with geographical proximity 
                                                          
43 The little kingdom is the seat of the NSA Bahrain, the home base of the US Navy 5th fleet, by far the 
most important American military facility in the area, both from the numerical and strategic point of view. 
The US military personnel deployed in Bahrain ranges between 1500 (considering just permanent ground 
forces) and over six thousand people considering the whole NSA Bahrain program (ground plus afloat) 
[U.S. Department of Defense 2008]. Considering an overall population of 1.3 million inhabitants, the US 
presence in Bahrain is the more numerous among GCC allies, both in absolute and relative terms. 
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and the enormous size differential between the two countries, have favoured a wide 
circulation of Saudi riyals alongside the Bahraini dinar (U.S. Department of State 2008b). 
As a result, any disalignement between monetary and exchange-rate policy on the two 
sides of the King Fahd Bridge may result in unbearable hot-money flows in or out of 
Bahrain and significant losses on Ryials balances of ordinary citizens.  
 
 
6.6  Monetary policy, reserves and sovereign wealth funds. Opportunistic 
followership in small holders  
The same pattern favouring the neutral moves of small holders is observed for monetary 
policy, where states without regional constraints exploited their size advantage to 
diversify on foreign investments and practice a tighter monetary policy detached from 
an hyper-expansive Federal Reserve. While Saudi Arabia has started a massive purchase 
of dollars on international markets since 2004, small countries (except Bahrain) strove 
to diversify away from the plunging greenback investing in euros and gold. Indeed, 
although the small monarchies’ share of dollars in foreign reserves is even higher than 
that of Saudi Arabia  ̶  it oscillates between 90% and 85%  ̶  the bulk of these countries’ 
financial wealth has been largely allocated through sovereign wealth funds whose assets 
are managed in a more risk-averse and profitable portfolio allocation (Samba Financial 
Group 2008; Tétreault 2011).  
On the one hand, the graph in Figure 17 shows that the major holder allocates 
almost all the exceeding revenues from oil exports in the central bank’s official reserves. 
Contrarily, monetary authorities in small holders hold a minimal quota of these 
countries’ financial wealth, which is mostly gathered in some of the largest sovereign 
wealth funds in the world economy. On the other hand, Figure 18 shows that the share 
of dollars in the currency composition of these funds, according to many independent 
estimates, is far from the 80-90% threshold observed in foreign reserves, with more than 
half of financial and real assets denominated in currencies other than the US dollar. The 
United Arab Emirates (especially the Dubai Investment Fund), probably for the greatest 
absolute size of their portfolio, is the only country distributing at least half of its 
investments to US-based securities.  
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Figure 17 – Official Reserves/GDP ratio in GCC countries (yearly data, % on GDP at current US$) 
Source: IMF- IFS & IMF-World Economic Outlook, author calculations 
Figure 18 – Currency composition of SWFs in GCC minor monarchies (2007, in billion $) 
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The enhanced policy autonomy of small countries compared to the responsible 
behaviour of Saudi Arabia and its allies left traces also in diplomatic meetings held by US 
representatives in the period of greater divergence between the Gulf Countries and the 
American monetary policy. On the one hand, central bankers from loyal countries have 
repeatedly exposed their concerns for the misalignment of the Fed’s expansive stance 
with the local economic cycle. For instance, in late 2007 the Central Bank governor of 
Bahrain told to the US Treasury Secretary Kimmitt that the Fed’s monetary policy «was 
contraindicated for Bahrain's current economic conditions and deprived him of a useful 
tool for fighting inflation», then adding, «"Our economy is very strong. I should be raising 
rates"» (U.S. Department of State 2007c). By contrast, defector countries avoid 
complaints and tend to focus on how to justify their choices relative to the allocation of 
reserves and interests rates. In Oman, local officials communicated that «the Central 
Bank has increased commercial bank reserve requirements from 3% to 5% and has 
issued more certificates of deposit in an efforts to mop up excess liquidity». This caused 
capital inflows from the US to the local market that Omani officials related during 
another meeting in early 2008: «[there] has been a lot of money coming into the 
country, and with the recent tumbling of world financial markets, more Omanis are 
bringing their money home» (U.S. Department of State 2008c).  
In Qatar, central bank officials «urged the US government to "do something" 
quickly to reverse the dollar's decline» reporting that «the Central Bank is doing its job 
with monetary policy, particularly with respect to open market operations to absorb 
excess liquidity, including issuing CDs44 and increasing reserve requirements» (U.S. 
Department of State 2008d). In two occasions in 2008 Doha’s decision-makers describe 
to the US Treasury Secretary what, in fact, is definable as a fruitful speculation against 
the greenback. Around 20% of the country’s dollar holdings, according to Qatari officials, 
have been swapped for euro-denominated assets during 2007 and early 2008, and 
bought back in late 2008 when the American currency was expected to rebound against 
major currencies (U.S. Department of State 2008d, 2008h). Despite the pressure exerted 
                                                          
44 Certificates of Credit, equivalent to a sovereign bond or bill 
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by capital inflows on the exchange rate, Qatar and Oman had other and well-
documented reasons to avoid appreciation and maintain the dollar peg. Consequently, 
they took advantage of the short-term benefit of surplus countries and kept their 
currencies in line with the dollar through sterilised foreign-exchange intervention.  
 
 
6.7  Conclusions 
The present case-study aims at testing the two key hypotheses of this research looking 
at a regional scenario which provides insightful and original data on the behaviour of 
small and middle powers enjoying a structural current account surplus. The results of 
this vast analysis confirm the interaction between the major/small holder divide, 
regional politics dynamics and the traditional variables that are deemed to influence the 
monetary and exchange rate policy of minor states. 
In the first place, the findings show the value added and the contribution of the 
major/small holder hypothesis in particular, and the international-structural approach 
in general, against the unsatisfactory and incomplete account given by domestic-based 
theories. Against conventional wisdom, in the case of GCC countries domestic drivers of 
exchange rate policy (i.e. political regime, GDP size and trade openness, financial 
development, and interest-group politics) do not give a clear indication on the 
desirability of the rigid peg, calling for a further consideration of the international-
structural explanas. Moreover, a further analysis into the economic desirability of fixed 
exchange rates for oil- and gas-exporters revealed that the alleged mission of this 
currency regime, stabilising the internal and external purchasing power of national 
currencies, was patently failed when applied to this kind of actors. Eventually, domestic 
incentives seem to have had little impact on how the six countries reacted to the 
consequences of the global crisis between 2007 and 2009, with the only exception of 
Kuwait where they might have had a role given the complete lack of structural 
counterweights. On the contrary, data and documental evidence emphasise the role of 
external dependencies  ̶  such as financial entrapment and security ties  ̶  and regional 
political dynamics in the GCC countries’ choice to defend the stability of their exchange 
rates during the crisis. 
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 In the second place, the study of the three deviant cases of Kuwait, Qatar and 
Oman provided a clear evidence of the greater autonomy of small holders. The 
major/small holder distinction turns out fundamental to reconcile empirical outcomes 
with previous considerations on the web of external incentives tying Saudi Arabia, and 
in principle all the GCC countries, to the United States and the dollar. Indeed, although 
all the six actors are equally engaged in security cooperation with Washington and hold 
dollar-denominated securities as reserve assets, smaller countries actually enjoy a 
greater room for policy manoeuvring given the negligible impact of their moves on the 
global demand for dollars. This is particularly visible in the allocation of SWFs financial 
stocks, which in every country except Saudi Arabia the US dollar do not represent more 
than 50% of the fund’s portfolio.  
Nonetheless, it has been observed that exchange-rate policy remained anchored 
to the US dollar in all countries except Kuwait, and that two actors, Bahrain and the 
Emirates even refused to adapt their monetary policy to counteract the mounting 
inflationary pressures. In all this cases, the hypothesis of regional power intermediation 
provides the clue to bridge the gap between theory and empirical evidence explaining 
monetary followership in small holders. On the one hand, Bahrain is a de-facto 
protectorate of Saudi Arabia, where Riyadh plays as the benchmark for Manama’s policy 
choices in every economic, political or military decision that may have an impact on 
regional or global issues. On the other hand, Qatar and the UAE were probably the most 
interested actor in the proposed monetary union, and diplomatic communications 
indicate that both countries felt restrained to free-ride on Saudi Arabia given the risk to 
jeopardise the whole project. 
In this sense, both the importance of the monetary union per se, and the web of 
connections with other regional issues inside the GCC justifies the definition of this 
situation as a ‘contextual linkage’ (Axelrod and Keohane 1985). In other words, for small 
countries abandoning the peg could have been detrimental to this and other issues on 
the table within the GCC institutional arena, regardless of the regional key power’s will 
to punish their choice. The dollar-GCC link was, so to say, ‘embedded’ in regional politics 
and the UAE and Qatar had too much stakes in the currency-union project to sacrifice it 
for short-term autonomy. It went differently, of course, for countries like Oman and 
Kuwait which place much less importance on this regional development due to less 
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ambitious geopolitical objectives and a different economic structure. As a further 
confirmation of the two major hypotheses of this research, it is worth noting that all the 
five small holders, according to their own words in diplomatic meetings, were fully 
aware of their lesser vulnerability to the leader’s (i.e. the United States) bargaining chips 
in the monetary game. However, when they decided not to exploit this advantage, 
regional issues and the pivotal role of the Saudis have been explicitly mentioned as main 
policy-drivers.  
Conclusively, the present case-study suggests that currency issues remain deeply 
dependent on international dynamics such as alliance dilemmas and regional 
cooperation both with respect to the exchange rate policy and the management of 
macroeconomic policies. The ruinous failure of the GCC currency union, which was 
expected to get started in 2010, but will not see the light in the near future, is perhaps 
the most famed victim of this troubled period. Indeed, once they realized that regional 
monetary cooperation was not enhancing their autonomy over economic policy, but 
simply expanding Saudi Arabia’s grip on regional affairs, small monarchies decided to 
abandon the project one after the other. Oman left the project in late 2006 over 
concerns for its fiscal and monetary autonomy. Kuwait dropped the exchange rate 
harmonisation to revalue the dinar and tighten monetary policy against the mounting 
inflation. Finally, even the United Arab Emirates announced its withdrawal from the 
project in early 2009 after disagreement with Saudi Arabia over the location of the 
future central bank, probably the most important issue at stake for the Emirati 
leadership. 
   
 Conclusions 
 
The purpose of this research was to improve the theoretical understanding on how the 
financial size of small and middle-sized states affects their behaviour in the monetary 
system. In particular, against the tide of a literature focused on small economies and 
underdeveloped countries, I posited that within the sub-group of surplus states, 
characterised by a considerable buffer of foreign reserves and stocks of foreign assets, 
small states would be advantaged against middle powers in the bargaining over 
macroeconomic adjustments, which is assumed to emerge cyclically in heterogeneous 
monetary systems. Secondarily, once the peculiar effect of the small/major holder 
divide among surplus countries was made clear, deviant cases of monetary followership 
in small holders, given a baseline incentive to free-ride, remained largely unexplained. 
Hence, the second hypothesis of this research states that, ceteris paribus, small holders 
cohabiting in the same region with a major holder will be more likely to be pressured by 
these actors for cooperating in the management of the international monetary system.  
 On the theoretical side, a careful assessment of states’ preferences, given by the 
combination of both domestic and international pressures, reveals the greater priority 
assigned to policy-making autonomy and the protection from excessive exchange-rate 
fluctuations in a context of strong financial and trade interdependence. In other words, 
states manage their relations with other subjects of an international monetary system, 
included private actors, in order to reconcile as much as possible three usually 
incompatible elements such as economic interdependence, policy autonomy and 
exchange-rate stability. Small and middle-sized states are justifiably considered as 
concerned as great powers for avoiding this tradeoff as demonstrated by a careful 
assessment of their potential preferences and a brief overview of case studies.  
 After stressing the underlying bias of current theories for the case of small 
underdeveloped countries, among the deficit units, and that of major holders among 
surplus units, I drew the set of strategic interactions showing that small states can be 
more autonomous than large states when experiencing a significant record of current 
account surplus. Small holders are considered rational actors with full knowledge of 
their effect on the market and full awareness of the constraints of major holders. Given 
that state of things, the benefits of interacting in a system characterised by the stability 
 among major currencies and a growth-friendly environment with financial stability in 
larger states is hold constant and independent from their actions. Consequently, the 
cause of their policy decision between followership and neutrality falls entirely on the 
cost side, where the first opinion is undoubtedly the more expensive given the value 
attached to autonomy in all actors’ utility function. At the same time, the greater 
protection form painful currency crisis given by the trend on the current account shields 
the small holder from the downsides of autonomy commonly experienced by its deficit 
counterparts.   
 Nevertheless, while this insight provides a convincing explanation for the cases of 
defection and autonomy in small countries, and significantly challenges the size-
pessimism previously inherited from open macroeconomics, it inevitably opens another 
problem as regards the numerous cases of small followers.  Indeed, in the old theoretical 
framework, based on the assumption of the equal influence of potential followers, it 
was plausible explaining followership in major holders and small holders with the same 
variables. On the contrary, if traditional variables are scarcely effective on small holders, 
the usual determinants of monetary followership must be at least complemented by a 
new approach. The strong proposal of this research is to consider the intermediation of 
major holders as both more likely and more effective than the action of monetary 
leaders, the only one taken into account so far. On the one hand, major holders are 
more likely to engage small holders in the same geographical region because of the 
domestic pressures from relevant constituencies and the public opinion, more 
concerned with intra-regional politics, and for the increased burden of policy divergence 
with neighbouring actors. On the other hand, they are also more effective for the more 
extended web of diplomatic, economic and military connections useful to exploit 
potential issue-linkages against small states. The first set of elements increases the 
benefits of coercion or inducement, the second lowers the costs and risks of such 
initiatives.  
Eventually, the detailed analysis of historical and present policy choices of the 
six member countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council confirms the testable hypotheses 
outlined in the theoretical part of the research. On the one hand, despite an equal set 
of economic and political incentives to follow the Federal Reserve and the US dollar in 
one of the most troubled periods of their history, data show clearly that the major 
 holder (Saudi Arabia) behaved in a consistently loyal way compared to small 
monarchies, which defected repeatedly the US leadership with a documented 
awareness of their size advantage. On the other hand, whenever small countries did not 
exploit their bargaining power to remain autonomous against the pressures of financial 
interdependence, data, press reports and diplomatic documents provide a clear 
evidence that the regional major holder had in fact set up an explicit or implicit set of 
incentives to make cooperation convenient, even reluctantly and temporarily, to small 
holders.  
In conclusion, the findings of this research hold a set of substantial strengths and 
some weakness, especially on the empirical side, which represent the privileged fields 
for future research on this issue. Firstly, the merit of this reflection is to shed light on 
the political mechanisms governing fundamental policy choices, such as those on money 
and exchange rates, by providing a universal tool with which assessing the monetary 
power of all non-leader states. Indeed, while theories on the influence of domestic 
factors (like party-politics interactions) or international dependencies (like the military-
monetary nexus) might not be applicable to all states, the small/middle power divide 
acts as an underlying force filtering all the traditional causes of monetary followership. 
Every country that is not a monetary leader is either a small or a middle power, and this 
factor affects the efficacy of the overall set of bargaining weapons at its disposal. This 
innovation finally provides a convincing account for a consistently large unexplained 
variance in the behaviour of small countries in the group of surplus economies. Thanks 
to its contribution to the prediction of policy choices in a wide set of markets and 
countries, the model developed here is useful for a variety of potential applications 
besides the academia, in both policy-making and private-sector activities such as cross-
border asset allocation and portfolio management.  
  Secondly, however, the findings on the small/major holder divide show some 
limitation related to the large extent of empirical evidence that has yet to be provided 
to make its theoretical predictions more robust. On the one hand, the design of the 
baseline distribution of monetary power between major and small holders, based on 
the free-riding expectations of Collective Choice Theory, is potentially testable through 
econometric techniques on a much larger panel of units than the six countries of the 
GCC. Admittedly, an ideal confirmation for this hypothesis would be made of a careful 
 combination of qualitative accounts, showing in detail the motivations and perceptions 
of actors, and a wider statistical evidence provided with a large longitudinal study. On 
the other hand, while the present case study has shown that the actual moves of the 
major holder, as well as the response of small holders, fit the theory’s predictions, a 
wider cross-regional comparison is necessary also to stress the different effect on small 
holders of regional environments characterised by the absence of a major holder or the 
presence of a major holder which is not politically interested in cultivating the ties 
between small followers and the monetary leader.  
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